Title: The 2011 Egyptian Uprising: a new chapter among Egyptians in the UK?

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

The 2011 Egyptian Uprising: a new chapter among Egyptians in the UK?

By

Rua Ghanim Al-sheikh

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

I, Rua Ghanim Al-sheikh, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

The 2011 Egyptian Revolution: a new chapter among the Egyptians in the UK?

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2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

3. Where I have cited the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as indicated on page vii.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the reactions of Egyptians living in the UK to the 2011 uprising in their home country, in terms of belonging to Egypt, Egyptian identity, political participation and media use. The Egyptian revolution was a defining moment in the history of the country and several studies have focused on the effects of the unrest on Egyptians. Further studies are required to study the impact on the Egyptians abroad. This thesis focuses on studying the effects of the revolution on Egyptians living in the UK, including first and second generations.

The study is qualitative research involving interviews and ethnographic work among Egyptians in the UK. The inclusion criteria of interviewees include Egyptians residing in the UK aged 18 and over who witnessed the 2011 uprising in Egypt or in the UK. Twenty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted, four ethnographic events were attended and data from two groups on Facebook were collected. The transcripts of the interviews, the ethnographic checklists, reports and the groups' data were thematically analysed and studied.

This study has revealed that the revolution acted as a catalyst for the sense of belonging and identity in three dimensions, namely, differences among the first and second generations, in terms of reaction to the revolution, in defining the terms homeland, sense of pride and notion of return, among other parameters. Political participation of the diaspora in response to the revolution was variable and the sense of hopefulness faded away over time to a sense of hopelessness. Offline participation, compared to online participation, was a feature expressed more among the second-generation diaspora. Media use by the diaspora was studied regarding the role of social and mainstream media as a source of information of the revolution.

The study concluded that the exertion of the effect of the revolution on the diaspora during the early years faded away over time, witnessing an unexpected deviation with respect to changing events in Egypt. The study proposes a new framework for features of the second-generation Egyptian diaspora in the UK, which covers eight different areas emphasised in this study.

Keywords: Egypt, UK, Egyptian diaspora, 2011 uprising, generations, identity, political participation

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Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

Are diaspora communities politically active, whether in the affairs of their countries of origin or their host countries? According to the study conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) entitled the '*Good Practice Guide for enhancing youth political participation',* young people including ethnic minorities in the West are not interested in politics. The guide also revealed that young people are interested in informal political activities, such as civic engagement and activism but not enrolling in formal political parties.

The aim of the guide is to realise ways to encourage young people to be politically engaged in politics and change. The Arab Spring provided a great example of how young people can make a difference when getting involved in politics (UNDP 2013). In addition, a report conducted by the House of Commons (2014) demonstrated that the percentage of Black Minority Ethnic communities (BME) in the UK that register to vote is significantly lower than that of White British people. The report highlights that the turnout of White British people on the electoral register is 85.9%, while the turnout of black groups is 76%. Moreover, the turnout of Asian groups is 83.7%, whereas the turnout of other ethnic groups is estimated to be 62.9%. These figures demonstrate how ethnic minorities are less politically active in British politics.

Indeed, the identity of diaspora groups is controversial, especially those with dual identities and belongings. The contribution of diaspora communities in both countries of origin and host countries is of scholarly interest. Consequently, this thesis focuses on the contribution of Egyptians in the UK to Egypt and its affairs regarding the 2011 uprising.

William Safran has been associated with defining diaspora and how diasporic communities are affiliated with their homeland. According to Safran (1991), one of the main features uniting diasporic groups is the image of the homeland. Diasporic communities hold strong relationships with their homeland. According to Kuşcu (2012), diasporic groups without the image of homeland in their minds, would be like any other immigrant groups; however, a strong relationship with their homeland is what makes diaspora groups unique. While diasporic communities are strongly connected to their homeland, diasporic groups would obviously be involved in historic events such as uprisings.

The focus in this thesis is on the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK and how connected they are to Egypt, particularly with 'new Egypt' after the uprising. Their sense of Egyptian identity has been challenged, particularly in relation to historic moments, such as the 2011 uprising. Scholars' studies conducted on the Egyptian Diaspora vary. The review of studies on Egyptians primarily focuses on the contribution of the Egyptian Diaspora in developing Egypt economically, for instance the study by Fawzy (2012). Fawzy (2012) contributed to a study conducted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) tackling the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK, specifically after the 2011 uprising. The main findings of Fawzy's study are the contribution of Egyptians in the UK to Egypt, after the transformation in 2011, and furthermore, how Egyptians in the UK could be beneficial to Egypt. Fawzy's study concentrates on how Egyptians in the UK could be the bridge between the UK and Egypt to exchange skills, goods and money.

Karmi (1997) also conducted a pioneer study on Egyptians in Britain, in which she examines the integration of Egyptians in British society. Moreover, Caroline Nagel (2002) tackles Arab identity among Arabs residing in the UK and how challenging it is to live in host

countries. These studies have inspired me to tackle the issue of diaspora and identity amongst Egyptians in the UK who are, according to Fawzy (2012), the most diverse diaspora community in the UK, in terms of their being highly-skilled, qualified and professional groups.

There is a historical relationship between Egypt and the UK; hence, for that reason, it is important to study Egyptians in the UK, particularly in the wake of the unrest in 2011, and how this might have affected the Egyptians' sense of identity and belonging (to Egypt and Britain). Regarding the study of diaspora groups, it is essential to explore their sense of belonging to their homeland and the UK, especially for those Egyptians who have been settled in the UK for a long time (first generation) and for those who were born in the UK (second or third generation). Reviewing previous studies conducted on Egyptians in the UK, I have identified a gap in the literature: Most studies do not cover the diasporic identity and what factors affect it. Kuşcu's (2012) study is on the political activities of Egyptian-Americans and the aftermath of the 2011 uprising; nevertheless, she did not tackle their sense of identity and belonging. However, this thesis focuses on the impact that the 2011 uprising had on belonging and identity among the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK.

A qualitative approach has been adopted for this research on Egyptians in the UK and their identity, sense of belonging and political participation in the wake of the 2011 revolt. Interviews have been conducted with Egyptians in the UK across two generations to examine the impact that the 2011 rebellion has had on these specific groups of people. An ethnographic method has also been adopted which has predominantly involved attending protests organised by Egyptian groups in the UK and taking notes on such events. Ethnography has been useful in observing the political activities of the Egyptian diaspora in

the UK in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising; a turning point in the history of Egypt, their homeland.

In terms of theoretical framework, this thesis depends on the concepts of diaspora and identity. In addition, Goffman's (1959) notion of 'performing identity' is what links both concepts. In this thesis, I apply Goffman's concept to the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK and how political activities had been employed by the Egyptian Diaspora to achieve their Egyptian identity and to display their 'Egyptianness'. In addition, I have applied Safran's (1991) diaspora features or characteristics to the Egyptian Diaspora, in the UK, including second generation Egyptians. With my academic background in Sociology, I have highlighted Social Identity Theory, combining it with media and identity concepts in a novel theoretical framework.

Research questions

This research seeks to propose answers to three main research questions. The first one concerns the effects the 2011 Egyptian revolt had on belonging and Egyptian identity. Given the fact that the 2011 Egyptian revolution was a defining moment in every aspect of the lives of Egyptians, Ghannam (2011), for instance, concentrated on social media and the uprisings, specifically in Egypt. Consequently, more focus is required on researching the impact of the Egyptian uprising on Egyptian expatriates, especially those in the UK and raises the following question:

- To what extent has the 2011 revolution in Egypt impacted on Egyptian-British communities, particularly with regards to their sense of belonging and identity?

Kuşcu (2012) highlights the significance of diaspora groups being involved in their homeland's politics; on the one hand, she argues that this was not possible for American-Egyptians during President Mubarak's era; conversely, the 2011 uprising was a turning point

for American-Egyptians – a sense of being beneficial to Egypt resumed among Egyptians in the US after the uprising (p. 136). This has proved an essential point; specifically, how important the role of diaspora groups is to the homeland, and how historic events such as the uprising have dramatically changed everything. Can we generalise findings obtained from Egyptians in the US to the Egyptian community in the UK? This is one of the questions which this study seeks to answer.

The second question focuses on the assumption that ethnic minorities in the UK are not enthusiastic about British politics. The assumption is based on the report conducted by the House of Commons (2014), which reveals that Black and Ethnic Minority[1] communities in the UK are not keen on becoming involved in politics. Based on this specific report, a further research question has been formulated as follows:

- To what extent has the participation of Egyptians in the UK in political activities been challenged, after the 2011 revolution?

The third research question focuses on media use among Egyptians in the UK. The Arab Spring is generally described as a 'social media revolution', or 'Revolution 2.0', as Ghonim (2011) defines it. Eltantawy (2011) tackled the role of social media in the Egyptian uprising. His article demonstrates how powerful the media can be, especially social media. The role of mainstream media in the uprising, however, especially among diaspora communities, has not been covered. The additional focus is on whether the 2011 revolution has had any effects on the use of social media and consumption of Arab and Western mainstream media by Egyptians in the UK. The most important point in this research question is whether Egyptians

[1] BME refers to Black and Ethnic Minorities in the UK.

in the UK have used media as a tool to express their political engagement, belonging and identity. The third research question then asks the following:

- To what extent have mainstream and social media been used as a tool to enforce a sense of identity and belonging to Egypt and political engagement?

Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter One presents the motivation behind studying Egyptians in the UK and the impact the 2011 revolution has had. The aims and objectives of the project have been presented to introduce readers to what unfolds in the subsequent chapters of the journey. Chapter Two is the background on Egyptians in the UK and the Arab uprisings, including the Egyptian revolution. Chapter Three is primarily concerned with theoretical foundations, for instance, diaspora, identity and Goffman's theory. Chapter Four focuses on studies conducted on Arabs in the UK, particularly Egyptians and supporting studies regarding the topic of this thesis. The literature review is significant because by reading what the literature has covered, a gap has been discovered in the literature. This specific gap is what has led to this study on what effects the 2011 Egyptian revolution has had on Egyptians abroad, particularly Egyptians in the UK. Chapter Five focuses on the methods used in the project and justification for using such methods. A qualitative approach has been adopted in this thesis and the main methods used are interviews and participant observation.

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight include the principal themes formulated by conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK. Chapter Six focuses on belonging to Egypt and Egyptian identity; Chapter Seven focuses on the political participation of Egyptians in the UK, including first and second generations; Chapter Eight concentrates on media use among Egyptians in

the UK; whilst Chapter Nine is the analysis of Chapters Six, Seven and Eight and links them to the theories adopted. Chapter Nine is a substantial discussion of all the themes generated in this thesis. Chapter Ten is the conclusion. The limitations of conducting this thesis have been dealt with in this chapter, as well providing suggestions for further research to enrich the literature regarding the topics covered.

Chapter Two: Background

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the background to the Egyptian community in the UK and the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the main topics of this thesis. This chapter also explains the events which motivated Egyptians to rebel, such as the Tunisian uprising in 2010. The first section deals with the Egyptian community in the UK, such as how many Egyptians reside in the UK and general information regarding the Egyptians in the UK followed by a discussion on the Arab Spring, primarily the Tunisian uprising in 2010 and the effect it had on motivating many Egyptians to start a peaceful revolution. It is important to mention the Tunisian uprising as it was taken as the role model for Egyptians to follow regarding their own revolution. The third and most important section is the Egyptian revolution, and the part it played in the Arab Spring. The chapter ends with a summary of the topics covered.

There have been many scholars, critics and journalists such as Al Aswany, who have written about the situation in Egypt and analysed what led Egyptians to the uprising in 2011. The factors leading up to the revolution may have been internal – revolting against President Mubarak's regime – and external influences from Tunisia and Syria, for example. The roles that social media played in the Arab uprisings and with respect to the Egyptian diaspora worldwide are examined. Attention is drawn to the current situation in Egypt concerning the use of social media, the arrests of activists, and political activities in Egypt and worldwide.

The Arab Spring

One of the catalysts of the Arab Spring was the death of Bouazizi, a Tunisian grocer, who set himself on fire in 2010. This incident is one of many that happened throughout Tunisia, but Bouazizi's death went viral on social media and led to the uprising in Tunisia. Bouazizi's

death was a symbol of resistance, freedom and dignity. The crucial question is why this incident raised so much attention rather than other incidents that happened prior to his horrific death (Lim 2013, p. 921). Lim argues that some people refer to the uprisings in the Arab world, principally in Tunisia and Egypt, as 'social media revolutions'. Other scholars such as York (2011) claim that they were people's revolutions, and the revolutions would have happened with or without the help of social media. The one strength associated with Lim's argument is that social media revolutions and people's revolutions are not detached from each other. Lim adds that the media had successfully been used in uprisings for a long time prior to 2011 (p. 922), and social media was one of many media tools used in the uprisings. Calling the uprisings social media revolutions is unfair to other types of media used in the uprisings. This can be applied to Tunisia and Egypt as, at the time of the revolts, the youth did use social media to spread the word and organise protests. However, other types of media, such as satellite channels and mobile phones also played a role in mobilising and organising protests in Tunisia (p. 922). Having said that, this is not to deny that social media played a role in the uprising, but it was not the reason, or the only tool used in the uprisings, as Lim maintains.

Lim explains in his article framing Bouazizi, how the death of Bouazizi was not just the death of an ordinary man but was about the narratives behind this death. For instance, how people reacted to this death and how they framed the story of Bouazizi's death is the most significant element in the uprising (p. 926). According to Sidney Tarrow, a social movement scholar, violent emotions can be triggered by violent deaths. People could express that at the funeral and the images could subsequently be forgotten. Therefore, such deaths need to be framed within, or linked to, something bigger, beyond death itself (p. 926). Additionally, there are some facts regarding Bouazizi's death that need expanding upon to link Tarrow's

definition of the emotions concerning death. The immolation of Bouazizi was recorded and then distributed online (p. 926). This made the case of Bouazizi's death unique, and people around the world became aware of it. Thanks to the Internet and social media, people had the chance to watch the incident and witness what had happened to Bouazizi. According to one of Bouazizi's cousins: 'Images are like weapons – they can topple a regime' (p. 926). Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian activist, shares this position as, once he had seen the picture of Khalid Said, the Egyptian man who was beaten to death by the Egyptian police, Ghonim decided to create his famous page on *Facebook*: 'We are all Khalid Said', which attracted thousands of Egyptian supporters (Ghonim 2012, p. 58). This proves the importance of images and how influential they can be in the case of repressed countries.

Simon Cottle (2011) explains how social media in the Arab Spring played a role in making people aware of the Arab world and what was happening in Egypt, for instance, by broadcasting images and videos of the peaceful protests in Tahrir Square (p. 648). Cottle supports Lim's argument about the media playing a crucial role in the uprisings. It is not strictly accurate to call the Arab uprisings solely social media revolutions, as other types of media, such as mobile phones and satellite channels also played an essential role. Cottle tries to present the current situation in the Arab world in his article. What Cottle fails to consider is (i) what the Arab uprisings might bring to the Arab world; and (ii) the article is descriptive without a deep analysis of events currently happening and what might happen in the Arab world. Cottle deals with Western media coverage of the Arab uprisings and terms it 'blind Western media' (p. 650). Cottle fails to acknowledge the magnitude of the Western media's coverage and how the Western media could have played a significant role in shaping the future of the uprisings.

The relationship between mainstream media and social media is crucial (p. 652); for instance, during the Arab uprisings, mainstream media, mainly Arab such as *Al-Jazeera*, broadcast videos originally published on *YouTube*; this shows how powerful social media are. One question that might need to be asked is whether material published on social media is accurate or not. The credibility of material published on social media is questionable. For instance, some videos or images on social media can be fabricated using software such as Photoshop. Cottle fails to tackle this issue of credibility of material published on social media but does mention how mainstream media depends on social media, even though anyone can publish whatever he or she likes on social media such as *YouTube*, *Facebook* or *Twitter*, the accuracy may be questionable.

Authorities in Arab countries have attempted their best to control and censor the flow of information through social media. Mainstream media can, to some extent, be controlled by the authorities, as satellite channels, especially State-owned, are controlled by the State; whereas social media such as *YouTube*, *Facebook* and *Twitter*, on the other hand, cannot be censored by the State, as they are controlled by ordinary people. Governments such as the Egyptian one, shut down the Internet, as a result, to prevent people from joining and organising protests (Cottle 2011, p. 652). Cottle (2011) thus argues that this has not banned people from protesting but has led to people finding a way to join their fellow protesters. The authorities also limited coverage by foreign journalists to prevent the world from seeing or hearing about what was happening in places like Egypt. This point contradicts what Cottle says regarding the role of Western media being 'blind' and not that effective. It is the opposite, in fact, as Western media coverage of the uprisings has been crucial in terms of making the voice of Arab people heard worldwide. For instance, Kuşcu (2012, p. 121) argues that the Egyptian-American diaspora has played a significant role in informing people

worldwide about what is going on in Egypt and demanding that the US government should support Egyptians in Egypt by using social media and mainstream media. This shows the powerful role diaspora groups and the mainstream media can play.

Cottle (2011, p. 654) also tackles the issues that uprisings in the Arab world have been contagious. In this sense, this is true, and can be applied to the Tunisian uprising which in turn led to the Egyptian uprising. The sharing of the symbol of 'self-immolation' in Tunisia and the murder of Khalid Said in Egypt helped to spread the Arab Spring. Consequently, the symbolism of 'martyrs' was shared among Tunisians and Egyptians and thus, motivated them to revolt. Furthermore, there were specific tragic incidents which prompted citizens to revolt in Tunisia and Egypt. Those incidents were the self-immolation of a young Tunisian vendor, Bouazizi, and the brutal killing of Khaled Said by the Egyptian police in 2010. It is worth mentioning that Bouazizi was not the first to set himself on fire, and in fact, just a few months before Bouazizi, another young Tunisian immolated himself. The difference between Bouazizi and the other Tunisian is that the incident was not filmed nor broadcast on *Facebook* (Rane et al. 2012, p. 97). The role of the media is thus essential, especially social media. According to Rane et al., the Arab world had witnessed uprisings across Arab countries in 2011, starting with Tunisia and spreading to many other countries such as Egypt, Yemen and Syria (p. 98).

According to Rane et al. (2012, p. 99), the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, for example, were leaderless; they were steered by ordinary people, especially the youth, the unemployed, and those who were suffering from high food prices and corruption. The main demands made by protesters were with respect to freedom, dignity and democracy, which were the key reasons for the uprisings. Rane et al. (2012) claim that the Arab uprisings were a response to the local conditions which people wanted to change (p. 98); they wanted democracy that had

been diffusing from developed countries to developing countries. The violation of human rights in many Arab countries has attracted support from the West through the revolutions (Rane et al. 2012, p. 100). Rane et al. (2012) also state that although the uprisings were leaderless, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political opposition parties, human rights groups and unions led successful revolts by organising the protesters and providing instructions (p. 100). Human rights groups and NGOs have been helpful in terms of lobbying support worldwide, especially from Western governments. Rane et al. (2012) claim that there are common elements that united the Arab uprisings, such as poverty. Populations had been oppressed by Arab regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and many other Arab countries (p. 100). Additionally, numerous people from countries witnessing the uprisings in various countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been humiliated and tortured by police forces, and many have been imprisoned without fair trials. The most common elements among countries that have witnessed uprisings have been the high rate of unemployment and poverty.

Rane et al. (2012, p. 101) assert that Egyptians were inspired by what happened in Tunisia, and how the Tunisians were successful in forcing President bin Ali to step down. This is part of what Rane et al. (2012) tackle in terms of diffusion theory: how actions in one country in the MENA region were diffused and inspired other nations to revolt. Social media was helpful in terms of Tunisians giving instructions to Egyptians on what reaction to expect from the authorities, according to what they had already experienced. It is worth noting that having geographical locations for every revolution, for instance, Tahrir Square, were significant, not only for gathering protesters in a certain place, but also for distributing videos and news from and to mainstream media. Tunisian and Egyptian regimes blocking the Internet connection did not prevent the activists from using text messages, phone calls and

social media (Rane et al. 2012); protesters found other ways to communicate by using social media and teaching fellow citizens how to use it (p. 101).

The 2011 Egyptian uprising

'A year that shook a region and the world: how it happened and what it means', writes Toby Manhire (2012, p. 10). Manhire describes the Arab Spring as a storm that unnerved the Arab region. He goes on to describe the Arab Spring as contagious, given the fact that it started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Yemen, Syria and many other Arab countries. Egypt had been living in fear for generations. Emergency law had been in force from 1967 until mid-2011 and gave the right to Egyptian authorities to arrest any Egyptian and jail him or her for up to six months (Ghonim 2012, p. 2).

Egyptian activists risked being easily arrested; Wael Ghonim was one of these activists who had been arrested for his online activities. Ghonim is famous for creating the *Facebook* page, 'We are all Khalid Said', the young Egyptian who was arrested and tortured to death by the Egyptian police in 2010 for no apparent reason (Ghonim 2012, p. 2). His *Facebook* page attracted millions of followers in only a few months. Ghonim (2012) in his book, *Revolution 2.0: The power of the people is greater than the people in power: A memoir,* expresses how he expected that he would not be returned to his family, after the Egyptian police had called him in for investigation, or, according to Ghonim, a 'chat', in late 2010. Ghonim did not inform his family that he had been called in by the police, to save them from worrying. Ghonim did inform his friend, however, in case he 'disappeared' (Ghonim 2012, p. 4). Ghonim was correct; he was one of many Egyptians who had been arrested and subsequently disappeared, and whilst many more were most probably killed by the Egyptian police.

Egypt has gone through three main historical phases: Egypt before 2011, Egypt during 2011, and present-day Egypt after 2013. Experts argue whether Egypt is on the right development pathway. For instance, according to Critchlow (2015), Egypt at present is going through massive investment such as the new expansion of the Suez Canal under President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi. Moreover, the Egyptian investment minister stated that Egypt is currently regaining the trust of investors which was almost lost, after the instability caused by the Arab Spring (Critchlow 2015). Many investors were invited to attend a major conference in March 2015 in Sharm El-Sheikh, to discuss gas, electricity, agriculture and tourism in Egypt. These conferences raised many issues relating to Egypt and may help to find solutions for the problems Egypt is going through (Critchlow 2015).

The relationship between Christians (Copts) and Muslims in Egypt has been strained. There has been tension between these two religious groups for many years; however, the tension increased after the 2011 uprising. Kalin (2015) argues that the situation deteriorated in 2012, when Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the presidential election and became the Egyptian president. When El-Sisi pronounced that the military was taking over the role of governing Egypt in 2013, thus ending the Muslim Brotherhood's one-year tenure, Egyptian Copts were relieved. The mission of President El-Sisi was to heal divisions in Egyptian society and give hope to Copts for equality (Kalin 2015). When El-Sisi's forces killed thousands of former President Morsi's supporters allegedly objecting to the coup, the attacks on Copts increased. El-Sisi, considered to be moderate, endeavoured to win the trust of Egyptians again, by defending the rights of the Copts (Kalin 2015).

Khalil (2013) reviewed the police in Egypt in 2013, two years after the beginning of the 2011 revolution, and how it affected the police academy in Egypt. Khalil (2013) claims that

the police in Egypt lost respect after the revolution, given the fact that revolution started on the 25th of January, the Egyptian police's national day. The Egyptians began to disbelieve the police regarding human rights and the Egyptian police were accused of human rights violations, one of the main reasons that Egyptians revolted against the Egyptian regime. Since then, the police claim that human rights have been modified and that Egyptians once again trust the police.

Khalil (2013) argues that Egyptian streets in 2013 were lawless and the police had no control. When Egyptians were asked for the reasons, they claimed that the nation was being punished for what happened during the 2011 revolution. According to Khalil (2013), chaos such as car thefts, robbery and kidnapping was common on the Egyptian streets. Egyptians in 2013 were still complaining about the brutality of the Egyptian police, and the 2011 revolution did not change much in relation to the police's behaviour. Egyptian police officers believe that the media had played a key role in overplaying their negative image. Khalil (2013) interviewed an Egyptian policeman, who states, 'the media exaggerated some incidents'. The policeman admitted that mistakes had been made by some policemen; however, this did not mean that everyone in the police was bad. The policeman added, 'the media keeps showing the one negative incident and this will make the police's situation look bad to Egyptian citizens'. There are several policemen who believe the same about the media's exaggerated reporting, whether it is social or mainstream media, especially nowadays, as everyone can upload any videos on *YouTube* or *Facebook* and the truth cannot be verified (Khalil 2013).

Al Aswany (2011, p. 11) claims that Egyptians have lost faith in the Egyptian elections and decided to boycott them. According to Al Aswany, the Egyptian government did not offer any guarantees that the elections would be fair; in addition, decisions were not made to

discontinue with emergency law which had been effective in Egypt for almost thirty years – since 1981 when President Saddat was assassinated. Al Aswany (2011) believes that the decision taken by Egyptians to boycott elections was not a sign of passivity, as the Egyptian authorities claimed but in fact it was a conscious decision (p. 15). Al Aswany maintains that it was the right decision to make, because electoral fraud existed, and the Egyptian government was not trying to prevent it. Therefore, the boycott was the correct right decision. Al Aswany also suggests that the Egyptians choice to boycott the elections was made to demonstrate to the world that the government does not represent all Egyptians (p. 15).

Egyptians are not passive, and are ready to participate in fair elections, not ones that are rigged. For instance, Al Aswany (2011, p. 15) demonstrates how Egyptians were keen to vote in sports club elections but had lost hope in ever having fair presidential or parliamentary elections. Even if Egyptians decide to take part in elections, genuine parties would not have an effective voice, as most parties would be representing the government. Al Aswany (2011) has tackled the 'moment of awakening' for Egyptians, as he called it in his book. This moment was when the politician Mohamed El-Baradei returned to Egypt in early 2010.

According to Al Aswany (2011), many Egyptians went to the airport to greet El-Baradei. Al Aswany adds that he did not expect Egyptians to be at the airport to welcome El-Baradei with the fear of possible torture, arrest and abuse by Egyptian police hanging over them (p. 16). According to Al Aswany (2011, p. 16), this moment was historic for Egyptians: it was the breaking point for Egyptians who had decided to no longer fear the Egyptian police. This moment also proved that the Egyptians were not passive and believed in a better life. The Egyptian people believed in El-Baradei, who had fought President Mubarak's regime for years and placed their faith in him to return the rights they had lost (Al Aswany 2011, p. 130). Those

Egyptians, Al Aswany (2011, p. 118) claims, were ordinary Egyptians – teachers, workers or students, and not politicians or members of any party – regardless of their religion, faith or gender. Muslims and Copts were united as Egyptians, who agreed on one thing: Egypt needed change to restore freedom, justice, dignity and human rights to all.

Al Aswany (2011, p. 136) states that young Egyptians had started organising *Facebook* pages and campaigns to support change in Egypt ever since El-Baradei's return to Egypt in late 2010 (p. 20). Young Egyptians began to feel empowered to make the necessary changes and gained back the hope they had lost many years ago. The youth prepared everything for the historic reception of their hero – El-Baradei. Young Egyptians were responsible for distributing instructions to those who wished to join the welcome party, such as airport maps, and how to reach the airport by car or public transport. The young Egyptians even prepared an emergency strategy in case the police interfered and destroyed their plans (Al Aswany 2011, p. 137).

Al Aswany (2011, p. 140) describes how underprivileged Egyptians suffered from poor care, especially regarding public hospitals during President Mubarak's regime (p. 145). He adds that the minister of heath was not only responsible for poor public health services, especially for poor Egyptians, but that President Mubarak was directly responsible. According to Al Aswany (2011, p. 142), it was Mubarak's obligation as the Egyptians had not elected him to represent them. President Mubarak was sure that he could punish any Egyptian who opposed him, without mercy or consideration, as the Egyptians were not able to resist his rule (p. 145). As a result, this attitude generated a sense that all Egyptians, including ministers, should please and serve the president, rather than the Egyptian people. Al Aswany continues to explain how the Egyptian police adopted the ideology of beating and torturing State

security detainees, and how they deserved this punishment. The State also believed that the Islamic religion orders them to treat Egyptians that way, according to Shari'a law; consequently, torturing Egyptians had become the norm, according to police officials; in Al Aswany's opinion, this was one of the factors which led the Egyptians to rebel (2011, p. 146).

Al Aswany had read about the situation in Egypt since 2009 and was convinced that a revolution was going to break out because of the inequality and injustice the Egyptians were experiencing. His prediction was correct, and the Egyptians revolted against President Mubarak's regime in 2011. Al Aswany (2011, p. 147) adds that Egyptian authorities were not only fighting the rebels, but they were also fighting against capable Egyptians. These citizens had limited options: the first being to immigrate to a democratic country, to freely express their opinions and demonstrate their abilities. Secondly, skilled Egyptians may prefer to stay in Egypt and raise their voices, but the circumstances would be difficult, as torture and imprisonment would be waiting for such people.

The example that Al Aswany provides to show how capable Egyptians were being fought by the Egyptian authorities is Ibrahim Eissa, an Egyptian journalist who had opposed Hosni Mubarak's regime, for years. Al Aswany (2011, p. 147) adds that Eissa was one of the most talented Egyptian journalists and directed his blame for Egypt's suffering on the head of the Egyptian regime, President Mubarak. This led the Egyptian regime to fight Eissa, and to stop him encouraging the youth to revolt and change the situation in Egypt. Moreover, Eissa was against the notion of transferring power from father to son, as Hosni Mubarak intended to do, by appointing Jamal Mubarak, his son, to the presidency (Al Aswany 2011, p. 148). The Egyptian regime sought to silence Eissa on many occasions; he was once accused of questioning the health of President Mubarak, which was a taboo: Mubarak's health should

never be mentioned, according to Al Aswany (2011). Al Aswany concludes his book with this statement: 'Egypt has risen, and no one, whoever he may be, can stand between Egypt and the future'. Al Aswany sees that in 2010 and asserts that 'democracy is the solution' and on its way in Egypt (p. 138).

Eltantawy et al. (2011) explain that the Egyptian revolution only lasted 18 days – it is known as 'the 18-day revolution'. Egyptian cities were filled with millions of protestors demanding President Mubarak's resignation; he had ruled Egypt for almost 30 years (since 1981) and it was time for him to go. Eltantawy et al. (2011) also state that the reason that Egyptians revolted was not only Mubarak's long period in power, but there were many other factors: the presidential and parliamentary elections lacked transparency; the corrupt Egyptian authorities; lack of political freedom; inequality and poverty; injustice and limited freedom of speech; and the state of emergency.

Egypt had been under the state of emergency law since 1967. The law allowed the government to arrest citizens and put them into prison for no good reason. It gave the government the right to quash any protests organised by the Egyptians, who obviously opposed it. Finally, this state of emergency law had censored the media since 1967 (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1207). Moreover, emergency law in Egypt violated its citizens' human rights, according to the 2008 United Nations Development Programme's annual report; nonetheless, it was extended many times until 2011. In addition, President Mubarak drafted 34 constitutional amendments in 2007, including revoking the judicial supervision of parliamentary elections and restricting those who would like to run for presidential elections (Eltantawy et al. 2011, 1208). This intimidating and repressive emergency law was one of the principal reasons for Egyptian protests and the consequent demand for President Mubarak

to quit, but there were also other reasons. The law resulted in poor Egyptians facing more difficulties in meeting their basic needs (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1208). The final key reason for the Egyptian revolution was the fact that President Mubarak was preparing his son, Jamal, to succeed him as president; this was a legitimate move, as Jamal Mubarak was a member of the National Party (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1208). The restrictions imposed by this never-ending emergency law and the amendments to the constitution resulted in a frustrated Egyptian population who wanted to see change.

Eltantawy et al. (2011) argue that El-baradei, winner of the Nobel peace prize in 2005, and chief of the United Nations' international Atomic Energy Agency, gained popularity among the Egyptians, and thus, became one of the major leaders of the 2011 revolution (p. 1209) El-baradei started to reach young Egyptians. He was able to motivate them to keep demanding political change for Egypt and to show them how it was possible. El-baradei soon became an enemy of the Egyptian regime because of his opposition to the regime and encouraging the youth to demand changes to the current situation in Egypt (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1210).

Moreover, in February 2010, El-baradei and a group of politicians and intellectuals formed the National Association for Change. This association gained popularity in Egypt – the Egyptians hoped that it would help to bring about the changes they desired (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1210). What led to the success of the uprisings was overcoming the fear of the police and the security forces. People felt inspired by the large numbers of protesters in the streets sharing the same demands for freedom, democracy and dignity, for all. Social media helped to diffuse the news about brutal killings of innocent people, for example. As a result, governments blocked the Internet to prevent people from being informed of what was happening in the country. This did not prevent alternative action. For instance, in Egypt, many

young Egyptians joined fellow Egyptians in Tahrir Square to personally witness the events happening there, rather than checking online forums and *Facebook*.

Eltantawy et al. (2011, p. 1211) stresses the importance of Tahrir Square situated in the heart of Cairo. The central location of Tahrir Square, close to a metro station, was one of the principal reasons for the success of the Egyptian revolution. The location of Tahrir Square was one of the major destinations for protestors to unite. Tahrir Square not only attracted millions of Egyptians to gather there, they also found it easy to join the protestors and share their grievances with Western and Arab media reporters. Mubarak's thugs attacked these media reporters, though they managed to set up cameras in buildings surrounding Tahrir Square to witness the activities and report the truth. Eltantawy et al. (2011) go on to reveal that one of the main factors which led Egyptians to revolt was the brutal death of Khalid Said in June 2010. Reporters and bloggers claim that police officers demanded money from Said, and when he refused because he did not have any, they started beating him until he died (Eltantawy et al. 2011, p. 1211).

Cyber-activism in the Arab world

Cyber-activism[2] in Egypt started in 2004, according to Khondker (2011, p. 676); since when, it began to spread across the Arab world. Khondker fails, however, to acknowledge which Arab countries have been involved in cyber-activism. The focus was predominantly on Egypt, although his article also focuses on the role of social media during the Arab Spring and includes all the Arab countries that experienced the uprisings, not specifically Egypt. This is a limitation that is associated with Khondker's study, as many Arab countries, including Egypt,

[2] Cyber activism in Egypt includes blogging, *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube* (Azer 2013). Azer proved that cyber activism is considered a new social movement in Egypt which led to change in Egypt.

have been affected by the 'cyber-activism invasion'. Khondker criticises Wael Ghonim's exaggeration when Ghonim was interviewed by CNN, on how the freedom of any nation depends on the Internet, and how the Internet can empower people and bring freedom. Khondker may be correct regarding the exaggeration of Ghonim's statement; however, it would have been more beneficial to look at the reasons why Ghonim made that statement: how the Internet can be effective in countries such as Egypt. Therefore, Ghonim's statement can be justified in terms of looking at how the Internet was successful in the Egyptian revolution. Khondker argues that some scholars consider the Internet to be a tool for democracy, while others believe the Internet can threaten freedom and privacy (p. 676). Khondker continues to explain how in Tunisia the immolation of Bouazizi became a public issue, thanks to the Internet and some mainstream media, such as *Al-Jazeera*. Consequently, the Internet can be an effective tool for democracy but has its limitations and requires support from other sources.

According to a report conducted by the Sixth Annual E-marketing Insights conference, 62% of respondents revealed that the Internet in Egypt, primarily social media like *Facebook*, has enhanced their social activity and their learning opportunities (Daily News Egypt 2016). The report adds that Egyptians mostly use the Internet to access social media, check emails, play games, follow events and news and additionally, for online shopping. Moreover, Egypt ranks 13th among countries that use *Facebook* the most, with 28 million users. During the Arab Spring, the number of Egyptians using *Facebook* increased according to the report. As a background to the use of the Internet in Egypt, it was estimated by Internet World Stats (2012) that there were 29,809,724 users in 2012. Moreover, Internet use in Egypt increased dramatically from 450,000 users in 2000 to 29,809,724 users in 2012. A huge difference in

just 12 years. The number rose dramatically between 2009 and 2012, especially since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010 (Internet World Stats 2012), as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Internet Usage and Population Growth in Egypt (source: Internet World Stats 2012)

YEAR	Users	Population	% Pen.
2000	450,000	66,303,000	0.7 %
2006	5,100,000	71,236,631	7.0 %
2008	10,532,400	81,713,517	12.9 %
2009	12,568,900	78,866,635	15.9 %
2012	29,809,724	83,688,164	35.6 %

An Egyptian activist concluded the role of social media as follows, 'We use *Facebook* to schedule the protests, *Twitter* to coordinate, and *YouTube* to tell the story to the world (Khondker, p. 677). This quotation sums up how social media was effectively used in the Arab world during the uprisings. Having said that, Khondker also states that although social media played a significant role in the uprisings, mainstream media helped to present the uprisings to the global community, which probably depended on mainstream media rather than social media. Khondker's argument is valid in terms of paying attention to social media, nevertheless, he ignores the role of mainstream media.

Rane et al. (2012) demonstrate how social media has enabled people to function as 'journalists', by conveying messages to mainstream media, and social media forums which they owned. There were some incidents that were not covered in the mainstream media; hence, an alternative method was found by 'citizen journalists', as Rane et al. (2012, p. 98) named them, as the conveyors of news items to social media and mainstream media audiences. According to Tufekci et al. (2012, p. 363), the penetration of *Facebook* in Arabic countries in 2009 made it easier for activists and ordinary people to follow political unrest in Egypt. *Facebook* has become incredibly popular among Egyptians to the extent that many

protesters first heard about the protests via *Facebook.* Egyptians used *Facebook* a great deal for distributing videos and photos of protests in Tahrir Square (Tufekci et al. 2012, p. 364).

It is worth mentioning that social media has empowered people to take control of their lives. A good example of the powerful role of social media is what happened in Egypt during 2011 uprising. Egyptians inside and outside Egypt have become more connected thanks to social media. Many studies have dealt with the impact of the 2011 revolution on Egyptians inside Egypt despite the effective role of social media on Egyptians inside and outside Egypt. In addition, social media websites have not only had an impact on the use of Internet among Egyptians, but social media have also affected the identity and sense of belonging to Egypt among Egyptians residing in the country. Consequently, this has led to this study being conducted on the effect of the 2011 uprising on Egyptians in the UK.

The Egyptian community in the UK

This section presents a historical background related to Egyptians in the UK. According to Sameh Fawzy (2012), the number of Egyptians in the UK is inaccurate. Egyptians in the UK seem to be disorganised for many reasons. The first reason is that Egyptians in the UK are polarised and cannot be unified and agreed on one aim. For instance, El-Shafey (2000) has written about how polarised Egyptians in the UK are in meetings of members of the Egyptian community and how the British police intervened to end a clash that took place in London between members. El-Shafey (2000) adds how members of the Egyptian community were fighting with each other to the extent of beating up other members due to different points of view. The second point is that Coptic-Christian Egyptians in the UK tend to organise themselves apart from Muslims. Though there is a long history of the presence of Coptic-

Christians in the UK since 1954, they organise themselves as a separate component from Egyptians in the UK (Coptic Orthodox Church, UK 2015).

Moreover, the other factor contributing to the disorganisation is the sense of suspicion that Egyptians have of any strangers. Egyptians are extremely suspicious of strangers and fear that activities might be secretly planned by the Egyptian intelligence, as I sensed as a researcher from the reactions of potential participants. Having said that, there were individual initiatives launched to unionise Egyptians in the UK. For instance, there was an attempt to form a union for Egyptians in the UK led by a surgeon, Hany Shouaib, who is still interviewed in Egyptian media as the 'leader' of Egyptians in the UK. The union failed to hold regular general assembly meetings; in fact, the London-based *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* newspaper ran a short piece poking fun at that union when their members physically attacked one another at a meeting. The newspaper also claimed that the Egyptians were the worst community to form unions and associations (El-Shafey 2000).

Groups such as the Association of Egyptians in London fail to maintain an official website gathering Egyptians in the UK. This shows how fragmented Egyptians in the UK are. You can find individual websites of Egyptians in the UK or pages on social media such as Facebook; however, Egyptians in the UK still lack a group or association which unites Egyptians in the UK. The page for the Association of Egyptians in London had attracted 1,906 likes although it was not that active, when I examined it back in 2014.

To find valuable information about Egyptians in the UK, I contacted several associations and groups claiming to represent Egyptians in the UK. The groups I contacted were the Egyptian Union in Europe, the Egyptian Union in the UK, the Egyptian Community Association in UK, the Egyptian Arab British Cultural Forum Association, the Anglo-Egyptian Society

Association and finally, the British Egyptian Society. Some groups' websites such as the Egyptian Community Association in the UK are unavailable to view and gather information. Below is the sample of the email sent to groups acquiring information regarding Egyptians in the UK.


Egyptians in the UK

Rua Al-Sheikh <rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk> 16:40 (28 minutes ago)

to egyptiancommun.

Dear Mr. El Alfy ,

My name is Rua Alsheikh, PhD student in media studies at University of Bedfordshire, my PhD thesis is on effects of 2011 Egyptian revolution on Egyptians in the UK in terms of belonging, political participation, Egyptian identity and media use, I am writing to you to kindly ask you if you could provide me with any information about the Egyptian community in the UK in terms of number and any other useful information if available,

Many thanks and looking forward to hearing from you

Best regards

Figure 1 Email enquiry sent to Egyptian groups

The number of Egyptians in the UK was estimated to be 250,000, whilst the total Egyptians outside Egypt was 6,500,000, according to 2008 statistics (cited in Fawzy 2012). Moreover, communication with the Egyptian embassy is limited; consequently, the number of Egyptians in the UK cannot be verified. Fawzy adds that Egyptians in the UK are mainly concentrated in different areas of London, depending on the financial situation of the individual, and other cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Brighton, with others living in Wales and Scotland (p. 47). Most Egyptians in the UK are Muslims, with a minority of Christian Copts.

Egyptian Copts in the UK participated in the 2011 uprising by organising protests. Copts have organised protests and showed their solidarity with fellow Egyptians in Egypt, especially after the terroristic attacks in 2011 on the Egyptian Coptic Church (El-Kedesseen) in Cairo. Fawzy adds that the tension between Muslims and Christians in Egypt declined after the 25th of January 2011 revolution, especially as Egyptians shared the same demands and felt they were 'one family', as expressed by Al Aswany (2011, p. 20). To obtain an accurate number of the number of Egyptians in the UK, the researcher contacted the UK Census Centre. The

contact was in March 2015. Below is a screenshot of the email that was sent. The reply from the census services shows that number of Egyptians in the UK is inaccurate due to the fact place of birth is not an indication of the number of Egyptians in the UK.



Egyptians in the UK

Rua Al-Sheikh <rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk> 10/03/2015
to census.custome.

Dear sir/madam,

My name is Rua Al-sheikh, PhD researcher at University of Bedfordshire.. My thesis is on the 2011 Egyptian revolution and Egyptians in the UK.. I wonder if you could send me the Excel table showing how many Egyptians who live in the UK (or born of Egyptian parents, if this is recorded) ..

Many thanks and looking forward to hearing from you

Best regards,
Rua

Re: 089/03/15/ED/DB Egyptians in the UK Inbox x

Census CustomerServices <Census.CustomerServices@ons.gsi.gov.uk> 13/03/2015
to me

Dear Rua,

Thank you for your email.

Nationality is not available from the Census but country of birth is.

Please find attached an extract from Census 2011 table QS213EW - Country of Birth (Egypt) for England and Wales.

Please note: country of birth is not always an indicator of someone's nationality.

Country of birth of parents would not be available from the Census as we would not be able to link parents to children that were not at the same address.

Census Customer Service can provide statistical information for England and Wales. Northern Ireland and Scotland conduct their own censuses and statistics can be obtained from them:

NATIONAL RECORDS OF SCOTLAND
Tel: 0131 314 4308/4582
Email: customer@gro-scotland.gsi.gov.uk
Website: http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/

NORTHERN IRELAND STATISTICS & RESEARCH AGENCY
Tel: 028 9034 8160

Figure 2 Email enquiry regarding the number of Egyptians in UK

Summary

This chapter has presented some vital information relating to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 – one of the most important uprisings in the Arab world. It was not only linked to previous Arab uprisings, primarily the Tunisian one, but has also shown the similarities and

differences between them. This chapter has also revealed how important the Egyptian uprising has been to all Egyptians, both in Egypt and abroad. After reviewing studies concerning social media among the Egyptian diaspora worldwide, theoretical considerations should be drawn based on the relationship between diaspora groups, identity and social media. Having a background to Egypt, the Egyptian diaspora, identity and social media leads smoothly to constructing a theoretical framework extracted from theories of diaspora and identity in the following chapter, Theoretical Considerations.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Considerations

Introduction

This chapter addresses the theories adopted in this research. The approaches I adopt are multi-disciplinary. Studying sociology, cultural and media studies previously has encouraged me to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, which incorporates theories of sociology, political science and cultural studies. The chapter has been divided into sections discussing the main concepts pertaining to the diaspora, including the principal features of diaspora groups suggested by William Safran.

I have consulted theories related to sociology, political science and media studies. For that reason, I categorise theories into three groups. The first group is the school of sociology represented by William Safran and Robin Cohen. The second theoretical group is also based on social sociology and focuses on identity represented by Erving Goffman and his concept of 'performing identity'. Moreover, part of this sociological concept is social identity theory spearheaded by Abrams and Hogg (1990) and Tajfel (1972). The third theoretical perspective is from media studies reported in Faiza Hirji, Nikos Papastergiadis and Roza Tsagarousianou. This group of media theorists have principally focused on the connection of the media to diaspora groups. Other schools such as political science, history and cultural studies have been consulted in some sections to gain an idea of how other theories might deal with the concept of diaspora and identity. However, the focus has been on diaspora and identity, particularly social identity theory and diaspora, to draw a picture of how such groups interact and deal with the concept of diaspora, homeland and country of origin vs. host country.

Thus, the theoretical framework is anchored in sociology, with focus on diaspora groups and the relationship between diaspora groups and their host country versus country of origin.

I have chosen to operationalise and highlight the concepts introduced by Goffman and Safran, namely how identity could be performed as suggested by Goffman, and how this 'identity performance' can be applied to diaspora as theorised by Safran and Cohen. Although Cohen and Safran, among other sociologists, have dealt with the historical background of diaspora with the Jewish example of such diaspora groups, there is need to test those concepts on other diaspora groups. In this thesis, I apply Safran's model to study the Egyptian diaspora in the UK, whilst integrating Goffman's concept of performing identity, as explained below.

The main theoretical foundation then rests on diaspora theories, and this chapter discusses how such concepts can be applied to the case study of Egyptians in the UK. The discussion of the main features of diaspora leads to an examination of identity and belonging to diaspora groups. This allows further discussions on how diaspora communities deal with their identity and belonging to their homeland or host countries. The second section of this chapter deals with the term 'identity' in social identity theory, collective identities and its relationship to constructing identities. Presenting theories regarding the construction of identities allows more understanding of how they are constructed; in addition, it can be linked to diasporic identities and how diasporic communities adopt multiple identities and a sense of belonging. The link between identity and diaspora is what Goffman terms 'performing identity'. The platform used by diasporic groups to perform their identity is political activities, which will be discussed in the following section.

The next section of this chapter tackles the issue of how significant moments in any nation's history can have an impact on its citizens; in the case of Egyptians, it is the Egyptian uprising in 2011. How diasporic groups react to such historic moments is significant, as a nation may not witness such historic moments for centuries. Studying the impact of historic

moments on diaspora communities such as a revolution, sheds new light on our understanding of the relationship between diaspora communities and their homeland.

Diaspora

Sheffer (2003) claims that the term 'diaspora' had always been associated with Jews and their dispersion, throughout history. Cohen (1997) also associates the term diaspora with the Jewish case, though Safran (1991) includes the diaspora in other nations to be called 'diaspora groups' (cited in Brubaker 2005). The main features are the following: (i) a dispersion of people from a country of origin to multiple host countries, either by force or voluntarily; (ii) how diaspora groups always preserve a memory of their homeland, even though it may be a mythical one; (iii) the overwhelming notion of not being fully accepted in host countries. The sense of adaptation to host countries is not an easy task, and, even if they do manage to adapt, the host country may not completely accept them in their society; (v) how strong the notion of return to one's homeland is among diaspora groups. This consequently creates the sense of impermanence in host countries; (vi) there is a belief among diaspora groups that they are committed to the maintenance of the notion of homeland by any means; and (vii) the sense of duty that diaspora groups should sustain links with their home country, no matter what the political, economic and social conditions are.

Sheffer (2003, p. 5) and Cohen (1999, p. 15) have associated the term diaspora with the Jewish example and consider it the classic example of diaspora; even in Cambridge dictionary, the term is defined as 'the dispersion of Jews to different countries around the world'. However, the term has been redefined to include all dispersed people from their homeland. The new definition is 'the situation of people living outside their traditional homeland' (Sheffer 2003, p. 9). According to Sheffer (2003, p. 7), the term 'diaspora' has been defined in

ethno-nationalist terms. Ethno-national groups are groups which are politically and socially formed and share the same ethnic background, such as a shared language and heritage and a shared experience in residing in different host countries because of forced or voluntary migration.

According to Clifford (1994), diaspora has always been associated with emigration. A group can be called 'diasporic' or a diaspora group, even though it may never have previously migrated. Those groups are the offspring of diaspora groups (p. 14). Does diaspora mean settlement rather than immigration? This question is important in the case of the offspring of diaspora groups, who are born and raised in the host country. They occasionally still do not feel that they belong to this country, however, like other offspring, because of their background (p. 14). Belonging to a specific country can be difficult in the case of diaspora, especially when they cannot decide to which country they belong. The meaning of diaspora is deeper: should multinational immigrants be called 'a diaspora' or merely an 'immigrant'? For instance, an Egyptian-British person cannot be only called 'Egyptian' or only 'British' because he or she lives in a country but keeps ties with the home country. Some diaspora might just belong to one country which is the country of birth. Or the opposite – some diaspora groups might experience belonging to a country to which they have never been before but consider as their homeland. Diaspora therefore describes people with dual nationalities labelling them as people with dual nationalities (p. 14). Diaspora is about how such movement can affect both the sending and receiving countries. For instance, building relationships and ties with the host country is as important as keeping ties with the country of origin (Clifford 1994, p. 15). It is argued by Kissau and Hunger (2010) that new diasporas describe how people can sustain the links between their home country and host country (p. 246).

There has been a new wave of diasporas which involve multiple loyalties to a place. A new type of migration is a population's activities and networks relating to both homelands and host countries. Maintaining both the homeland's and the host country's activities and traditions creates what is called 'transnationalism' (Van Hear 2005, p. 4). According to Bruneau (2010, p. 37), all diaspora groups experience what Bruneau calls 'socio-spatial networks' and 'territorial expansion' (p. 36). Both concepts are concerned with the notion of living and belonging to a place of residence, host country and the place of memory; the country of origin (p. 36). Moreover, territories cannot be moved and are based on specific locations. However, diaspora groups tend to create their own 'places of memory' by adopting the identities and customs of the country of origin in the host country (p. 37). This is what could be termed as a diaspora experiencing transnational lives. Bruneau (2010) adds that diasporas can be divided into four types (p. 39). These types depend on religion, politics and a combination of race and culture. The first type of diaspora is associated with culture and race and how religion does not play a vital role for multiple religions in specific nations. The examples of such diasporas are the Chinese, Indian and Lebanese diasporas (p. 39). Such a type of diaspora is interrelated with the concept of transnationalism for multiple belongings. The second type is concerned with religions' role in shaping diasporas, such as the Jews, as well as the Greek and Armenian diasporas. The third type of diaspora is governed by political conflict, for example the Palestinian diaspora.

Diasporic groups share several characteristics, for instance, the dispersal of people to more than one country (Safran 1991, p219). Hirji (2009) explains in her article about second and third generations of immigrants, how these generations of immigrants do not meet this characteristic of diaspora. She has also written about the role played by second and third generations of immigrants regarding the concept of homeland and diaspora. Second and third

generations of immigrants might not consider themselves as part of a diaspora in the first instance. In addition, they might not have any bond with their parents' homeland or it might differ from one person to another. Hirji (2009) claims that this can create an 'identity crisis', and young people may struggle in terms of defining themselves. Hirji (2009) adds that second and third generations of immigrants in the United Kingdom, United States and Canada can be known as 'inhabitants of diaspora'. They are so called because they have never migrated before and were born in a country which they consider to be their homeland.

Hirji (2009) also argues that the definition of diaspora proposed by Safran and Cohen deals with those who were forced to leave their homeland and were dispersed from their country of origin for reasons of war or disaster. Moreover, the offspring of immigrants, or, as Hirji terms them, 'inhabitants of diaspora' are not mentioned in any of the classic definitions of diaspora. The definition of diaspora should therefore stretch to include various types of immigrants. Hirji provides an example in her article, suggesting that none of the criteria of the diaspora Cohen or Safran set are met by second and third generations of residents, even though they are classed as diaspora groups. Hirji therefore puts forward a definition of diaspora which includes those who have been dispersed from their homeland to a host country, as well as the offspring of first generation immigrants, meaning second and third generations. Hirji includes second and third generations of immigrants because they are part of diasporic groups and are involved in the businesses of their parents' countries of origin. In this thesis, I define 'diaspora' as the immigrants who have been dispersed from their country of origin because of war or any disaster in addition to 'inhabitants of diaspora' including second and third generations. In this case, my definition combines the classical definition of diaspora suggested by Safran (1991) and Cohen (2007) with the new definition suggested by Hirji (2009).

According to Safran (1991), diaspora can be limited to populations that have been dispersed from their homeland to one or more foreign countries. Other features of diaspora, according to Safran (1991), are slight alienation in the host country and the wish to return to the homeland. Reis (2004, p. 43) tackled the classical versus modern diaspora phenomenon in his article and uncovered the difference between them. The classical example of diaspora has always been the Jewish case, given the fact that they were dispersed from their land (as previously mentioned). Hirji (2009) has discussed the second and third generations and how they deal with the notion of diaspora and whether or not they can be considered as part of a diaspora, according to the Jewish example.

Reis (2004) claims that the Jewish case is not the classical example of diaspora. The main features of diaspora include dispersal from country of origin to one or more foreign countries due to war, violence or natural disaster. Secondly, the notion of return to the country of origin is common among diasporic groups. Thirdly, not being able to integrate into the host country or not belonging to the host country is another feature of diasporic groups. Diasporic groups enjoy the notion of the preservation of memories or myth about the country of origin, including its location and history. Moreover, diasporic groups have the sense of duty to rebuild the country of origin. Finally, diasporic groups believe in one community and a shared fate which depends on the country of origin and their adaptation to the host country. Reis (2004, p. 44) claims that all the characteristics of diaspora cannot be applied to one group; a group of people might have two out of five features or might enjoy the main features of diaspora.

The feature of not being accepted in a host society can be applied to second and third generations of immigrants. Occasionally, second and third generations who were born in a

country which is not their parents' homeland, may not be accepted or feel they do not belong to that country because they are originally from another country. This raises the issue of place of birth and its effects on diasporic groups (Hirji 2009). Bauböck and Faist (2010) also associate the concept of diaspora with the Jewish dispersion. However, in the present day, it can be associated with various nations.

As suggested by most scholars, there are six criteria concerning diaspora. The first criterion is the notion of dispersion from countries of origin by force. 'By force' means that people have been compelled to leave their country of origin because of a natural disaster, war, poverty or political conflict (Bruneau 2010, p. 35). What about those who have not previously migrated but are classified as a diaspora group because of their parents' migratory history? The second criterion is the choice of destination for diasporic groups in relation to residing in host countries. The option of choosing the country of destination is up to the migratory chains. For instance, when a group of people are dispersed from their country of origin, they join other groups who have previously settled in host countries. Thus, previous migratory routes can be reused by newly diasporic groups to make it easier for them to integrate into host countries (Bruneau 2010, p. 36). The third criterion is the awareness of a common identity among diasporic groups. Diasporic groups tend to have a strong identity awareness and a strong sense of community life within diasporic groups. The fourth criterion is the creation of a networked space among diasporic groups. This networked space is created by diasporic groups by means of exchanging goods or information. Moreover, this networked space does not only link diasporic individuals with each other, despite their differences, but also links them to their country of origin if it still exists (Bruneau 2010, p. 37).

The fifth criterion is the transmission of dispersion experience from generation to another. For instance, the first generation of diasporic groups that are settled in host countries would transfer their experience and identity of dispersion to their children. Consequently, generation after generation would transmit the dispersion experience and would be considered as diasporic groups, even though they may never have been dispersed before, for example, second and third generations of diasporic groups (Bruneau 2010, p. 44). The last criterion is the relatively autonomous nature of diasporic groups. This autonomous social formation is because of the various cultural, social and professional associations, according to Bruneau (2010, p. 45).

The most well-known type of diaspora is 'victim diaspora', of which the Jewish case is a classic example. However, Reis (2004) fails to fully acknowledge the other nations which can be classified as 'victim diasporas' such as the Palestinians and Armenians. Reis (2004) mentions other nations, as part of the ancient period, but does not give examples of the ancient diaspora period. Reis (2004) has discussed the notion of globalisation and 'diasporisation', as he has termed it. It is also important to state that technological revolution has affected diasporic groups in terms of making it easier for them to stay in touch with families and their homelands, unlike before, where travelling was hard and kept people away from their families and friends. The current inexpensive and fast travel, in addition to advanced communications, have eased the notion of diasporic groups being far away from their homeland and families. Furthermore, the expansion of economic transactions among countries has increased due to globalisation and advanced telecommunications. Reis (2004) elaborates further on the effects of globalisation on diaspora by showing how borders between countries are fading, or as Reis (2004) calls it 'eroding'. Reis (2004) adds that globalisation has benefited diasporic groups in terms of strengthening ties between their host

country and homeland. Regarding 'emotional distance', it has been reduced due to globalisation and advances in technology, such as the telephone, more frequent cheap flights and the Internet. Nevertheless, globalisation and advanced technology have made it easier for everyone to keep in touch and stay connected with their family and friends, not only for diasporic groups, as Reis (2004) claims. This can be considered as a weakness in his argument.

Waterbury (2010, p. 132) also addresses the diaspora and diasporic politics. He argues that state borders create a mode of 'logic', according to which diaspora groups can create a threat to social solidarity. Additionally, as nations share norms and traditions, diaspora groups can bring their own traditions and norms which, in turn, can affect the natives' norms and traditions. Waterbury's (2010) argument can be challenged, based on globalisation and how the world has become a small village. Appadurai (1996) addresses the issue of living in a globalised world. Accordingly, as the number of diaspora groups has risen due to many of them leaving their countries of origin to work and settle somewhere other than their homeland, the world can be considered to be 'one small village' or a 'transnational community', as Waterbury defines it.

Tsagarousianou (2004, p. 53) identifies the stages through which diasporic groups have passed and perceptions of understanding the concept of diaspora have evolved. Tsagarousianou challenges the notion of how ethnicity, mobility and displacement can allow nations to make sense of the concept of diaspora or diasporic communities. The article questions if some of the traditional assumptions of diaspora should be rethought (p. 56). Tsagarousianou suggests that diasporas should not only relate to displacement, as some scholars such as Cohen (1997) believe. Moreover, diasporas should be taken as given communities not as imagined communities, as suggested by Anderson (1991), and should be

dealt with as communities that can be reinvented and reconstructed (cited in Brubaker 2005). Tsagarousianou (2004) suggests that the media and new technology can play a significant role in transforming and reconstructing diasporic identities. She also believes that Safran's features of diaspora are debatable, as they focus only on the relationship between diasporic groups and their homeland and neglect other relationships and linkages. Tsagarousianou (2004) asserts that diasporic groups can only be classed as a sub-category of an ethnic group or a specific nation (p. 55). Cohen (1997) suggests that the diaspora features suggested by Safran need to be readjusted and that more elements should be added to those of Safran. Those elements include specifying whether groups who have left their country of origin have left voluntarily or by force; furthermore, sufficient time should be given before any groups can be called diasporic. The third element that should be added to diaspora features is the positive aspects of diasporic groups, which should be taken into consideration, and which can lead to creative formulations, according to Cohen (1997). The final element Cohen (1997) proposes is that diasporic groups do not only form collective identities in host countries but also in their homeland.

However, Tsagarousianou (2004) argues that Cohen contradicts himself in his analysis of diaspora, or his vision of diaspora. Cohen (1997) claims diasporic groups have 'strong links to the past' which does not push forward Tsagarousianou's (2004) debate regarding updating Safran's features, previously mentioned, or of updating Safran's features by adding modern elements of diaspora. Reis (2004) has addressed the notion of diasporic groups benefiting their homeland by using advanced technology to send money home. This is part of one feature of diaspora which is a united notion of benefiting the country of origin, either psychologically or by sending money. Tsagarousianou (2004, p. 55) alleges that not all groups which have been dispersed can be called a diaspora. However, using the label diaspora or

diasporic identity indicated willingness and imagination that constitute the transformation from ethnic to diasporic identification. Diaspora is not considered to be a given community but reinvented and reconstructed (p. 56). Tsagarousianou (2004, p. 56) argues that although diaspora is not considered to be an 'imagined community', in contrast to Benedict (1991), features of imagined communities are still met in diaspora. Tsagarousianou (2004) maintains that what makes diasporic groups is their ability to realise themselves – self-mobilisation around their awareness of who they are is what makes a group 'diasporic'.

Papastergiadis (2013) argues that the late modern migration movements are associated with three terms: solitude – the state of being lonely and the loneliness which diaspora groups experience; itinerary – related to the state of moving and travelling; and illegality – the state of living illegally in foreign countries. Each of these terms can be applied to various diasporic groups. To call a dispersed group a diaspora, they should meet an important element: self-mobilisation or self-imagination as diasporic groups (Tsagarousianou 2004, p. 57). Likewise, the awareness of being a diasporic group is essential regarding categorising any group as diasporic. Bruneau (2010, p. 40) contends that when a diasporic group settles in a community, there would be a common identity among people living in that society. This relationship might be family, religion or economic ties. Additionally, a group of people can create a common identity which depends on a shared trauma or catastrophe. According to Bruneau (2010, p. 44), diaspora groups preserve the links between two places: the place of memories (place of birth) and the place of residence (host country). Kenny (2013) asserts that the concept of diaspora has covered not only diaspora groups but refugees, guest workers, ethnic communities and exiled communities. According to Kenny (2013), the concept diaspora is used by people as a way of explaining daily life and their experience; while for scholars, diaspora is more of a category of analysis, as Kenny states. The category of analysis is related

to explaining the theoretical concept and relating it to other concepts, while people adopt diaspora as a category of practice (Kenny 2013).

The main features of diaspora groups, according to Safran (1991, p. 220), attract some criticism. For instance, Reis (2004) claims that all features of diaspora cannot be applied to one group, seeing as a group of people may have two of the five features, or may enjoy the main characteristics of diaspora. If each of Safran's features is individually addressed, there are some gaps in his suggestions. Regarding the first feature vis-à-vis dispersion, this is applied to people who had to leave their country of origin by force. However, what about those who left their country of origin by choice? What about the offspring of immigrants who have never been dispersed from any country? Regarding the feature of having a collective memory of one's homeland or even the myth of a homeland, this feature can be shared with not only immigrants from the first generation who have left their country of origin, but with the second generation who shares the same feature as the first generation. Safran (1991) has not dealt with other generations of immigrants and whether or not to include them. The interviews conducted with Egyptians concerning this thesis, have shown that, many second generation Egyptians share a collective memory of Egypt, even if some had not lived in Egypt or were visiting the country as a holiday destination. The feature of how political events in the home country could have an influence on diaspora communities and how this could have an impact on the sense of belonging to a specific country could be added.

The characteristic of not being accepted in a host society can be applied to second and third generations of immigrants. Occasionally, second and third generations who were born in a country which is not their parents' homeland, are not accepted or do not feel that they belong to host country because they are originally from another country. Second and third

generations suffer from not belonging to the country in which they were born because of their origins. This raises the issue of place of birth and its effects on diasporic groups (Hirji 2009). Bauböck and Faist (2010, p. 44) also associate the concept of diaspora with the Jewish dispersion; yet, today it can be associated with various nations (p. 35). The findings in this thesis, however, have revealed that second generation Egyptians do not experience this sense of not being accepted in British society, although some Egyptians from the first generation might experience such feelings. One of the main findings in this thesis is that many first generation Egyptians are fully accepted and happy to live in British society and, simultaneously, retain the sense of belonging to Egypt. Furthermore, the combination of residing in both Egypt and in the UK has been an advantage for many.

The other factor Safran discusses is the notion of return. One of the main features of diaspora groups is the notion of their return to their homeland when the situation there is stable. This feature is designed to be applied to immigrants who have left their countries of origin; some second generation immigrants also share this feature with the first generation. Safran's features together with those of Cohen need to be modified and include new features regarding other groups of immigrants, which I discuss later in the dissertation. Cohen (1999) contends that not all immigrants can be part of diaspora groups, such as second-generation immigrants. Nevertheless, through conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK, the findings show that second generation Egyptians share many of the features proposed by Safran (1991). Diaspora features should therefore be updated to include second and third generations as part of the modern diaspora concept.

Cohen (1999, p. 10) readjusted some of Safran's features of diaspora to include as many groups as possible. For example, regarding Safran's first feature of diaspora, Cohen added the

notion of having a traumatic incident, initiating dispersal from the country of origin to other host countries. The sample from this thesis, however, reveals that this feature does not apply to Egyptians in the UK. Consequently, this feature needs to be readjusted once again to include groups who have not witnessed any traumatic incidents and have not been dispersed by force, such as the offspring of immigrants. The second feature to which Cohen has added specific elements is the notion that diaspora groups have a collective memory of a territory (homeland). However, this should also include a collective identity, as Cohen states, diaspora groups also share their identity with diaspora members in other countries who have the same background (identity) (p. 7), which Cohen terms 'deterriotorialized diaspora'. This type of diaspora is not associated with a specific territory or homeland but a shared culture, religion and language. According to this concept, Egyptians in the UK in the wake of the 2011 uprising, could be named members of a 'deterriotorialized diaspora', whether they are the first or second generation, because they all shared their demands with their fellow Egyptians in a show of solidarity. The concept of homeland, according to Brah (1996), is placeless and founded in the diaspora imagination.

Diaspora has been linked to the term 'deterritorialized identities' which describes groups whose loyalties, hybrid identities and orientations are connected to neither homeland nor host countries nor any known territory. The term diaspora applies to groups that are connected to their homeland, even though they reside in numerous different host countries, as they feel they have a loyalty to their original homeland. Sheffer (2003) argues that sense of belonging and loyalty among diasporic groups are based on psychological and emotional elements. Jon Armstrong defines diaspora in his book *Mobilised and Proletarian Diasporas* (1976) as, 'any minority groups which do not belong to any territorial base within states'. Armstrong's definition has been problematic for diaspora scholars. The definition is

challenging because other scholars stress the notion that diasporic groups belong to their countries of origin. For instance, critics such as Mishra (2006), discuss Sheffer's new definition of diaspora.

Sheffer's (1986) new definition of diaspora is: modern diasporas are groups of ethnic minority groups residing in host countries and actively involved in these societies but retaining their links and ties with their countries of origin or 'homelands'. Mishra (2006) maintains that, the weakness of Armstrong's definition is the generalisation that diasporic groups are not connected to any territory. In addition, Mishra (2006) adds that Sheffer fails to include other generations of diaspora in his definition and whether or not the new diaspora definition applies. Sheffer (1986) elaborates on the definition of modern diasporas by mentioning the causes of migration, voluntary and forced, and gives examples of each type. Diaspora groups in any host country remain minority groups, regardless of the length of stay in that country (Mishra 2006). One question that needs to be asked, however, is whether this definition can be applied to the second and third generation of diasporic groups who were born in host countries and consider the host countries as their homeland. I define 'diaspora' as the ethnic groups dispersed from their countries of origin and residing in host countries in addition to second and third generations of immigrants with keeping links with homeland for first generation and parents' homeland for second and third generations.

Political activities have acted as a tool to express identity and belonging by diaspora groups. Martiniello (2005, p. 11), for instance, has dealt with how immigrants are involved in unconventional activities such as politics. Della (2013, p. 3) has dealt with unconventional political activities and how to create a social movement, in which case, the Arab uprising could be a social movement. Martiniello (2005) asserts that immigrants tend to be active in politics,

especially in host countries, for the purpose of 'self-identification' and to prove themselves as citizens of host countries. Conversely, when immigrants are not guaranteed 'citizenship' or 'naturalisation' in host countries, they tend to be interested or active in the politics of their countries of origin (Labelle and Midy 1999).

Identity

In this section, I discuss selected theories of identity including collective and social identity. Social identity, for one, is defined by Abrams and Hogg (1990) as the membership of individuals to specific social groups (p. 2). Tajfel (1972) contends that social identity would be identified by other individuals through acknowledging social identities in shared beliefs, norms and values with other members (cited in Abrams and Hogg 1990, p. 2). Abrams and Hogg (1990, p. 50) maintain that Social Identity Theory (S.I.T.) is based on comparing individuals of the same social groups with each other. Additionally, recognising similarities and differences among members of the same social groups also allows self-evaluation (p. 3). Consequently, identities are constructed through interaction and comparison of members of the same social group. According to Social Identity Theory, individuals tend to be attached to more than one identity, such as religious, organisational and national (Ashforth and Mael 1989, p. 20). Ashford and Mael suggest that individuals tend to psychologically belong to the societies of which they are members (p. 4). This could be applied to diasporic groups, as they remain part of the societies of which they are members but do not necessarily reside in the same places.

According to Langellier (2010), identities are the stories we tell ourselves, to let us know who we are and to let others see ourselves (p. 68). Identity is constructed by daily performances controlled by race, religion and culture. Cooley (1964) claims that people tend

to construct their identity and know who they are through the opinions of others and adds that it is like looking in the mirror and discovering oneself. According to classic sociological constructs, such as those of Durkheim (collective conscience), Marx (class conscience) and Weber (cited in Cerulo 1997, p. 386), collective identity is concerned with the 'we-ness' of a group. It is regarding shared norms, beliefs and any other similarities. According to Collective Identity Theory, the need for individuals to belong is part of human nature (Baumeister and Leary 1995, cited in Brewer and Gardner 1996). The need to belong results in adopting specific identities and is how individuals define themselves according to how engaged they are in collectives and social groups; thus, developing collective identities. The term 'we-ness' could be applied to any social group such as diasporic groups, with a shared language, beliefs and norms. Adamson (2008) claims that diaspora groups can be linked through common identities and attachment to a real or imagined homeland.

Hall and Gay (1996) discuss the concept of identity and how it is formed. First, identity is a concept mentioned by Hall and Gay as operating 'under erasure' or that the changing nature of the concept of identity relies on the terms 'emergence' and 'reversal'. Therefore, the concept of identity is not fixed but changing (p. 4). Emergence means new statuses and concepts emerge regarding the concept of identity. Nature is associated with the identity concept at the same time, therefore, the reversal of nature is also related to identity formation and nature reverses from one type to another. Hall and Gay (1996) use the term 'irreducibility', meaning 'complicated and impossible to simplify' in relation to the concept of identity (p. 2).

According to Foucault, the concept of identity is not about finding a theory of knowing but finding a theory of 'discursive practice' (cited in Hall and Gay 1996), which means forming

an identity is an ongoing process. Hall and Gay (1996) believe that identity requires the 'reconceptualisation' of terms and not 'abandonment' of subjects and terms. To explain how identity is formed, the term 'identification' needs to be defined here. According to Hall and Gay (1996), the identification of a group involves sharing common origin and characteristics by a group of people (p. 2). According to the discursive approach, however, the formation of identity including identification, is never completed and always in the process of development (Hall and Gay 1996).

According to the psychoanalytical approach, identification is associated with semantic legacy, which Freud calls 'the expression of an emotional tie with another person' (Hall and Gay 1996, p. 3). Hall and Gay (1996) assert that the formation of identities is associated with many terms. For instance, identities are fragmented and non-integrated and are always constructed by means of the differences among people and being dissimilar (p. 4). Furthermore, identities are always in the process of change and transformation (Hall and Gay 1996), but, more importantly, identities are about 'becoming' and not about 'being' (p. 4). Hall and Gay explain how forming identities among people is not about 'who people are' or 'where people came from' but rather about 'who people might become' (p. 4). Hall and Gay (1996) define identities as 'constructed through difference' (p. 4); people are unified by being different in terms of constructing identities. Burr (2015) argues that the way people think in any society gives meanings to actions and concepts, and consequently, provides a framework of meanings that are derived from original language. Language is not only about determining words and meanings, but also sends signals regarding identity (Mead 1934).

Given the fact that identity is a changing concept, Hall and Gay (1996) present three different notions to explain the concept of identity. The first is associated with the 'real me'

or ‘inner core’, which is the identity associated with birth. The second is a sociological subject which is about interaction between self and society. The third is a postmodern subject which is about the fragmentation of the conceptualisation of identity, as described by Hall and Gay (1996). Identity is a changeable process and ‘a social product’. To prove how identity is changeable, the essentialist approach regarding formulating identities focuses on how fixed identities are; however, the de-essentialised approach rejects the notion of identities being fixed. Moreover, the social constructionist approach tends to focus on how identity is not fixed as the essentialist approach argues (Cerulo 1997, p. 387). Additionally, the de-essentialised approach allows for the construction of multiple identities, unlike the essentialised approach, in which case, the de-essentialised approach is adopted for this thesis, in order to examine the situation of Egyptians and their Egyptian identity, as well and other identities they might adopt, such as British.

Regarding social constructionism, based on theorists of identity formation, such as Goffman, Berger, Becker and many others, identity formation rejects the notion which the essentialist approach suggests, that are the essential features of collective members and their identities (Cerulo 1997, p. 387). It is worth mentioning that Joshua Meyrowitz (1985, 1989, 1997) is one of the theorists who discuss the effects of New Communication Technologies (NCT) on identities (cited in Cerulo 1997). Meyrowitz tackles the notion of how television has empowered the identities of women and disabled people. Furthermore, NCT could therefore be applied to the present regarding the identities of diaspora and how social media have empowered diasporic groups.

Diasporic identity, belonging and identity performance

Belonging is associated with diaspora in terms of belonging to place of birth and place of residence. Stuart Hall (cited in Kalra et al. 2005, p. 29) explains how 'diaspora' is about living in a place and being attached to another place. Likewise, it can be viewed as a complicated term. A diasporic conscience is crucial for diasporic groups in addition to belonging. For instance, diasporic groups can sense they are different from their culture and the society in which they live. According to Clifford (1994), a diasporic conscience is 'the product of cultures and histories'. Moreover, Hall believes that sensing the difference and not ignoring it can help to create real identities in societies, rather than ignoring being different. Factors which can bond people together and strengthen belonging to a nation are no longer religion and faith, but media, newspapers and television. Benedict Anderson says in his book *Imagined Communities* (1983) that the consumption of media will result in connecting people and building bonds between them (p. 31).

According to Tsagarousianou (2004), home is not only related to the term 'nostalgia', home is about the processes of inclusion and exclusion experienced by diasporic groups under specific circumstances. Home is a fairy-tale place about which diasporic groups dream. This can be related to the notion of 'return' and how important this feature is to diasporic groups. Fazal and Tsagarousianou (2002) argue that home, for diasporic groups, is all about the multiple relationships they have with various locations through cultures and beliefs. Questions of how people can differentiate between 'feeling at home' and the claim that 'a place is like home' are addressed by Fazal and Tsagarousianou. The notion of 'lost homeland' is that diaspora groups tend to adapt to the host country whilst keeping the notion of a 'lost homeland', according to Clifford (1994, p. 16). The notion of a lost homeland is associated with the notion of the 'imagined community' presented by Benedict (1991, p. 18). Benedict

(1991) expresses how diaspora groups are more associated with the concept of an imagined community as they experience the loss of their home. Consequently, they tend to create their own home by other means, such as the media, organisations and the Internet.

One characteristic is shared among diaspora groups and it is an 'illusion of impermanence', as Van Hear (2005) terms it. Diaspora groups who live in a host country always feel they are not settled and only temporarily living in a host country, although in the case of children of diaspora groups who were born in the host country, they might not have the same feeling as they consider the host country to be their homeland (Van Hear 2005, p. 4). The notion of return to one's homeland plays a significant part in the illusion of impermanence. If diaspora groups keep thinking about the idea of returning to their homeland, they will end up feeling unsettled. Organisations which gather diaspora groups in host countries, play an important role in diaspora groups' lives, not only in terms of keeping ties with their homeland but also in terms of adapting to a new home or a host country (Hirji 2004, p. 18). The mission of such organisations is to offer ways to adapt to a new home (host country) and, at the same time, to preserve ties with the homeland (country of origin). This is the case of diaspora groups who have recently left their country of origin, but, what about those who were born in a country in which their parents were not born?

Goffman and performing identity

Goffman (1959) addresses the formation of identity and deals with significant aspects of construction of identity. There are three main aspects of identity formation. The first is social structure of identity, the second aspect is to expect risk and failure in identity formation, the third aspect is the role of audience in the process of identity formation and finally, the last aspect is the details of face-to-face interaction and identity construction. For Goffman (1959)

the construction of identity consists of three main aspects or characters as in a theatre or a film. The first character is individuals in any given society acting as performers. The second character is audience members in society, whilst the third aspect is outsiders operating in social spaces or stages, as Goffman explains. In addition, Goffman (1959) deals with the concept of 'impression management'. Impression management is associated with how individuals represent themselves and what impression they give to others about themselves. Consequently, impression management is termed management because individuals choose and manage what to reveal and what to conceal. Goffman (1959) illustrates that in any society, 'performers' act accordingly to a set of expectations the audience in any society set for performers to perform.

For Goffman (1959) the main aspect of the influential dramaturgical approach is that any society is a stage and individuals of that society act as performers or actors who play various roles in life, written for them and according to what suit them. Goffman is influenced by Shakespeare's famous line 'All the world's a stage'. Goffman adds that performers tend to prepare the performance they would perform to audience. In this sense, performers tend to prepare the 'given' and 'given off'. Given off refers to what performers tend to conceal from the audience and what they want to show to the audience. Goffman (1959) adds that the given information is uncontrolled by individuals unlike given off information which is controlled. Goffman (1959) divides the stage of performance into two arenas; specifically, frontstage and backstage. Frontstage is where interactions occur and what is shown to others, while backstage is what is not revealed to others and where actions are prepared to be shown to others, as an idealised image of the self.

Goffman's theory basically focuses on the notion of how individuals interact to form their identity in society. This theory is associated with the notion of individuals who form their identity according to the environment they are in, which is what impression management is. Goffman (1959) came up with the term 'impression management' and refers to the management of individuals of their activities, appearance and words in their interaction. The purpose of this management is to convey a specific image about the self to others. However, Mead (1934) constructed the notion of how individuals form their identity according to what it is expected from them in society. For that reason, Goffman clarifies and shifts the notion of forming identity among individuals from conveying a special message to the audience, so that the audience expect a specific performance from performers and consequently, performers should meet such expectations, Mead (1934) claims. Moreover, such expectations are set by the audience for performers to meet. In other words, Goffman (1959) believes that forming an identity would be as a result of what others expect from you, so your identity is constructed according to what is expected from you in society.

According to Goffman (1959), impression management is associated with face-to-face interaction and physical presence of others to perform a specific identity. Farquhar (2009) questions Goffman's notion of 'impression management' regarding offline and online interaction and the absence of physical presence, which is the main aspect of impression management according to Goffman. Moreover, Farquhar (2009) investigates how impression management could be applied to online interaction giving the fact interaction online does not involve a physical presence or face-to-face interaction. Farquhar (2009) agrees with Mead's (1934) notion regarding performing identity according to what reaction the audience creates about performers and not what the audience expect from individuals regarding identity formation.

In this thesis, I explore how Goffman's theory can be applied to diasporic communities and how their identity is being performed. The question is how could diaspora groups perform the identity of their homeland when some have not lived or have not been to their parents' home country before? According to Goffman (1959), presentation of self is regarding performances. Goffman argues that performance can be taken in two areas. The first area is known as 'private region performances', where individuals prepare for 'public region performances' (p. 28). In addition, Goffman (1959) adds that societies set expectations for their citizens and that citizens are expected to meet such expectations. Consequently, performances are socialised.

Goffman (1959) calls the process of concealing and revealing aspects of self or identity 'mystification'. Furthermore, Goffman (1983) argues that every activity an individual undertakes, either face to face or online has its own rules, and that such rules can be governed by society's expectations of its citizens. Sinclair (1997) built on Goffman's theory by naming performance as 'formal' and 'informal'. In the case of the Egyptian diaspora, Egyptians' actions are governed by how they are expected to behave and what identity they should adopt. People might fail to meet some of the expectations set by societies. Consequently, interaction order, according to Goffman (1983), will be incomplete and people will subsequently be criticised. For instance, Egyptians abroad, if they do not meet expectations of Egyptian society by being politically active, supporting Egypt financially or by any other means, would be called 'non-Egyptian'.

Criticism of Goffman

As mentioned previously, the main notion of Goffman's theory of self-representation is the front and backstage performance. In addition, another aspect of Goffman's theory of self-

representation is ‘given’ and ‘given off’ and how to control information given to the audience about ourselves. Hugh Miller (1995) criticised the concept of Goffman regarding face-to-face interaction and how to apply the concept to what Miller calls the ‘Electronic Self’. Miller (1995) argues that Goffman’s concept does not apply to the electronic self’ and how people interact online nowadays. However, the Internet can be used by people as a good medium to enclose and disclose what they like. As a result, Goffman’s concept regarding representing self could be applied online especially for those who do not want to enclose everything online. However, regarding Goffman’s face-to-face interaction, proper interaction with others would be incomplete. Moreover, Kendon (1988) also tackled the issue of ‘electronic selves’ and how to employ Goffman’s concept. To apply ‘electronic selves’ to diaspora groups, it is essential nowadays for them to interact online and present themselves electronically. It is part of Goffman’s concept of performing identity online, especially among diaspora groups.

Theoretical framework

Having discussed the concepts of diaspora, identity, performing identity and transnationalism, this section presents how those concepts are linked and applied to the Egyptian diaspora in the UK. Initially, reviewing the main concepts of diaspora has enabled a better understanding of how to apply the concept ‘diaspora on other groups’. Some of the diaspora features proposed by Safran and then amended by Sheffer and Cohen have been applied to the Egyptian diaspora in the UK. One of the main features is the notion of return to Egypt, especially after the 2011 uprising. Moreover, not only have the first generation diaspora had this feeling of returning to Egypt, the second generation of Egyptians experienced the notion of return after the transformation which Egypt had gone through. Furthermore, another feature to be applied to the Egyptian diaspora is their holding

memories of Egypt. The Egyptian diaspora, especially the first generation, hold memories of their childhood, besides memories of their teenage years and even adulthood. Such memories motivate diaspora groups to hold the idea of having a duty to rebuild their homeland. For instance, Egyptians after the 2011 uprising felt they had a duty to rebuild Egypt after the revolution. It is worth mentioning that both features of return to homeland and sense of duty to maintain homeland are interrelated. Moreover, the final feature which is preserving links with the homeland, also applies to the case of Egyptians in the UK.

The unifying factor among Egyptians is the temporary effect of the 2011 uprising on different generations despite their place of birth, age and ideology. In contrast, some diaspora features proposed by diaspora theorists cannot be applied to the Egyptian diaspora, such as dispersion by devastating causes and the sense of not belonging to host countries. However, regarding not being accepted in the host country, some of the Egyptian diaspora might experience such a feeling despite residing in the UK for a long time. Therefore, most Egyptians particularly those belonging to the second generation do not experience such a sense of not belonging to the host country, seeing the UK as a host country as well as a homeland for such people. The gap in literature has features which can be applied to any group of second generation diaspora, which is what I propose (more details in Chapter Nine). Regarding identity theories, primarily Goffman and performing identity, performing Egyptian identity could be explored here, particularly amongst the second generation, in the wake of the 2011 uprising. In addition, the term transnationalism could be linked to the theories of identity and diaspora. For instance, in the case of Egyptians, the Egyptian diaspora may experience a transnational identity due to the fact they are living in a transnational world, residing in one host country whilst maintaining a strong relationship to Egypt. Consequently, the terms diaspora, identity and transnationalism are correlated. The theoretical framework in the case

of the Egyptian diaspora therefore incorporates features from theories of diaspora, identity and transnationalism.

Summary

The main theories adopted in this research such as identity and diaspora have been discussed in this chapter. The main theories of diaspora such as those of Safran, Cohen, Clifford and others have been examined regarding their ideas on diasporic communities and, a link has been made between diaspora and identity. This chapter has drawn a picture regarding identity among diaspora communities and how significant events, such as political upheavals or revolutions may affect the sense of identity and belonging among diaspora groups. The analysis chapters applies these concepts (of diaspora identity and how it can be 'performed' to a specific diaspora community, namely Egyptians in the UK, in the wake of the 2011-revolution, which was met with euphoria by Egyptians both inside and outside Egypt. Prior to engaging with this analysis, a review of relevant previous studies about Egyptians in the West and the UK is presented in the following chapter. I have adopted theories related to sociology mainly diaspora, identity, social identity and Goffman's performing identity for many reasons. The first reason is to apply existing theoretical concepts of diaspora on a selected group, i.e. Egyptians in the UK. Secondly, social identity theory is instrumental in studying groups in their societal environment and to explore their interactions. The other aspect of sociology is anchored in Goffman's concept of performing identity in order to link both the diaspora and identity theories. Another way of linking concepts of diaspora and identity is through exploring media and political activities. For instance, in the case of Egyptians in the UK and the 2011 Egyptian revolution, political activities were a tool to display their 'Egyptianness' and to prove to fellow Egyptians in Egypt that they still belong to Egypt.

Chapter Four: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter discusses some of the studies conducted on diaspora communities in various parts of the world, particularly in Egypt, and their role in and methods of, maintaining links with their homeland. The aim of this chapter is to give readers an overview of studies conducted in the field of diasporic communities and their connection to their country of origin and host country. I have divided the chapter into sections concentrated on studies conducted on diasporic communities living away from their country of origin. Moreover, the chapter deals with studies on the Arab Spring and how diasporic communities have reacted to such a historic event in Egyptian history.

Studies on diaspora communities

There is a large volume of published studies on diaspora communities residing outside of their country of origin. Diasporic groups can contribute to their homeland by spreading news of events to broadcast on local TV in the host country (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013, p. 2185). The new methods of advanced communication, such as the Internet including social media, are a modern way to keep in contact with the homeland. Caroline Nagel (2002) studied Arabs in London, including Egyptians, Iraqis and Moroccans. She has dealt with the problem of being 'Arab', particularly in London (Nagel 2001, p. 381). Nagel discusses the concept of 'race' and how 'Arabness' in London is considered neither a separate race, nor as part of the 'white' race (p. 389). Nagel states that being different or labelled 'white' is as problematic as being labelled 'black' (p. 385). For example, being labelled as an Arab is problematic in the case of Arabs in London, because, according to Nagel, they are considered as 'Other'. Many interviewees who participated in Nagel's study were struggling to define themselves as

'British', or 'Arab' or 'British-Arab', and whether they fitted into British society. One of the interviewees in Nagel's study explains how having a British passport does not mean that you are 'English' (Nagel 2002, p. 269) – a British passport only means security and legal permission to stay in the UK.

A study conducted by Işık Kuşcu (2012) examined the role of the Egyptian-American diaspora in their homeland affairs. Kuşcu claims that members of the Egyptian-American diaspora group are connected to their homeland by following events there (p. 121). The 2011 Egyptian revolution has, moreover, been a turning point in terms of Egyptians abroad – they are more involved now in Egyptian affairs than in Mubarak's era (p. 121).

This study seeks to look at the role played by the Egyptian-American diaspora group during the 2011 revolution and the aftermath, and how this group can influence both the homeland's and host country's politics. Diaspora groups, in general, used to be disconnected from events in their homelands. It used to be difficult to stay connected due to expensive flights, there was no social media, the lack of new communications to call family and friends at home, such as *WhatsApp* and other phone applications. However, nowadays, thanks to new technology, communication and transport, diaspora groups are now more easily able to stay in contact with their homelands (p. 122).

The question that needs to be asked and answered, however, is why would diaspora groups want to be connected to their homeland while living abroad? Safran (1991) defines homeland as 'occupying a central position as a major component of diasporic identity' (cited in Kuşcu 2012, p. 123). The relationship between diasporic groups and their homeland is strong as a result, especially concerning diasporic identity. Diasporic identity depends on the notion of homeland. The characteristics which make diasporic groups unique are the notion

of returning to their homeland when it is safe to do so, and the connection to the history of the homeland by way of being connected to its roots. These characteristics, as Kuşcu expresses, keep the identity of diasporic groups alive (p. 123).

Diasporic communities can play an essential role regarding their homeland affairs. One of several studies conducted on diasporic communities focuses on diasporic communities in Germany, specifically, the Egyptian community. The study concentrates on the contributions of diasporic groups to their country of origin, such as the transfer of economic, social and health information from the country of residence to the country of origin. Furthermore, it also investigates the impact these have on the societies in both countries. Egyptians, Serbians and Afghans are among the diasporic communities that have been studied in Germany (Baraulina et al. 2007, p. vi). Baraulina et al. (2007) believe that Egyptians in Germany are highly-educated and well-integrated into German society.

There have been many scholarly studies conducted on Egyptian diasporic groups worldwide. Zohry and Debnath (2010), for instance, studied the Egyptian diaspora in three countries: specifically, Kuwait, the United States and the United Kingdom. Zohry and Debnath highlight the issue of not allowing the Egyptian diaspora to vote, as Egyptian citizens, in Egyptian elections, and how this would affect their political participation. One major drawback of this study is that it was conducted in 2010, and the laws have been changed in respect of political participation of diasporic groups, especially after the Arab Spring. Zohry and Debnath (2010) also assert that diaspora groups have the right to contribute to their countries of origin. This contribution could be possible in three ways: (i) financial capital – by sending money or remittances to the country of origin; (ii) human capital – by transferring knowledge and skills; and finally (iii) social capital – by exchanging ideas and beliefs.

Zohry and Debnath's study (2010) has revealed that the United Kingdom hosts almost four per cent of Egyptian migrants (p. 19). Another study (in Arabic) was conducted on the Egyptian diaspora in the Gulf by M. Morsi (2000) (cited in Zohry and Debnath's 2010 article). The research conducted by Zohry and Debnath (2010) fills the gap in studies on the Egyptian diaspora in Western countries, primarily Germany, and Morsi's study on Egyptians in the Gulf. Then, this thesis attempts to fill the literature gap concerning Egyptians in the UK, especially regarding the 2011 Egyptian uprising and its effects on members of the Egyptian diaspora in the UK, in terms of political participation, belonging and their role in the media.

Karmi (1997) studied Egyptians in Britain and integration into British society. The main points raised by Karmi (1997) are how Egyptians in the UK are strongly attached to Egypt. The strong attachment is represented by regular visits to Egypt by those respondents who participated in the study. However, many of Karmi's respondents do not wish to return to Egypt to settle down. This demonstrates that strong attachment to Egypt is symbolic and not related to settlement. Moreover, Karmi stressed the notion of 'myth of return' and how it is a shared notion among Arab communities, including Egyptians in Britain.

Fawzy (2012) conducted a study on Egyptians in Britain 15 years after Karmi's research. Fawzy studied Egyptians in Britain, where the focus is on Egyptians in Britain and the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Fawzy shares the same group as Karmi but with a different focus. The main points discussed in Fawzy's study are how Egyptians in the UK are attached to Egypt; the symbol of strong connection with Egypt is regular visits to Egypt, as Karmi showed. The other symbol is the sending of money to Egypt by Egyptians residing abroad, predominantly the UK. The interesting finding Fawzy came up with is the emergence of the notion of rebuilding Egypt after the 2011 uprising. The 2011 uprising has enforced the

notion of a return to Egypt to contribute to its rebuilding. In this sense, Fawzy (2012) has shown in his study how the opinion of many Egyptians changed after the uprising and the notion of return restored, in contrast to what Karmi (1997) claimed in her study. This shows the effectiveness events like the uprising had on Egyptians abroad. Although they conducted their research 15 years apart, Karmi and Fawzy are unified in the notion of studying the same group of migrants (Egyptians) and the same country (the UK). However, things have changed, such as the opinions of Egyptians regarding the notion of return.

Fawzy states that Egyptian identity is undeveloped, unlike other Arab groups of migrants in the UK, such as the Moroccans. Fawzy (2012) adds that Egyptians in the UK are integrated into British society more than other Arab groups. The weakness related to Fawzy's argument about Egyptians being integrated into British society is that the interviewees in his study cannot be generalised to all Egyptians in the UK.

The notion of return is common among many Arab groups in the UK. This notion, however, is not common among Egyptians in the UK. Fawzy states that one interviewee believed his being abroad would benefit Egypt more than going back to his home country. Egyptians cannot return to Egypt and build their lives from scratch there because of the critical political and economic situation. Moreover, Egyptians have succeeded in looking for alternatives to help Egypt. The alternative is to send money to Egypt to rebuild the country and contribute towards supporting a 'new Egypt'. The 25th of January revolution, moreover, has led Egyptians to believe that Egypt is making progress and heading in the right direction. Almost all the respondents Fawzy interviewed agreed that Egypt was progressing towards being a developed country, although progress was slow.

Fawzy adds that Egyptians abroad are more attached nowadays to Egypt, thanks to the revolution. Fawzy finally tackles the issue of difference between first and second generation Egyptians living in the UK. The first generation of Egyptians refers to those who were born in Egypt and currently reside in the UK and can be from different age groups; moreover, the age varies regarding when Egyptians left Egypt and settled in the UK (Rumbaut 2004, p 1166). The majority of second generation Egyptians were born in the UK and those who came to reside in the UK at an early age are included in the second generation group. He states, for instance, that both first and second generation Egyptians do not wish to permanently return to Egypt. Although they regularly visit the country; settling down in Egypt is uncommon. The second generation do not wish to live in Egypt because some of them were born in the UK and prefer to continue living there. The fact that they were born and raised in the UK and were becoming used to the British way of life compared to the critical economic and political situation in Egypt, was a good reason for second generation Egyptians not to consider settling down in Egypt. The different lifestyles, the uncertain and even risky situation in Egypt, are a few of the factors which prevented second generation Egyptians from permanently returning to Egypt.

Belonging and identity among diasporic groups

The term citizenship is complicated especially among immigrants. Those who reside away from their countries of origin tend to adopt multiple identities and citizenships. Immigrants tend to adapt to the new culture of host countries, and, simultaneously, maintain links with their country of origin (Staeheli 2003, p. 98). Labelle and Midy (1999, p. 214) dealt with the definition of citizenship and the differences between citizenship and nationality. Citizenship is the formal status of individuals who have a set of rights when awarded citizenship, whereas

citizens of a specific country enjoy rights and obligations and are protected by that country as a member of its society.

According to Labelle and Midy (1999, p. 215), dual citizenship is not recommended in some countries such as the US and Canada. The sense of belonging to countries of residence has weakened among some immigrants due to dual citizenship being discouraged. In Germany for instance, to be naturalised as a German citizen, immigrants should abandon their first citizenship. This has resulted in some of them becoming involved more in the politics of their countries of origin to show their identity and belonging. Nagel and Staeheli (2004, p. 216) study the terms citizenship, state, nation and belonging among Arab migrants in the US. The findings extracted from interviews with Arab-Americans in the US have shown that the relationship between homeland and host country is correlated. This has not merely affected the level of integration in host countries but has also affected the level of Arab-Americans' activities in the politics of their home country.

According to Labelle and Midy (1999), integration in the host country's politics not only affects immigrants' standard of living in host countries but it also affects their country of origin's development. For instance, Labelle and Midy (1999) argue that, according to their study conducted on the Haitian diaspora in North America, some immigrants seek not only to change foreign policies in their host countries but are also part of political organisations in their home country, to have a voice in both countries. According to Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014), there are mechanisms to follow to keep immigrants involved in the politics of their countries of origin. The first mechanism is termed 'diaspora-building'. Diaspora-building primarily focuses on recognising existing diaspora communities and identifying the new ones, worldwide. The second mechanism is known as 'diaspora integration'. Diaspora integration is

interested in extending the rights and obligations of diaspora communities and focuses on the construction of a legitimate transnational power.

It should be stated that International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)[3] (2007) was the first to propose the right of immigrants to vote in the elections of their country of origin. The right of immigrants to vote in these elections can strengthen the relationship of immigrants to their homeland, by allowing their right to vote, even if they reside outside of the country (cited in Zapata-Barrero et al. 2014). Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014) argue that the notion of double loyalties comes from the idea of having two nationalities and practising voting and other political activities in multiple countries. There are some European countries, such as Germany, which do not support multiple citizenships. This started to change in many European countries, when certain scholars came up with the notion of the 'zero-sum game'.

A considerable amount of literature has been published on the Egyptian diaspora in the United States. One of these studies was conducted by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), which shows that the United States is not the number one destination for Egyptians (MPI 2014). In fact, the United States is the fifth destination for Egyptian migrants, while the Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are the first ones. According to the MPI study, the number of Egyptians in the United States is estimated to be 240,000. There are first, second and third generation Egyptians in the US – approximately 175,000 first generation and 100,000 second generation. The sort of Egyptians who migrate to the US are more likely to be educated, and those who were born there, study for their bachelor's and higher degrees.

[3] IDEA is an intergovernmental organisation located in Stockholm, Sweden, that has many offices across Europe, Africa and Asia. It supports the democratic process in institutions around the world.

It is worth noting that the US received many more Egyptians, especially after the 2011 revolution (MPI 2014). The Arab Spring encouraged migration, especially those who had witnessed the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The number of Egyptian migrants rose between 2010 and 2012 (MPI 2014), which means that although Egypt is losing skilled citizens because of migration to foreign countries, it also benefits economically because of migrants sending money back home.

The role of the diaspora is essential in respect of shaping public perceptions of Egypt. The Egyptian diaspora could help to change the opinions held in foreign countries regarding Egypt and its politics. There are new organisations in the US that not only defend human rights in Egypt, but, after the 2011 uprising, they also defend prisoners' rights in the country (MPI 2014). Conversely, during President Mubarak's era, organisations in the US concentrated on cultural activities which did not involve political activities. Things dramatically changed after 2011, seeing as Egyptians inside and outside of Egypt felt a sense of liberation.

'Zero-sum' is the correlation between how involved immigrants are in their homeland's politics against the host country's politics. The argument in favour of zero-sum is that the more immigrants are involved in their homeland's politics, the less they would be interested and become integrated in the host country's political activities (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2014). In contrast, according to Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014), other scholars disagree with the concept of 'zero-sum' and believe immigrants being involved in the politics of both country of origin and host country would strengthen links between immigrants and their homeland and host country. Destination countries endeavour to support the groups disagreeing with their host country's policies in some cases, and, at the same time, support the disagreement of some groups of immigrants with their homeland's governments. In this sense, a political

confrontation will be created because of multiple loyalties. It is worth mentioning that social media websites have been employed by people and diasporic groups to stay connected to their homeland, as was the case among Egyptians during the 2011 uprising. The subsequent section explains more about the studies dealing with the role of social media and the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

Studies about the role of social media in the 2011-uprising

After reviewing studies conducted on Egyptians abroad including the UK, this section deals with the role of social media (an important contributor to the Egyptian revolution) with respect to the Egyptian society. This section introduces readers to factors contributing to the Egyptian uprising. The introduction of social media in Egypt approximately six years ago was a turning point in the lives of Egyptians, as they started to use blogs to express their opinions (Tufekci and Wilson 2012, p. 363). Tufekci adds that although authoritarian regimes, such as that of Mubarak's were strict in limiting political activities in Egypt, social media websites thus gave freedom of expression to Egyptians. The Egyptian government had started to lose control of political activists by way of social media. In addition, social media was just one part of new political communication. As Howard (2011) states, most studies conducted on the MENA, Middle East and North African countries, as well as the Arab Spring, focus on the effects of social media on the uprisings. Barrie Axford (2011), for instance, tackles this phenomenon in his article 'Talk About a Revolution: Social Media and The MENA Uprisings' and the effects of social media in these uprisings (p. 681).

The new political communication system consists of three main components (Tufekci and Wilson 2012, p. 365). The first is satellite channels such as *Al-Jazeera*, which have introduced Arabs to a new information platform. The second component is the penetration of the

Internet into the Arab world. The Internet has allowed Arabs to freely express their opinions and receive news from various sources. The third component is the introduction of mobile phones, with pictures and video specifications (p. 365). Taking pictures and recording videos by means of mobile phones is considered a turning point among Arabs. Arabs could record events such as the uprisings in the region and publish on social media to spread the word about some events not broadcast on mainstream media. As a result, people have taken control of what to broadcast, thanks to modern technology.

A considerable amount of literature has been published on the role of social media, during the Arab uprisings in different Arab countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia. One of these articles is written by Axford (2011, p. 681), who tackles the role of social media across the Middle East, particularly focusing on the MENA area. Axford examines the role of the mainstream media and discusses the number of Internet users in the Arab world. A developing country can have many Internet users; however, it can only be a number in terms of outcomes and impact – 'the voice of guns and bombs wins the revolution' according to Axford (2011). This is arguably true, but what Axford fails to acknowledge is the reasons behind the large number of Internet users who have no real impact in developing countries. Axford contradicts himself here, in terms of arguing that an essential role was played by social media in the Arab Spring, but, at the same time, Arab countries only have a limited number of Internet users although the real impact would take a long time to be realised. This is a weakness in Axford's argument. He could have explained that the Internet's impact can be effective over the short term, though in the long term, developing countries need time to adopt a real democratic model.

The Internet in the MENA region is considered to have been influential in dispersing news and events that were not covered by main media outlets. The governments in Tunisia and

Egypt shut down the Internet connection during the uprisings in 2010 and 2011 in order to stop people from using it and spreading the word among other citizens. This action was unsuccessful, however, as people found other ways to use social media. Besides, this action was too late as people were already protesting in the streets and receiving global support. New technology, such as cell phones, had become one of the most effective weapons to use in uprisings, especially in the MENA region. Tunisian protestors were holding a stone in one hand and a cell phone in another. Consequently, cell phones could be used to let others know what was going on worldwide. One of the problems is that, in order for cell phones to be effective, Internet connection is required to be in contact with the world; without an Internet connection, cell phones and social media would be practically useless. Governments in the MENA region such as those in Egypt and Tunisia, realised this, and shut down the Internet connection in the hope it would stop people from protesting, and moreover, to quell the uprisings.

Waters and Lo (2012, p. 297) examine how social media, primarily *Facebook*, is used by non-profit organisations to promote themselves in Turkey, China and the United States. The main findings in this study, are the following: social media, including *Facebook*, *Twitter* and blogs have changed the way the public uses the Internet. Waters and Lo claim that social media creates a new virtual culture which challenges current traditions and cultural habits in any society. Waters and Lo's study (2012) examines how non-profit organisations use social media to promote themselves (p. 298). These organisations use *Facebook*'s wall facility, as a platform to advertise their products, services and to request donations. They also use *Facebook*'s wall facility to have open discussions with members and to share information about specific topics. The 'status' facility on *Facebook* is also used to publicise goods and services.

This is almost the same way in which the participants in the Arab Spring used social media, predominantly *Facebook*, as a platform to share ideas, to give instructions to protesters and to gather them together, and to organise protests. Social media was used by both local people and those living abroad to stay connected and updated. This is in alignment with Water and Lo's (2012) idea of social media being revolutionary in terms of how the Internet was used and how social media created a new cultural platform. Social media is not only used for publicising goods and services, but as a source of information for some audiences (p. 299). *Facebook* and *Twitter* were used for information, as people had lost faith in the mainstream media during the Arab uprisings.

The term 'dialogic communication' was developed by Kent and Taylor (1998). This principle or term concentrates on five dimensions. The first dimension is two-way communication or ease of navigation, as stated by Waters and Lo (2012). Social media is basically based on two-way communication regarding members interacting with each other and also the administrators ('admins') of *Facebook* pages communicate with members, worldwide. Members from different countries can also interact with each other via posts, videos and links on *Facebook* or *Twitter*. Audiences can express their opinions and share ideas with others and receive rapid feedback and responses from admins and members thus, 'dialogic communication'. The second dimension is providing valuable information which can be easily distributed using social media by posting instructions and sharing experiences. Protestors in the Arab revolutions, such as the one in Egypt, were giving instructions to each other on where to meet, and warning others not to go to specific locations which might be dangerous. Protestors could view official pages of the army and police and were thus able to pass on instructions and information regarding which streets were safe by way of social media.

It is agreed that social media is a platform for engagement, although real audience engagement is far from being achieved via social media. This is a criticism of dialogic communication on which social media is based (Kent and Taylor 1998); however, there is also a cultural aspect to communication. According to Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), culture can have over 160 definitions. Researchers and scholars do not have a united definition of culture as it is rather complex. Culture, as Philips and Sackmann (2003 p.10) define it, is 'a coherent and enduring set of values that members of the nation-state carry and act upon'. Defining culture is essential in terms of examining the creation of new virtual culture via social media. Culture can also be defined as a set of habits and behaviours learned and passed on to other members of a group through daily interaction, which shows how dynamic culture is. If culture is dynamic, it can be changed and modified and a new one can even be created from scratch, as social media is creating a new culture (of communication).

Waters and Lo (2012, p. 290) observe the use of social media by non-profit organisations in high-context and low-context cultures. The findings have shown that in high-context cultures, people tend to communicate more virtually, or, as Waters and Lo describe it, 'implicitly or indirectly'. In contrast, in low-context cultures, they tend to communicate directly and explicitly. Social media have helped high-context nations to communicate implicitly. Waters and Lo, however, failed to fully address the definition of high-context and low-context cultures, in the first instance. Giving these definitions would have been beneficial in terms of having a clear picture of how using social media might differ in these cultures. Nonetheless, it is true that Waters and Lo (2012) have acknowledged that further research is required into different cultures to arrive at some conclusions.

Individualism and collectivism are different in the three countries studied by Waters and Lo (2012). For instance, in the United States, the level of individualism is high, unlike China and Turkey where the level of collectivism is high. These levels of individualism and collectivism will affect the level of engagement and use of social media in such cultures. The use of social media, primarily *Facebook*, in individualistic cultures such as the US, reveals that the level of interaction is high, unlike China and Turkey, where face-to-face interaction is more common. Consequently, the study has proven that in countries with high levels of individualism, levels of virtual engagement are also high. The study by Waters and Lo (2012) has illustrated that social media and technology can create new cultures, particularly in the case of the three countries examined, but this cannot be a generalisation, as explained above. Waters and Lo (2012) argue that social media and technology can facilitate cultural change – proven in the case of the Arab Spring, in which the Internet, mainly social media, helped to organise protestors and facilitate protests in various countries such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia.

Agichtein et al. (2008, p. 184) dealt with the issue of social media being the platform for audiences' inquiries. Social media, specifically *Facebook* and *Myspace,* have recently become 'user-generated content', according to their article. The process of user-generated content is by members asking questions and receiving answers from other members. Waters and Lo (2012) tackled the issue of how dynamic and interactive cultures can be; consequently, social media can act like separate cultures, by creating interaction and communications or 'user-generated content' (Agichtein et al. 2008, p. 185). Members of social media platforms such as *Facebook*, use them as a source of information by interacting with others – the unique feature of social media is the communication and interaction facility. People who are concerned about a specific topic, for instance, can receive immediate responses by way of

social media, rather than using search engines and receiving automated responses. However, as social media responses are based on personal opinions, these can be misleading and even problematic as they are regularly subjective and even biased. Agichtein et al. (2008, p. 186) believe using social media with regard to questions and answers, on the other hand, is more accurate than traditional content.

A large and growing body of literature has investigated the role of social media in the Arab uprisings. One of these studies was conducted by Rane and Salem (2012). The Arab revolutions, according to their research, have been termed '*Facebook* or *Twitter* revolutions'. The role that social media played in the Arab uprisings is undeniable. Nevertheless, Rane and Salem (2012) argue that the failure or success of such uprisings depends on domestic factors, and not necessarily social media, contrary to what others believe. They also state that social media was not responsible for the success of revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – it was the tool used to facilitate intra-inter group communications among protesters (Rane and Salem 2012, p. 99).

Rane and Salem (2012) also highlight the role of mainstream media in the uprisings and not merely social media. Mainstream media was responsible for conveying the message that the uprisings were peaceful and pro-democracy and were freedom movements. This resulted in gaining support, not only from Western governments but from the entire world, as their demands were also legitimate. According to the *Guardian* journalist, Peter Beaumont (2011), social media protesters across the MENA region could transmit messages to the public which could never have been broadcast on mainstream media, whether it was Western or Arab. Rane and Salem (2012) claim that the main source of information is still the mainstream media. In the case of the Egyptian revolution, people were dependent on Egyptian state TV

for information regarding the revolution's progress, although social media, at the time of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, was dominant (p. 97). The statistics in a study conducted by the Abu Dhabi Gallup Centre (2011) show that eighty-one per cent of Egyptians relied on the Egyptian state channel, sixty-three per cent depended on *Al-Jazeera,* whereas only eight per cent of Egyptians relied on social media. This study confirms the assumptions made by Rane and Salem (2012). However, the study can be challenged on the basis that it is concerned with 2011; therefore, the statistics would have probably changed after the Arab Spring, especially in the MENA region. After the Arab Spring, the number of social media users dramatically changed. Consequently, the study conducted by the Abu Dhabi Gallup Centre (2011) is challenged. Moreover, the percentage could be different nowadays due to the dramatic change after the Arab Spring.

It should be pointed out that the mainstream media has been under the control of various governments in the MENA region; consequently, content in the mainstream media has been in favour of the State. *Al-Jazeera*, a channel privately-owned by Qatari businessmen, was even deliberating whether to broadcast news which contradicted the agenda of other governments in the Arab world. Therefore, the media, especially the State media, was the first challenge which protesters revolted against in the MENA region in 2011. Rane and Salem (2012) add that, with the emergence of social media, governments in the MENA region began to understand that citizens were out of (their) control. Social media had therefore been revolutionary, especially for protesters in the MENA region, where the number of Internet users rapidly increased and where it was expected to reach 100 million users in 2015 (Ghannam 2011, p. 30).

Rane and Salem (2012) suggest that social media in the Arab uprisings have not been the main reasons for people to revolt, although social media played a vital part in mobilising the uprisings. It is true that the number of Internet users in the MENA region has increased by seventy-eight per cent, but in some Arab countries, the percentage of *Facebook* users is still low – in Egypt, for example, it is only twenty-two per cent. It is evident from the above, that social media was not the main cause of the Arab revolutions – it was merely a facilitator. Additionally, Rane et al. (2012, p. 99) assert that some countries with a low percentage of *Facebook* users witnessed uprisings. The example of that is Tunisia with only 8 per cent of Tunisians using social media. This shows that high percentages of social media are not the best indicator that a country would go through a revolution like that in Tunisia.

It has been suggested by Ghannam (2011, p. 36) that the percentage of *Facebook* users in the MENA region is rising, due to what he calls 'the youthful generation'. Young people make up almost seventy-five per cent of *Facebook* users (Ghannam 2011, p. 36). It is worth mentioning that young people in the MENA region constitute one third of the population (Ghannam 2011, p. 36). Most of the MENA region's population can therefore be considered to be the transmitters of the Arab uprisings, as Rane and Salem (2012) suggest. According to the UN, most of the population in the MENA region is under 25 years old (cited in Rane and Salem 2012). In Egypt, for instance, young people constitute fifty-two per cent of the entire population, making the youth the dominant population group in the MENA region, as Rane and Salem (2012) suggest. This has led to young people demanding democracy, freedom and dignity, by revolting against authoritarian regimes.

Rane and Salem (2012, p. 99) raise two questions: why the revolutions started in 2010 and not before, and why in certain countries and not others? The answers, according to them,

concern social media. Egypt and Tunisia are pro-West, for example, which led to the United States supporting the uprisings in those two countries. Tufekci and Wilson (2012, p. 369) claim that activists have not only met online, but also in reality. This raises the issue of 'virtual' and 'real' communities – virtual communities can sometimes dominate without meeting each other. This has created many virtual communities, especially for protesters in the Arab uprisings, wherein they could exchange ideas and give instructions on a 'virtual' platform. It is more likely, however, in the case of activists in the Arab uprisings, that community members had already met in person, and gained each other's trust, before they started organising themselves and gathering protesters, both personally and virtually. Activists would have met in venues like conferences, or Arab 'techies' (computer technologists) collectives in Cairo and so on (Tufekci and Wilson 2012). According to Tufekci and Wilson, these networks were not just for meeting local activists, but also assisted other activists to meet each other around the world, and to build a rapport (p. 370).

The media – particularly social media (*Facebook*, for example) – was the main communication medium for protesters in Egypt and Tunisia during the uprising. Furthermore, although face-to-face communication played an additional major role in disseminating information, the print media and satellite channels played a lesser part regarding the uprising in Tahrir Square in Egypt (Tufekci and Wilson 2012, p. 362). It is interesting to note that the attendance of women in the uprisings was significant. These women were educated, and some came from better economic backgrounds than the males and joined in the protests to show solidarity with their male counterparts. Social media was, moreover, also liberating women regarding using *Facebook*: *Facebook* gave them a chance to express themselves 'virtually' and a voice when they attended meetings. The female interviewees also stated that

it was difficult for them to have an opinion, but the protests allowed them to show their support (Tufekci and Wilson 2012).

Participatory journalism or citizen journalism and the Arab Spring

Participatory journalism has been common in England since the eighteenth century. Newspapers used to let audiences engage in the news they reported by publishing the comments made by readers in each edition (Singer et al. 2011). The advance of modern technology has changed the techniques employed in participatory journalism, especially regarding social media sites. According to Goode (2009), citizen journalism can include re-posting, linking and tagging.

Tufekci and Wilson (2012) tackled the issue regarding the notion of 'citizen journalists' mentioned by Rane and Salem (2012). Tufekci and Wilson stressed the point that *Al-Jazeera*, for instance, used ordinary citizens as 'citizen journalists' in order to record the most important incidents in various areas of Egypt and Tunisia. Citizen journalists are significant in terms of recording news which ordinary journalists cannot reach and reporting to the channel. Reporters can be present in major cities, for instance, but the locals would be more involved in incidents happening in their small towns or villages, which they could subsequently report by using social media. As a result, the notion of 'citizen journalists' is essential with regard to uprisings and revolutions, as small details provided by journalists cannot always be 'spot on'.

Tufekci and Wilson (2012) conducted a study on Egyptians who participated in the Tahrir Square protest in 2011, and on those who had not previously participated in any protests (p. 371). The interviews revealed that several of the respondents in the study had participated in activities with social movements and political organisations, but not in protests such as those

in 2011. This shows that people had become more aware of the notion of protesting for change and how a 'protesting culture had emerged'.

Studies on the Arab Spring

Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) conducted a study on the activities of the Syrian diaspora, and its role as Syrians in the uprising. The study focuses on how the Syrian diaspora was the bridge between activists inside and outside the country. The term 'citizen journalists' emerged then, as citizens, acting like journalists, informed the world of what was happening in Syria. This term was later used in Egypt with the help of social media, when ordinary people were able to report incidents which actual journalists could not reach (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013).

The authors also argue that diaspora groups are inclined to interfere with their country of origin's political activities; with the rise of globalisation, diasporic groups are more involved in politics and engagement with conflicts than they previously were. The Syrian uprising, as with other Arab uprisings, had what is called 'distributed leadership'. Distributed leadership was present in most Arab revolutions, primarily Tunisia and Egypt, due to the public's contribution to the uprising by way of publishing videos and news via social media (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013). This demonstrates the idea of citizen journalists raised by Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) and how they played an essential leading role in the success of the revolution. Syrian activities, especially in the diaspora, raised awareness of the role that the Syrian diaspora can play using social media.

Regarding the importance of diasporic groups pertaining to revolutions, particularly in the case of the Syrian uprising, Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) claim that, not only have Syrian families in the United Kingdom and United States been threatened by Syrian

authorities, but also that their families back home in Syria have been intimidated. The Syrian authorities have introduced these measures to stop Syrian activists in the country and abroad from reporting any abuses of human rights; and those who did so faced torture and even death.

The role of diasporic groups became more powerful when the Syrian regime restricted communication between Syrian activists inside Syria. Syrian activists in the diaspora therefore adopted a strategy to raise the issues that internal activists could not publish. New media has made activists in the diaspora more powerful and helped to make their mission less difficult. The term 'members of both worlds' is coined by Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) and refers to 'host country' and 'homeland'. It has been used in order to demonstrate the vital role that diasporas play with regard to repressed nations such as Syria, and their uprising against President Assad's regime.

The strategy of Syrian activists in the diaspora is as follows: (i) report the sufferings of Syrians inside Syria to the whole world; (ii) share the hatred of the Syrian regime with Syrians inside Syria: (iii) tell the host country they are aware of their homeland's situation; and finally (iv) show their solidarity with Syrians inside Syria and what the Syrian regime is doing to them (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013). One of the interviewees in the study by Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti states that even if some people are not considered journalists but act as journalists or 'citizen journalists', they have a duty to report the truth to the whole world. Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) have written about social media in the Egyptian revolution and called the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria 'web-fuelled social movements' or cyber-activism. Additionally, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) argue that social media has given

the chance to some groups which are under-represented in developing countries, such as HIV/AIDS sufferers and Muslim feminists to raise their voice.

Summary

The Egyptian diaspora, the main scope of this thesis, has been thoroughly discussed. Studies on diaspora communities principally Egyptians in the UK have been dealt with. The other topic discussed is the Arab Spring, primarily the 2010 Tunisian uprising and how the Egyptian uprising was affected by it. This is followed by the Egyptian revolution and its causes and effects on Egypt, to show the importance of such a historic moment in Egyptian history. Given the fact that the Egyptian uprising has been termed the 'social media revolution', the role of social media has been dealt with.

It is crucial to mention studies on diaspora communities to have an idea of such communities and compare them with the targeted group. The chapter also dealt with studies that dealt with the role of the media in the Arab Spring to apply to a targeted group and how the media have played a role in Arab uprisings. However, there is a gap in the literature concerning the effects of the 2011 uprising on Egyptians in the UK in regard to belonging, identity, political participation and the role of the media; hence, the present study focuses principally on these issues.

Chapter Five: Methodology

Introduction

A presentation of methods adopted in this research is given in this chapter. The first section of the chapter concerns the main methods that are used in this thesis, such as interviews and ethnographic work. The second section focuses on the reasons for choosing these two methods. The following section discusses the difference between qualitative and quantitative methods, and why the qualitative approach has been selected as the main method for this research. The ensuing section focuses on the interviews and how they were conducted with 22 Egyptians in the UK. The section regarding interviews is divided into sub-sections comprising participants, recruitment, access, ethical consideration, transcription, translation and analysis; in addition, the concept of saturation in qualitative research is presented as justification for conducting a specific number of interviews. The concluding section in this chapter discusses the role of participant observation as part of ethnography and is the second method used in this thesis. It should be stated that ethnographic research involves participating in and observing events or procedures. The participant observation for this research project involved attending and engaging in protests and marches organised by the Egyptian community in the UK. A summary concludes this chapter.

Kumar (1999) argues that conducting research is a way of thinking and adopting 'a habit of questioning' (p. 2); furthermore, that research is not only about statistics and techniques. Research can be simple and find answers to questions concerning day-to-day activities (p. 6). Although conducting research can be simple, researchers need to be careful in formulating theories and laws constructed from research (p. 6). Lynch (2014) maintains that in qualitative research, meaning can be found in the entire text and, by examining experiences and personal

views, this meaning can be found, unlike in quantitative research which is principally concerned with numbers and statistics.

The researcher's voice in qualitative research is enormously important and should be echoed throughout the whole thesis. Qualitative and quantitative approaches meet at some point of the investigation, although processes vary. According to Newman and Benz (1998), the difference between qualitative and quantitative approaches is: first, the qualitative approach interprets and describes reality and subsequently develops a theory, which will explain the research journey. Conversely, the quantitative approach starts with a theory or hypothesis, with the possibility of either confirming or rejecting it (Newman and Benz 1998).

Research problem

To start conducting the research, a research problem has to be identified. The research problem in this thesis is that more studies need to be conducted on the Egyptian Diaspora, especially in the UK Studying the effects that the 2011 Egyptian revolution has had on the diaspora and Egyptians would hopefully reveal new results and would be a new contribution to current studies on diaspora groups, especially Egyptians abroad. The identification of the research problem generated three research questions:

(i) Has the 2011 revolution affected the sense of belonging, Egyptian identity and sense of pride among the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK?

(ii) To what extent has the political participation of Egyptians in the UK in political activities, for example protesting, changed after the 2011 rebellion? And, to what extent has the 2011 Egyptian revolt represented a turning point regarding the political participation of Egyptians in the UK?

(iii) How did Egyptians in the UK use the media, mainly social and mainstream and Arabic and Western media during the 2011 revolution and its aftermath?

Qualitative research

Qualitative research primarily adopts a naturalistic approach. This approach generally examines phenomena in the real world (Golafshani 2003). Golafshani (2003) asserts that quantitative researchers try their best not to become personally involved in the research, unlike qualitative researchers whose personal involvement is imperative. This is what Haynes (2012) discusses in his article on reflexivity in qualitative research (reflexivity, validity and other terms are discussed in the following sections).

Brannen and Coram (1992) claim that there is a difference between qualitative and quantitative research. Defining variables is how to differentiate qualitative and quantitative research. For instance, in qualitative research, the researcher starts by looking through a wide lens, searching for patterns of inter-relationships between known concepts, whereas in quantitative research, the researcher starts with a narrow range of variables (p. 4). The second difference between qualitative and quantitative research is related to the instruments used in data collection. For example, in qualitative research, the researcher needs to be physically involved in collecting data by way of participant observation. Thus, the researcher must be present in person to observe people in their social worlds (Brannen and Coram 1992). The same is expected when conducting interviews, as the researcher is personally involved in the interview by means of asking questions and interacting with the interviewees (p. 5). Conducting quantitative research, by contrast, involves merely designing a questionnaire and having no further interaction with the respondents. It should also be mentioned that

extrapolation and generalisability are the concepts which differentiate quantitative and qualitative research (p. 5).

Regarding induction and deduction, quantitative research adopts the inductive approach – discovering whether a group of people has a specific character. The main aim of quantitative research is to conclude whether a specific character which already exists is present or not in a group of people. Conversely, Brannen and Coram (1992) claim that qualitative research is about the concepts and categories themselves, and not their frequency (p. 5). Moreover, qualitative research concentrates on the concepts themselves and how to test them, rather than the implication of theories; thus, qualitative research is theoretical rather than descriptive (p. 6).

Reaves (1992) defines quantitative research as measuring the quantities of a specific thing, while qualitative research measures the quality of something; thus, qualitative research does not deal with numbers but rather with the meaning of a phenomenon or object (p. 16). Moreover, the qualitative approach concentrates on the significance of meaning and experiences of individuals rather than the numbers and statistics related. This does not indicate that the meaning of, and emphasis on, experiences are not significant, or that quantitative research does not address them. As previously mentioned, qualitative research is responsible for the meanings of experiences. Reaves (1992) maintains that quantitative research does not ignore the importance of the meaning of experiences, nonetheless it is not the focus (p. 16). According to Brannen and Coram (1992), most qualitative research is descriptive, unlike quantitative research which is more about numbers, graphs and calculations (p. 6). Researchers who use quantitative research tend to focus on the term 'validity'. To achieve validity in quantitative research, data should be generated from more

than one type of method, such as interview questions (p. 14). In contrast, in qualitative research, the focus is the nature of data and how data are related to established theories and their relation to the problem to be addressed (p. 15).

There are some research projects that require mixed methods. For instance, some cases require using the quantitative approach at the beginning of the project and using the qualitative approach later. The reason for that is that some qualitative research requires quantitative data at the beginning of the project to provide a statistical background for the problem to be addressed. Using mixed methods is therefore valuable regarding statistical information about a phenomenon and, by using the quantitative approach this might benefit the findings of a qualitative research project (p. 25). Thomas (2003) defines qualitative research as 'a researcher describing kinds of characteristics of people and events without comparing events in terms of measurements or amounts' (p. 1). Conversely, the focus of quantitative research is on measurements and the amounts of characteristics of people in the sample being studied by the researcher (p. 1). These definitions are a simplified explanation of the two different methods of research and how they could be used.

Thomas (2003) adds that qualitative researchers study things in their natural environments, and tend to interpret phenomena according to how people see them and through their stories. Consequently, qualitative methods depend on people's experiences in their natural settings (p. 1). Qualitative researchers look at empirical material such as interviews, case studies, life stories and personal experience and begin interpreting them according to people's personal lives (Thomas 2003). According to Thomas (2003), qualitative research is simply about making sense of personal stories and the interaction between people in a society (p. 2).

The focus of quantitative research, in contrast, is on statistics and numbers to test hypotheses (Thomas 2003). Quantitative researchers tend to depend on previous quantitative research conducted by others and build on it (p. 2). In quantitative research, researchers tend to seek interpretation of the material to produce generalisable results (Thomas 2003). Thomas (2003) argues that most authors believe that qualitative and quantitative methods are complementary and not antagonistic. The quantitative approach, it is claimed, is supported by a scientific approach, believing that the world is paved with measurable and observable elements (p. 6). The qualitative approach, in contrast, is supported by an interpretivist approach which reveals that reality is socially constructed by people in a society (p. 6).

Interviews

The interview technique has been selected as a method in this thesis for many reasons. An interview is not only a structured conversation but, according to Kvale (2008), it is 'a conversation site for knowledge' (p. 5). Conducting interviews allows the exchange of ideas, opinions and knowledge. In addition, examining people's experience and feelings can be approached by means of conducting interviews. Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013, p. 22), for instance, conducted research on 'diasporic Syrian activists and their role, as Syrian citizens, in what was happening in their homeland'. The interview method was used to examine their feelings. Semi-structured interviews were chosen in the current project for various reasons. For example, interaction between the interviewer and interviewees is possible, unlike in surveys or questionnaires.

Drever (2003, p. 10) claims that surveys are inflexible once they have been sent by post – the researcher cannot edit or elaborate some questions. During an interview, mainly face to

face, the interviewer can not only explain unclear questions, but other questions can be raised during the interview. Moreover, in the case of surveys, the questions are typically close-ended and require only 'yes' or 'no' answers. These answers do not demonstrate feelings or explain a specific matter in more detail. Drever (2003) explains that several answers might be incomplete in surveys, as respondents answer questions individually without supervision. These answers may be useless for the project. In addition, respondents cannot be asked to answer them again or to elaborate on a specific question. Interviews, in contrast, allow elaboration of the questions and answers to obtain an appropriate answer. Surveys do not capture feelings or memories of a specific event, and body language and emotions cannot be observed through surveys. Consequently, interviews are the most appropriate tool to adopt for this purpose.

According to Drever (2003, p. 11), in some cases, interviewers visit interviewees in their homes to observe their daily lives, as such details can have considerable significance when researching specific topics. Interviews are essential for the current research, for several reasons: the project examines the feelings, sense of belonging and effects of the revolution on peoples' lives. This can be examined by using the qualitative method which deals with quality rather than quantity. Padgett (2008) argues that qualitative methods involve engagement in peoples' lives, not merely quantitative statistics (p. 2). Padgett implies that if the researcher needs to investigate the in-depth feelings of people and their lived experiences, the qualitative method is the best tool (p. 16). The focus in this research is on how, and to what extent, the revolution affected the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK. Consequently, conducting interviews and adopting ethnographic research methods are essential in this case.

Marshall et al. (1995, p. 81) claim that the most significant element in conducting in-depth interviews is how a researcher asks the questions that can help to interviewees to reveal their opinions. There are some cases in which interviewees might not answer the researcher's questions in full detail. The researcher's mission is to rephrase the questions to encourage interviewees to further explain their experience in a specific issue. Close-ended questions will probably not give the researcher what they want (or need) to know, therefore, asking open-ended questions is the solution (p. 80). One of the most essential tasks of a researcher is to encourage answers which reflect the interviewees' points of view and not those of the researcher with the aim of avoiding bias (p. 80).

One of the major weaknesses of conducting interviews is the notion that participants may not disclose everything about their personal lives to the researcher. This is problematic, as the researcher hopes for responses that might be valuable in explaining the research phenomenon or problem studied (p. 81). It should be mentioned that this may be the researcher's fault for not asking questions which do not encourage long narratives. This may be because the researcher lacks the expertise and knowledge of the local language, or lacks the skills required (Marshall et al. 1995, p. 81). Gill et al. (2008) argue that interviews are the most common method used in qualitative research, as they help to generate stories concerning beliefs, views and experiences of individuals. In this research, conducting interviews has therefore been chosen as the principal method through which to explore the beliefs and views of Egyptians in the UK regarding their political participation, belonging and identity. Therefore, this study is interested in the interviewee's personal views.

Gill et al. (2008, p. 291) differentiate between structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews: (i) structured interviews are those which have a set of questions with

no follow up questions. Structured interviews are not a commonly used method because triggering information from participants is limited (Gill et al. 2008); (ii) unstructured interviews do not have a specific scope or set of questions but start with a broad question and then progress from there. Gill et al. (2008, p. 292) claim that unstructured interviews are time-consuming and hard to manage. Additionally, because of the lack of an organised set of questions to ask in the interview, the interview may last for hours and lack guidance in terms of what to ask next. Unstructured interviews would be more likely to be 'chatting' about several topics. Finally, (iii) Gill et al. (2008) discuss semi-structured interviews in more depth, by explaining their importance in research. Semi-structured interviews are significant because the questions are more specific. This means that the interviewer will be guided by a better organised interview which would be more successful for both the interviewer and the interviewee. Additionally, a significant feature of semi-structured interviews is flexibility, unlike structured and unstructured interviews. The flexibility of semi-structured interviews also allows for dealing with new topics that might arise during the interviews, an explanation of them, and to elaborate on new findings in the research (Gill et al. 2008, p. 293).

To summarise, semi-structured interviews are perfectly suitable for this project, seeing as they are preferable when researching a topic involving emotions and memories. Surveys and questionnaires can be used but are not considered appropriate for this project. The interviewer must follow certain regulations, such as timing, tone of voice, body language and scheduling. Small-scale research consequently requires interviews, rather than questionnaires or surveys which would be more appropriate for large-scale research projects.

Recruitment

Participants were chosen to be interviewed according to specific criteria: first, they should be of Egyptian descent, either born in Egypt or the UK; second, the age of participants should be between 18 and 40 and 41+; third, they must have witnessed the 2011 revolution, either from the UK or personally in Egypt; and finally, they must have lived in the UK since 2011. The above criteria were stated in the social media post and leaflet.

To access participants for this study, Egyptians living in the UK were found on social networking groups (*Facebook* and *Meetup* –Meetup.com*)* and by distributing leaflets calling for participation in the project (see Appendix 1.1). The total number of respondents was 119. Out of these respondents, only 22 successfully completed the interview. Table 2 presents basic information regarding each participant. The rest either withdrew for various reasons including personal circumstances, scheduling and logistical reasons, or as they were leaving the UK, or were excluded as they did not meet the criteria. The number of respondents from *Facebook* was 90 and from *Meetup* was 28, whilst one respondent was obtained by way of distributing leaflets. Table 3 illustrates the sources of recruitment and numbers of participants recruited from each source.

Table 2 List of participants in alphabetical order

Participant Name	Gender	Age	Place of birth	Stay in UK (Yr)	Generation	Passport	Relationship status
Dina	F	22	Kuwait	20	1.75	Dual	Single
Ehab	M	43	Egypt	23	1st (Mid adulthood)	Dual	Divorced
Eslam	M	35	E	2	1st (Young adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Hani	M	35	E	3	1st (Mid adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Issam	M	36	E	2	1st (Mid adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Karim	M	26	E	5	1st (Early adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Khouloud	F	45	E	15	1st (Young adulthood)	Dual	Divorced
Maher	M	38	UAE	10	1st (Young adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Majed	M	24	E	2	1st (Early adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Mazen	M	20	E	2	1st (Early adulthood)	Egyptian	Single
Michael	M	31	E	24	1.50 (Came to UK aged 7)	Dual	In a relationship
Mohamed	M	32	E	4	1st (Young adulthood)	Dual	Married
Mohammed	M	37	E	34	1.75	Dual	Single
Muhammad	M	18	UK	Since birth	2nd	British	Single
Nevine	F	50	E	25	1st (Young adulthood)	Dual	Divorced
Rami	M	36	UK	Since birth	2nd	Dual	Single
Rana	F	20	E	4	1.25	Dual	Single
Salim	M	32	E	10	1st (Early adulthood)	Egyptian	Married
Sama	F	24	U.S.	2	2nd	Dual	Single
Shabaan	M	50	E	10	1st (Mid adulthood)	Dual	Married
Shereen	F	31	E	5	1st (Young adulthood)	Egyptian	Married
Sherif	M	33	UK	Since birth	2nd	British	Single

Table 3 Sources of recruitment

Source of recruitment	Respondents who contacted the researcher to express an interest in being interviewed	People that participated
Facebook	90	18
Meetup	28	4
Leaflet	1	0
Total	119	22

On *Facebook* respondents were contacted and a message sent to them explaining the details of project and asking them whether they would be willing to participate. Participants from the selected groups were: Egyptians living in London and other areas in the UK; belonged to Egyptian student associations in the UK; participated in events and activities concerning Egypt and Egyptian political groups in the UK. Potential participants were contacted by 'private message'. Several potential participants on *Facebook* and *Meetup* did not reply, whilst the wishes were respected of those who did reply and stated that they were not interested in the topic. The procedure was as follows: when people replied and agreed to participate in the project, an information sheet was sent to them to read and to give them a chance to ask questions related to the project (see Appendix four); secondly, arrangements were made for face-to-face interviews, date, time and place. Interviewees were sent an information sheet and a consent form to sign for interviews, with the intention of protecting the interviewer's and the interviewees' rights (see Appendix 3).

The admins of several Egyptian groups on *Facebook* were contacted for two reasons: one was to look for participants for the project and the other was to ascertain if there were any upcoming events organised by the group. A search for Egyptian and Arab groups and pages (see Figure 3) resulted in contacting potential participants.



Figure 3 Egyptian groups on Facebook used to find potential participants

The second website used to recruit Egyptians was *Meetup.com*. *Meetup* is a social networking website aimed at gathering people together and introducing them to new people. There are many groups on *Meetup* and several Arab and Egyptian groups were found. For example, a group named 'London's Arab Circle' was contacted to access Egyptians who are members of this group. The reason that there were only a few replies from the *Meetup* website is that it is not very popular and not many people check the website. Nevertheless, it was a successful technique in this case, as some respondents were found on the website. A few members of the *Meetup* website agreed to be interviewed. However, one of the *Meetup* members, Eslam, read the post on the website and contacted me. He stated, 'Your PhD topic is very interesting, I am very interested in participating and reading the final report'.



Figure 4 Screenshot of an Arabic social group on meetup.com – second recruitment source

The final way to recruit participants was through distributing project leaflets (see Appendix 1.1). Leaflets were written in both English and Arabic to enable those participants who do not read or speak English to understand the details of the project. The leaflets were distributed in different universities, such as the universities of Bedfordshire, Sussex, Brighton, Queen Mary University of London and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). In addition, shopping malls such as 'The Mall' in Luton, and 'Churchill Square Mall' in Brighton were also used as venues to distribute leaflets. Nonetheless, this way to recruit participants was ineffective. This way of attempting to recruit participants was unsuccessful for security reasons; some potential respondents did not show an interest in participating because of the nature of the project tackling political participation. Although the focus of the project is not purely Egyptian politics, Egyptians fear such topics because they discuss people's political

activities. Most Egyptians, especially those who used to live in Egypt, still believe in conspiracy theories and the sense of being spied upon is common. Consequently, many Egyptians were anxious and fearful of participating in the project. Only one person expressed an interest in participating and directly contacted me after reading the leaflet. This one potential respondent then apologised and informed me that they would not be participating in the project for personal circumstances.

Participants, gender, nationality and religion

As mentioned previously, 22 interviewees participated in the study: 16 were male, while only 6 were female. More males participated than females for many reasons. The first reason is that out of politeness and a willingness to help, as I am not Egyptian, the male respondents wished to assist with the project. Additionally, it is also my personal opinion that males are more willing to help foreign, female researchers whom they feel are more attractive, by being helpful and polite. This is shown by the number of males who participated in contrast to females. The other reason is that I am not Egyptian, Iraqi. Although the interviewees were suspicious regarding non-Egyptians intervening and asking questions related to Egypt, many of the Egyptians in the UK have a sense of helping Arabs studying the country's affairs and benefiting Egypt in a positive way. As I lived in Egypt for ten years and speak Arabic (in the Egyptian dialect), I believe that this enabled me to communicate more easily with participants. Regarding religion, there was a question about religion in the demographic questions. Among the 22 interviewees, there was one Christian and 21 Muslims. As the sample is random, plus religion is not the main topic of the thesis, I could not pick a specific religion. Therefore, I could not draw a comparison between Muslims and Coptic-Christians.

Process of conducting the interviews

The first stage of building a rapport with participants begins long before face-to-face interviews take place. I, firstly, exchange many instant messages and calls via phone, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and Skype. This communication helps in building a rapport, explaining more about what to expect in the interviews and finalising the logistics of the meetings. On the day of the interview, I met the participant in a public place for the semi-structured interview. It began by explaining the consent form that had to be signed and gaining the individual's permission to record the interview. Afterwards, the first ten minutes are dedicated to building a rapport and making participants feel comfortable.

Subsequently, the next 45 minutes were spent discussing the 2011 Egyptian revolution in relation to their life. The semi-structured interview focused on learning more about choosing to live in the UK, as well as their relationship with Egypt and the UK. It also explored their Egypt-related political activities in the UK and their ways to stay informed about the recent events and news in Egypt. In addition, another important question ascertained what passport(s) the participant holds. This question was asked to both those born in Egypt and in the UK and was included in the section about passports: whether they are 'useful' or merely 'a piece of paper' and the significance of holding multiple identities. Some interviewees were suspicious about why the researcher (a non-Egyptian) is studying such a topic. Even if such comments were made as a joke, some interviewees believed in the notion that I could be a spy. Though such a notion was overwhelming, some Egyptians agreed to contribute and endeavour to answer the interview questions. Moreover, to keep a detailed record of the interviews, I kept a diary of each separate interview by taking notes before, during and after the interviews. Burgees (2006) explains the importance of keeping a diary in research. The

research diary keeps a record of minute details the researcher might forget after the interview or event has occurred. For that reason, keeping a diary is exceedingly beneficial.

The face-to-face interview locations were in public places such as cafes, restaurants, or railway stations in London. The location was chosen according to the preference of the participants. Most interviews were conducted in London, as previously mentioned, apart from Eslam and Shabaan, whose interviews were conducted on the phone and Skype because Eslam resides in Scotland and Shabaan lives and works in Newcastle.

Ethical considerations

Attention was paid to ethical considerations regarding this project. Consideration was given to ethical issues such as confidentiality – the most important aspect – information sheets and consent forms to sign to protect the rights of the participants and the researcher. This section explains some of the ethical considerations that were considered during the research project.

Researcher's positioning

A part of ethical considerations is to acknowledge the position of the researcher in the project. The researcher in this project is an Arab herself which can be challenging. One aspect is that, the researcher needs to be extremely careful about having unbiased or neutral opinions. It was easier to access the Arabs, mainly Egyptians, given the fact that the researcher lived in Egypt for many years and speaks Arabic. Nonetheless, this is, once again, problematic for several reasons: first, being an Arab and not Egyptian may have made some participants suspicious as to why a non-Egyptian would be interested in Egypt; second, a few participants felt that non-Egyptians might be spying on them by asking questions, especially regarding political activities. This could be the reason for some potential participants refusing

to participate in the project (see Figure 5 – a screenshot of the reply from a potential participant who was not interested in politics). Regarding the objectivity of the researcher, being an Arab and close to Egyptian culture, some interviewees asked me for an opinion or which political group I support. However, I was not able to do give a personal viewpoint because I had to maintain neutrality and objectivity. This issue was challenging when striving to build a rapport with the interviewees; therefore, an explanation had to be given to the participants that researchers must be objective and always remain neutral and that they cannot influence research with their personal opinions.

Confidentiality

According to Wiles, Crow, Heath and Charles (2006), confidentiality in research is an essential aspect. Six interviewees out of the 22 Egyptians preferred not to use their real names in the final thesis. After asking for their permission to use their first names, Issam, Mazen, Salim, Majed, Maher and Sama refused to use their actual first names. Mazen's reason for not wishing to use his genuine first name was the instability and lack of security in Egypt. Therefore, a pseudonym is used in the analysis and findings chapters. Additionally, using false names is better than using the technique of employing numbers for participants, as it not only helps readers to follow the stories presented to avoid any confusion but will also help participants to follow their own stories.

Salim preferred not to use his real name for security reasons, although he did not explain why he did not wish his genuine name to be revealed. It is worth mentioning that Maher also did not wish to use his actual first name. This was the same in relation to three more participants, Issam, Sama and Majed, who did not want to reveal their real names. Additionally, some interviewees only agreed for their first names to be used but requested

that their contact details were not revealed. To protect the interviewees' privacy, all these conditions were respected.



Figure 5 A potential participant showing no interest in the project

The period of recruiting and interviewing participants lasted one and a half years – from July 2014 until January 2016. To save participants' information, data was securely kept in locked folders with a password. I as the researcher am the only one aware of the password, to protect the data. Data is only shared by me with the supervisory team. Furthermore, after the submission of the thesis, the data will be destroyed. It is also worth stating that the ages of the participants in the analysis chapters are their ages according to the year the interviews were conducted.

Consent form

A consent form was presented to each interviewee to sign at every interview. The form consists of sections regarding the consent of interviewees to be interviewed, the recording of the interview and the use (or not) of the interviewee's first name during the analysis. The other section is to make sure that the interviewees have read the information sheet and to ask questions if necessary, which the participants have a right to do (a consent form sample is attached in Appendix 3).

Information sheet

An information sheet was sent to each interviewee to read carefully and to encourage them ask any questions related to the project. The information sheet allows the participants to read details about the thesis topic and to be completely aware of the topic and what types of questions will be asked during the interviews. The information sheet makes sure that both interviewees and interviewers' rights are protected. Moreover, it also gives the right to participants to withdraw from the project at any time, without giving any reason (information sheet sample attached in Appendix 4).

Saturation

The saturation concept is related to qualitative research. Mason (2010) claims that saturation is a factor that can affect the sample size in research. Additionally, saturation can control sample size and how many interviews, for instance, each project requires. Mason (2010, p. 2) claims that in his examination of a sample size of more than 500 PhD theses using interviews (in Theses.com), the mean sample size was 31 interviews; however, the size might vary from one PhD thesis to another. Ritchie et al. (2003) argue that sample size in qualitative research does not require too many interviews and that additional data does not mean new

information, as qualitative research is concerned with meaning and not the amount of data collected. The number of interviews conducted in this interview is 22. The reason why this number was selected was because of the concept of saturation. Glaser and Strauss (1967) state that a saturation point is reached when no new data is generated by new interviews.

Data Analysis

The thematic analysis method has been chosen in terms of analysing the data collected from the interviews. Thematic analysis is a way of observing something (Boyatzis 1998, p. 1). Thematic analysis is a process beginning with investigating a thing and then seeing that thing as something which has a meaning. Finally, it leads to the interpretation which establishes a meaning for that thing (p. 1). Boyatzis adds that if a group of people observe the same phenomenon, the analysis might differ from one person to another. The final step is to determine the correct interpretation of that thing which makes sense (Boyatzis 1998). Furthermore, to use thematic analysis, the researcher must sense themes, as described by Boyatzis (1998). Consistency is essential regarding using thematic analysis. For instance, to achieve consistency, the researcher needs to obtain the same results from coding today, tomorrow or in a year. The researcher will achieve this by consistently and accurately encoding data. Coding of the data must not reflect the researcher's personal point of view or perception of the world and will thus result in accurate coding and findings.

According to Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p. 27), coding is a way of relating the data collected with our ideas and creates a meaning for them. According to Saldaña (2012), coding is a short phrase which combines a group of statements concerning a certain topic. There are two cycles of coding. Saldaña (2012) claims that during the first cycle, coding can include a single word or paragraph. The most important point is to ascertain one idea which unites all

statements under one code; whereas the second cycle includes developing the results of the first cycle. Boyatzis (1998) identifies several advantages by using thematic analysis. One advantage is that thematic analysis allows researchers to gather qualitative information which, in turn, allows communication with the wider population of scholars and researchers in the same field. Additionally, thematic analysis helps to make knowledge available to many.

Formulating themes

The first theme formulated from conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK is their political participation and how effective it has been for Egypt. The first sub-category of this theme is the effectiveness of participation in the UK compared to that in Egypt. The second sub-category is the effect place of birth has on whether to be politically active, either in the UK or in Egypt. The third sub-category is a comparison between political participation among Egyptians in the UK before, during and after the 2011 Egyptian uprising. The fourth sub-category is the difference in political participation among various generations of Egyptians in the UK. The final sub-category is an investigation of the revolution's effects on Egyptians regarding political participation.

Analysing data has revealed differences among generations of Egyptians. Rumbaut (2004) conducted a study on immigrants in the United States and established different types of immigrants. First, he differentiates between two main generations, first and second generations. There are different categories of first generation according to age and age at emigration. Generations are grouped as first generation, including all those who were born in Egypt, but differ in age with regards to when they left the home country. The first category in the first generation is those who left Egypt in their early adulthood – aged 18 to 24. The second category regarding the first generation is those who left their home country in their

young adulthood years aged between 24 and 34, having completed their education in their home country. The third category related to the first generation is immigrants who left their home country aged between 34 and 54. The fourth category is those immigrants who left their home country aged 54 and above. This last category pertaining to the first generation is those who are unlikely to leave their home country unless it is essential, or are following their children (Rumbaut 2004). Rumbaut (2004) has termed those who can neither be classified as first generation nor second generation as 1.25, 1.50 and 1.75 generations. It is my view that they should be grouped as part of the second generation.

The next generation of immigrants is children of immigrants leaving their home country aged between 0 and 5 years. This group is known as the '1.75 generation'. Rumbaut (2004) contends that these immigrants share virtually the same experience as second generation immigrants born in host countries; however, they cannot be classified as the second generation, as they arrived in the host countries at a very early age and are therefore, not pure first generation. The adaptation outcomes and experience of the 1.75 generation differ from those who emigrated when they were older. The 1.50 generation is those who emigrated to host countries aged between 6 and 12. Rumbaut (2004) calls immigrants who left their home country aged 13–17, the '1.25 generation'. This generation is characterised as sharing similar experiences with first generation immigrants, although it differs in the level of adaptation to the host society and work or social experiences. This group of immigrants is classified as the 1.25 generation, seeing as it is neither pure first generation nor native-born second generation.

The last category of generations is the second generation of immigrants: children born to immigrants in host countries, having either one immigrant parent or both, are classified as

second generation. The interviewees in this thesis belong to different generations. For instance, 14 interviewees belong to the first generation, including four who left their home country in their early adulthood years, six from the young adulthood age group and four from the mid-adulthood group. Eight interviewees are from the second generation, of which only one is from the 1.25 age group, another from the 1.50 age group, two from the 1.75 generation, while the four remaining interviewees are from the second generation.

The process of coding and formulating themes is discussed here. According to Khandkar (2009), open coding is one of the key processes of data analysis in qualitative research. Open coding involves three principal stages: noticing, collecting and making sense of what has been collected to link this process to theories and to formulate interesting themes (p. 1). Open coding allows the examination of data and thinking of the relationships between every transcript and linking one interview to another. The researchers starts to generate themes from these data, and these become clear through noting and considering the data relationships. Colour coding has been used to highlight each theme with a specific colour in all the transcripts. For instance, green has been used to mark the political participation activities of the interviewee. Moreover, pink was used to mark belonging and identity sections, while yellow was employed to refer to everything related to media (see Appendices 2.1 and 2.2).

Reflexivity and validity

Reflexivity is how the researcher positions themself in the process of research and the outcomes (Haynes 2012). In terms of reflexivity, the researcher conducting the project must be aware of themself as a researcher and how this can affect the project. A researcher's reflexivity is related to one's thinking about specific things and how research can change such

thinking and understanding of things. Additionally, it is also related to how such understanding affects the way research is conducted (Haynes 2012). Reflexivity is significant in terms of relating the researcher to the topic and how this can affect the process of research, negatively, positively or neutrally. Hibbert et al. (2010) imply that reflexivity is not just about considering the position of the researcher, but also linking the researcher's experience and ways of analysing things according to the way the researcher deals with such experience, as well as how it might affect the research. Alvesson and Skoldburg (2000) claim that the two main elements of reflexivity are interpretation and reflection. Interpretation is not a reflection of reality but a reflection of the researcher's values and political position on the reflection of things regarding research.

Cunliffe (2003) states that researchers should not just depend on their way of questioning the truth mentioned by interviewees, but also need to question their own ability to construct the truth from participants' claims, and how such truth is constructed. The truth according to the researcher's perspective can affect how the truth is created by participants. Validity in qualitative research differs from quantitative research wherein validity is based on statistics and variables. Validity in qualitative research, in contrast, is based on people's points of view and how they are interpreted by the researcher. Altheide and Johnson (1994) have dealt with the notion of 'validity-as-reflexive-accounting'; it primarily regards the process of interaction between the researcher and the topic and making sense of it.

There are various ways of achieving validity. Triangulation is the first type of validity in which researchers search for relationships between participants' stories to form themes and categories (Creswell and Miller 2000). According to Creswell and Miller (2000), the other type of validity is member checking. Validity is back in the hands of the participants because the

researcher sends the analysis to participants for approval. This is a good chance for participants to validate the project by approving what they have mentioned and explained to the researcher. Validity can also follow another procedure, such as 'prolonged engagement in the field'. This procedure involves researchers spending time in the field to build rapport and trust with the participants, making participants feel safe when they tell the researcher personal stories and share their experiences (Creswell and Miller 2000).

An audit trail is required to make the research credible. An audit trail is principally about documenting every stage of the project, including interviews, observations and other details. (Creswell and Miller 2000). An audit trail presents readers and external auditors with confirmation that the data are credible and have not been fabricated. It should also be mentioned that collaboration is another way of validating research by involving participants in the research process. For instance, participants might become co-researchers by helping to form research questions and even helping in the analysis process (Creswell and Miller 2000). This could be challenging, however. Even if this may add credibility to the research, how can the researcher be sure that data would not be biased, seeing as they may depend on the specific ideologies of the participants. Creswell and Miller (2000) add that peer debriefing is another lens through which to achieve credibility and validity concerning research. Peer debriefing predominantly allows an external peer to look at the completed work and ask questions about the narrative and themes. Moreover, an alternative validation procedure is the rich and thick description of the project, given that this will give the impression that the researcher is knowledgeable in the field and in relation to the project (Creswell and Miller 2000).

Ethnographic work

The second method chosen is ethnographic research. Ethnographic research for this thesis is about attending Egyptian events organised by the Egyptian community in the UK. Ethnographic research has been beneficial in terms of accessing Egyptians in the UK who are not on *Facebook*. Participant observation is a method which can be used in almost all studies examining human existence (Jorgensens 1989, p. 10). Jorgensens (1989) implies that participant observation is unique in measuring relationships among people and how they deal with each other.

Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that the qualitative approach requires using more than one method. For example, when investigating a research problem, participant observation would be used to reveal the type of questions that should be asked to tackle the research problem. Participant observation does not, however, answer the problem of how many questions should be asked to solve the research problem. Therefore, interviews were needed to complement the participant observation method and to ask interviewees questions which answer the research phenomenon or problem (p. 105).

According to Marshall and Rossman (2014), participant observation allows the researcher to first observe the sample studied in its natural environment. Secondly, participant observation offers the researcher the opportunity to observe events which participants attend but cannot report. As a result, the researcher needs to personally attend such events to take notes. Moreover, researchers occasionally note things which participants do not, as they may feel that they are not that important to mention. Researchers would consequently interpret some events in a different way or in an academic way, about which participants might not care. Third, participant observation is valuable in terms of describing events which

have been revealed in interviews. The researcher needs to take notes and interpret them (p. 103). Additionally, participant observation requires the researcher to have checklists of detailed events and to compare those events attended at the analysis stage (p. 79).

A part of participant observation is ethnographic interviewing. According to Marshall and Rossman (2014), ethnographic interviews are used to gather cultural data (p. 83). Ethnographic interviews are useful in research in terms of collecting data regarding participants' views relating to specific events or behaviour (p. 82). The weakness of this method depends again on the ethnographer. For instance, if the ethnographer chooses to observe a specific culture or event, these do not represent the entire culture (p. 82).

An interview, as described by Kahn and Cannell (1957), is 'a conversation with a purpose' (p. 149). Interviews can be divided into three types, according to Patton (1990). The first type is the informal conversational interview, the second sort is the general interview guide, while the final type is standardised, open-ended interview questions (Marshall and Rossman 2014, p. 80). Kumar and Phrommathed (2005) explain how choosing the correct sample to study is essential.

To choose the appropriate sample, Kumar and Phrommathed (2005) set two significant principles to follow, according to sampling theory. The first principle is to avoid bias when selecting a sample to study and the second is realisation of the maximum accuracy of the available resources (p. 19). There are three types of sampling; specifically, random or probability sampling, non-random or probability sampling and finally, mixed sampling (p. 19).

Table 4 List of events I attended as part of ethnographic work and planned events to attend but got postponed and cancelled

Event	Date	Location
Rabaa – 1st Anniversary march.	16/8/2014	Egyptian Embassy in London.
4th Anniversary of the Revolution.	25-01-2015	Egyptian Embassy in London.
Solidarity with students and academics (A protest opposing the visit of President El-Sisi to London).	4/11/2015	10 Downing Street, London.
A protest in favour of the visit of President El-Sisi to London.	5/11/2015	10 Downing Street, London.
Freedom and dignity to our people back home. Organised by 25th Jan. (This is a group of Egyptians in the UK based on Facebook).	Originally 19/10/2014. Subsequently postponed 4 times and then cancelled.	
The current situation in Egypt اللحظة الراهنة في مصر Zyad Elelaimy a member of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition after the 25th of Jan Revolution will be the speaker to talk about the current situation in Egypt.	First organised for April 2015. Postponed 4 times. The event is still to be confirmed.	

Research process model

This section describes the process of the entire project and comprises the steps from the commencement of the project until the date of submission of the thesis. The first stage involved choosing broad topics such as Egyptians in the UK and the Egyptian revolution. Another topic was the Egyptian revolution and coverage of social vs. mainstream media. The subsequent stage was to conduct a search on those broad topics in the available literature to ascertain what has already been written. After consulting the supervisory team, the topics were narrowed down to study Egyptians in the UK and the effects of the Egyptian Revolution.

When the project topic was established, research questions were formulated. It was important to carefully formulate the research questions because they set out the foundation with regards to the aims and objectives of the entire PhD project. The ensuing step was deciding on the most appropriate methodology to adopt in researching Egyptians in the UK and 2011 Egyptian revolution. Interviews and ethnographic work were selected as the methods to adopt in this research.

Conducting interviews requires recruiting participants to be interviewed. As a result, social media websites, such as *Facebook* and *Meetup* were chosen to search for Egyptians in the UK, with described specific inclusion criteria. Looking for participants on *Facebook* and *Meetup* involved searching for Egyptian and Arabic groups and subsequently, posting a message to members of those groups requesting interested participants. A sample of the message posted to potential interviewees is attached in the appendices (Appendix 1.2). The other approach used to recruit potential Egyptian interviewees in the UK was distributing project leaflets to recruit Egyptians who are not on social media (see Appendix 1.1 for leaflet sample). Additionally, leaflets were distributed at universities across the UK, such as the universities of Bedfordshire, Brighton, Sussex, in addition to Queen Mary University London and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). The process of distributing leaflets included requesting permission from each university to post the leaflet in various locations at the universities. It is worth mentioning that distributing leaflets for the project was limited to the selected universities due to the limited budget.

The second method used in this project is ethnographic work. This work covered attending political events organised by Egyptian groups in the UK, such as protests or marches which were advertised predominantly on *Facebook*. Observational notes were made on these

events and subsequently analysed in response to the research questions. The first event I attended coincided with the first anniversary of Rabia and took place in London on 16/8/2014. The second protest was held on 04/11/2015 and consisted of students and academics standing in solidarity to express their concern about the visit of the Egyptian President El-Sisi to the UK. The protest took place outside Downing Street, London. The other event attended was held the following day (05/11/2015) and involved protesters welcoming the visit of President El-Sisi to London (see Table 4 and Appendices 5.1.2 and 5.1.3). There were more events which were postponed or cancelled and as a result, could not be included in the work.

Other steps accomplished with respect to this project involved conducting interviews with the 22 participants, transcribing the interviews and analysing data using colour coding. The on-going process throughout the project was preparing and writing up parts of the thesis. This process included presenting parts of the work in conferences organised at different universities, including Bedfordshire, Leicester, Canterbury and Cardiff (Figure 5 elaborates on the research process model).



Figure 6 The research process

Summary

The main methods used in this thesis have been discussed in this chapter. Interviews and ethnographic research have been used to answer the proposed research questions. The chapter has been divided into several sections, starting with the research problem and choosing an appropriate topic for the research project. This chapter also focuses on the ethical considerations regarding conducting interviews and ethnographic research. The principal importance of this chapter is to elaborate on the methods used in this thesis and the

reasons for selecting specific methods in contrast to others. The focus has been on adopting the qualitative approach rather than the quantitative approach.

This chapter has been a platform for the justification of this choice. The qualitative approach includes conducting interviews and participant observation, in order to examine the effects, the 2011 revolution had (if any), on first and second generation Egyptians in the UK relating to belonging, political participation and the effects the media had on the entire process. An important angle discussed in this chapter is the examination of the position of the researcher in the thesis and how to avoid any bias.

Chapter Six: Belonging and Identity

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the first theme formulated from conducting interviews with Egyptians in the United Kingdom. This chapter attempts to find answers to the first proposed question regarding the 2011 revolution and its effects on Egyptian identity and belonging among Egyptian diaspora in the UK. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section is regarding the first generation of interviewees. The second section is concerned with second generation Egyptians and an examination of their belonging to Egypt and Egyptian identity. The focus of this thesis is the Egyptian case and the narrative that Egyptians have used to express themselves regarding their identity and sense of belonging, both prior to, and after, the 2011 revolution, and what effect this had on their perceptions and attitudes.

This chapter attempts to answer the proposed research question: to what extent have belonging, identity and sense of pride been affected by the 2011 uprising? This chapter has divided the Egyptians in the UK into first and second generations. Fourteen interviews were conducted with first generation participants and eight interviews with second generation participants. The analysis of these two groups of the Egyptian diaspora in the UK has revealed a significant difference between the first and second generations, and the impact that the 2011 uprising had on their Egyptian identity. The most important issue this chapter deals with is the impacts of the 2011 uprising on belonging, Egyptian identity and being proud to be Egyptian among Egyptians from the first and second generations and how the 2011 uprising has impacted upon these feelings. Table 5 presents more information about the interviewees to remind readers about each interviewee regarding place of birth, which generation they belong to and the political activities of each participant, specifically with regard to the Egyptian uprising.

Table 5 Additional information about interviewees

Participant	Place of birth	Generation	Political activities
Dina	Born in Kuwait. Came to the UK when she was 3	1.75 generation	Participated in 2011 uprising in the UK and did not go to Egypt.
Ehab	Egypt. Came to UK 23 years ago	Left Egypt in his 20s. Rumbaut (2008), considers him to be from the 1st generation. Migrating in their mid-adulthood	Not interested in politics
Issam	Egypt. Came to the UK 2 years ago	1st generation. Left Egypt when he was 34. Migrating in his mid-adulthood	Active in Egypt and the UK
Mazen	Egypt. Came to the UK 2 years ago	1st generation. Left Egypt when he was 18. Considered 1st generation. Migrating in his early adulthood.	Politically active in Egypt
Nevine	Egypt. Came to the UK 25 years ago	1st generation. Left Egypt in her 20s. Considered to be from 1st generation. Migrated in their young-adulthood	Active in political activities in the UK
Sama	US. Came to the UK 2 years ago	2nd generation	Active in political activities in the UK
Shereen	Egypt. Came to the UK 5 years ago	1st generation. Left Egypt in her 20s. Migrated in her young adulthood	Active in political activities in the UK
Sherif	UK	2nd generation	Active in political activities in the UK
Eslam	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s. Migrated in his young adulthood	Active in online and offline activities in the UK
Hani	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s Migrated in mid adulthood	Active in political activities in Egypt and online activities such as blogging
Karim	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s. Migrated in early adulthood	Not interested in political activities just studying politics
Khouloud	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in her 20s. Migrated in young adulthood	Active in political activities in Egypt and the UK
Maher	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s. Migrated in young adulthood	Active in political activities in the UK and Egypt (when convenient) plus online activities on *Facebook*
Majed	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his teens. Migrated in early adulthood	Online activities and sometimes in Egypt

Mohamed	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s. Migrated in young adulthood	Active in Egypt
Mohammed	Egypt. Came to the UK when he was 3	1.75 generation	Active in Egypt and the UK and online activities
Muhammad	UK	2nd generation	In the UK and Egypt
Rami	UK	2nd generation	Not interested in politics
Rana	Egypt followed by Kuwait. Subsequently came to the UK when she was 16	1.25 generation	Active in the UK
Salim	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his teens. Migrated in early adulthood	Used to be active in Egypt but not politically active anymore
Shabaan	Egypt	1st generation. Left Egypt in his 40s. Migrated in mid adulthood	Not interested
Michael	Egypt followed by Saudi Arabia. Subsequently came to the UK when he was 7	1.50 generation	In the UK but not politically active anymore

First generation

This section focuses on the first generation of Egyptians and how they have felt towards their sense of belonging and their Egyptian identity, prior to, and after, the 2011 uprising. Defining homeland for Egyptians from the first generation has demonstrated how strongly they feel about their sense of belonging to Egypt. Kaplan (2003) argues that the word 'homeland' has many meanings; some dictionaries describe homeland as 'native land' or 'country of origin', 'fatherland' or 'motherland'. This demonstrates that homeland for some depends on their parents' country of origin. The term 'homeland' for Egyptians in the UK can be defined in various ways. Issam (M, aged, Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood. He was born in Egypt and eft in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for instance, explains how he considers Egypt as his homeland, regardless of whether he holds other passports. There are many factors that might affect the sense of belonging to a country, and the most obvious ones are place of birth, and the period spent in that country. Issam was

born in Egypt and moved to the UK in his mid-adulthood (see Chapter Five for more details); his belonging would obviously be to Egypt, and Egypt would therefore be his homeland.

Egyptians in the UK found the question of 'homeland' difficult to answer. Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and blogging) defined it as 'the place where I grew up and the place which has major factors which made me [are my make-up]'. He was asked if his point of view would have been different if he had been born in the UK but his parents were originally from Egypt. Hani replied that in that case, he would have two homelands. The result is that place of birth and the period spent in that country would make a difference in deciding which country is the homeland for that person. The notion that people who live in a multicultural world nowadays, would not limit themselves to one homeland, as Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) argues. There are some Egyptians, in contrast, who feel so strongly about being Egyptian, that they regard 'homeland' as being linked to the sense of one's own identity: 'I am Egyptian whatever happens', Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) said.

Egyptian identity among first generation Egyptians in the UK is somehow built on taking into consideration the fact that first generation Egyptians have spent their youth and adulthood in Egypt. Consequently, the sense of a strong identity is an undeniable fact. This has appeared obvious through the interviews conducted with Egyptians in the UK, especially when first generation Egyptians were asked about which country they considered to be their 'homeland'. The sense of identity and 'belonging' to Egypt among first generation Egyptians in the UK is strong, and the 2011 Egyptian revolution has made a slight contribution to the

enforcement of identity and belonging. The 2011 uprising, among second generation Egyptians, however, provided the chance for them to express their sense of belonging and identity.

The concept of homeland is typically linked to the notion of belonging. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) expresses how she is still connected to Egypt and 'belongs' there: 'I consider Egypt as my homeland as I am still attached to Egypt and feel its home for me'. Nevine also explains how belonging to a country is not only about the period spent in that country but it is more than that. For instance, Nevine was born in Egypt and lived there until she was twenty years old. This period is very important in terms of building a relationship with a country. She states: 'I have spent more years in the UK than in Egypt; however, I still believe Egypt is my homeland and I can't say that I am British'. The years spent in a country, in this sense, does not mean 'belonging' to that country or having a sense of loyalty to the country in which one has spent the most years – the sense of belonging is measured by how a person feels towards a country, as Nevine illustrates.

Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) explains how he believes that 'homeland' is the place where a person was born. Mohamed believes that 'homeland' is the place towards which people feel homesick, and where family and friends live. Several interviewees believe that that a country that does not offer anything for its citizens – a stable life, such as a good education, healthcare, job opportunities and security – cannot be called a 'homeland'.

Moreover, a reasonable standard of living should be available to all citizens. Mohamed went on to say, 'I have started to love this country – the UK – and feel that Britain is my

homeland, as, when I first came to the UK, I found a decent job, and people here are equal, unlike Egypt where you cannot find that. As a result, I feel obliged to offer something back to this country'. This demonstrates that if a country offers its citizens a decent standard of living, they will appreciate the benefits and even feel a sense of loyalty and belonging.

Egyptians from the first generation are happy to live within two cultures, Egyptian and British, despite the negative or positive effect of the 2011 revolution. Issam (M, aged 36, Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood. He was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) expresses how holders of a British passport are protected by the State: 'If I have the British passport, this will help me and my family to live decently'. According to Issam, a British passport gives people a sense of protection. However, in terms of belonging, Egyptians in the UK still feel their homeland is Egypt, even if they do hold a British passport – the British passport is just a piece of paper which provides a sense of protection for its holders. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood. Mazen is politically active in Egypt) explains how having a British passport will encourage him to participate in politics, especially Egyptian politics, as he will be protected by British law: 'If I get a British passport I will be more involved in politics in Egypt as the [British] passport will protect me'.

The notion of protection is not only for travelling or obtaining employment, but freedom of expression, as Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so is considered 1st generation-early adulthood. Politically active in Egypt) has demonstrated. Egyptian citizens who only hold an Egyptian passport do not feel protected, unlike British citizens who are safeguarded by the British authorities across the world. Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the

UK) states that the idea of obtaining a British passport is merely to guarantee protection in terms of residing in a safe place and not having to obtain a permit to stay in Britain. Egyptians who are multinational – in possession of dual nationality (Egyptian and British, in this case) were asked which one they preferred; the answer was 'Egyptian'. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) confirmed this, by saying that he is Egyptian, although he holds a British passport; this demonstrates that Egyptians in the UK feel they are Egyptian in spite of holding a British passport.

Interviews with Egyptians in the UK revealed the importance of belonging to both countries – the UK and Egypt. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution), for example, expresses how crucial it is to feel a sense of belonging to both Egypt and the UK, especially regarding children: 'It would be good to teach them to belong to Egypt in addition to the UK.' Teaching children the sense of belonging to both countries – home country and host country – is essential, particularly in the case of immigrants and their offspring born in host countries.

Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics) states how he preferred his children by his former wife to focus on the country in which they were born and raised and are currently resident (the UK) and not Egypt, as after the divorce, Ehab's former wife preferred to live in Egypt with their children instead of the UK. The notion is to keep links with one's roots (Egypt) but, at the same time, this should not ruin immigrants' progress and integration in the host country: 'I want my kids to stick to British-Arab cultural roots. I want

them to understand reality, here in the UK as European Muslims'. The notion is that people should remain linked to their original culture and identity but should also integrate with the host culture. Ehab (aged 43 and belongs to 1st generation as he left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. He is not interested in politics) adds that: 'Whenever we are connected to the past and our Arab roots in our home country, this keeps dragging us down'. Ehab adds how he wants his children and all European Muslims to focus on the difficulties and complications [facing] European Muslims here in the UK, not the affairs of [their] home country as this will not help them to progress at all and will drag them down.

There are some Egyptians who hold the notion of belonging to Britain because of human rights, and how they are respected in the UK more so than in Egypt. In this sense, Egyptians feel more secure living in the UK. Their sense of belonging is towards Britain, for the high standard of living they enjoy, but their homeland is still Egypt. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) feels that Egypt is his homeland but, at the same time, he respects Britain because of how he is treated as a human being.

There are other interviewees from the first generation who have shown their sense of belonging is to Egypt, and how this sense has been developed due to being born in Egypt and having spent a long period there. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for instance, argues that his sense of belonging is towards Egypt: 'I belong to Egypt as my family and friends are in Egypt'. Issam feels that his stronger links are with Egypt as he was born there and is only temporarily living in the UK for study purposes. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and

was active during the 2011 revolution) argues that her sense of belonging is to Egypt, rather than the UK because she spent her childhood and most of her adulthood in Egypt. This shows that where people are born has a big influence on the level of the sense of belonging.

The desire to return to their homeland for some first generation Egyptians, such as Nevine, has strengthened – especially after the revolution – in the hope of finding a better, more stable, Egypt. Nevine (F, aged 50. Left Egypt in her 20s so she is considered 1st generation from young adulthood. She is politically active in the UK and was during the 2011 revolution), felt that she could have considered going back to Egypt after the revolution, but the country was still unstable (and possibly dangerous) in the aftermath; moreover, her family objected to her returning due to the lack of job opportunities. This reveals that once more, the volatile political situation in Egypt has prevented many from returning, which consequently weakens their sense of belonging. There are some Egyptians from the first generation, however, who remain optimistic regarding the situation in Egypt, such as Eslam (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in online and offline activities in the UK). He would like to contribute to the future of Egypt despite the bad situation: 'For sure, I would like to return to Egypt and be an active member in rebuilding Egypt'. This confirms that although the 2011 revolution has had a negative impact on the sense of belonging to the country among the first generation and has stopped them from returning to Egypt after the revolution, the sense of belonging remains strong.

The effects of the 2011 Egyptian revolution have been quite significant for the first generation of Egyptians in the UK. This has not diminished the powerful sense of belonging for first generation Egyptians, on the one hand, due to several factors such as family ties, friends' networks and place of birth; but, conversely, the 2011 uprising has not resulted in the

anticipated improvement of the political and economic situation, either. Several interviewees expressed their wish to return to Egypt, but the situation after the revolution, especially after 2013, has prevented them from doing so. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) for instance, indicated how he does not wish to return to Egypt, especially after the 2011 uprising, because of the deterioration in the state of affairs: 'The problem nowadays is with people in Egypt being impolite and lacking morals […]. Maher adds that some Egyptians nowadays even laugh when people are being killed and hate you if your opinion disagrees with theirs. Maher believes Egyptians lack the basics of being human nowadays […] and corruption in Egypt is everywhere. The 2011 uprising has left a negative feeling among the first generation and many no longer wish to return to Egypt at present. This was confirmed by Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt).

There were many first generation Egyptians who felt optimistic regarding a better Egypt, after the 2011 revolution and hoped to return to Egypt. This desire has changed since then. For example, Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) states that he would like to go back to Egypt after finishing his education in the UK, but if there is a job opportunity available here in the UK he would not return to Egypt, especially as the situation appears to be getting worse, after the uprising. The notion of returning to Egypt has become less attractive after the uprising, as people feel that the situation regarding the insecurity, the economic crisis and poor resources has deteriorated, and there is very little hope of achieving their dreams. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he is active in online activities

and sometimes in Egypt), for instance, explains that, being a scientist in Egypt is not possible because of the lack of resources. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) remarks that his feelings of 'belonging' to Egypt, after the revolution, have turned to hate because of the continuous unfairness Egyptians experience, even after the changes in 2011: 'I have reached the point where I hate Egypt as it's unfair to its people', Mohamed added.

Regarding Egypt before the uprising, it was considered 'unfair' in terms of the killings, kidnappings and torturing of innocent Egyptians. Mohamed continues by explaining how things changed during the uprising and straight after, although only temporarily. On the other hand, during Mohamed's visits to Egypt after the uprising, Egyptians hate each other, according to him, and they even consider anyone who disagrees with them as enemies. The start of the uprising gave a sense of hope to the Egyptians, but this hope soon turned to despair and hate. Mohamed does not want to settle down in a country where his human rights are not respected, for example, and he also does not want his children to endure such an experience.

The 2011 revolution and its aftermath have not only affected the desire to return to Egypt, but it has also affected the personal Egyptian identity. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) explains how his identity as an Egyptian has not been positive because of the present in Egypt: 'To be honest, with the current situation in Egypt, I do not say I am Egyptian, as of the violation of human rights in Egypt', Issam stated. Moreover, Issam adds that he might regain his sense of pride in being Egyptian 'if free and fair elections are held'. But Issam believes that after the military coup in 2013, everything has been ruined. There are

a few interviewees such as Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution), who remain optimistic about the future of Egypt, and moreover, how Egypt is mentioned in the Qur'an and that it would be protected by God. The main theme that emerged was that almost all the interviewees agreed on the notion of the revolution being effective for change in Egypt, in the beginning. The current situation in Egypt is unsatisfactory for many, however, because of the army's 2013 coup.

Almost all Egyptians agree that the 2011 revolution was a turning point in Egyptian history: 'I am happy about what happened in Egypt, and what will happen, as it proves that we Egyptians can adapt to any change', Nevine said. What has united the Egyptians is the sense of pride during the 2011 uprising: 'I was really proud during 2011, and even saw that pride in the eyes of non-Egyptians', as Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) stated.

This sense of pride and euphoria has been shared by many Egyptians. Eslam (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in online and offline activities in the UK) shared this sense of pride with Issam by stating how Egyptians can do anything and can change a bad situation, which makes them feel proud. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) observed that the Egyptian revolution has taught Egyptians and others how to start a peaceful revolution, which makes not only Egyptians but the world proud. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he is active in online activities and sometimes in Egypt) has shared this sense of pride with his fellow Egyptians.

This shows that a sense of pride and euphoria have also been shared among Egyptians in the UK. This sense of pride has, however, been somehow negatively affected, after the 2011 revolution and additionally, it has also had an impact on sense of belonging and identity. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) declared that he does not wish to be called Egyptian, because of the current events in Egypt: 'To be honest, I do not wish to be Egyptian, if the system is going to be the same, as I feel the revolution has done nothing, and it is getting worse, not better'.

To conclude, Egyptians experienced a strong sense of belonging, identity and pride, straight after the 2011 uprising, but, they now feel hopeless regarding the situation in Egypt. The consensus is that the situation in Egypt is heading in the wrong direction, as many interviewees have said. This has had a detrimental effect on their identity and sense of belonging and pride in their homeland. For instance, when Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation as he left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation-early adulthood. He is politically active in Egypt) was asked about his reflections on the Egyptian situation and how the revolution has changed him, he replied: 'I feel sad about the situation in Egypt, and the revolution has made me realise how I hate the police and the army'. The first generation Egyptians in the UK experienced the euphoria during and immediately after the 2011 revolution, which has temporarily affected their sense of belonging, identity and pride. They now feel that the country is back to zero – the stage before the 2011 revolution. Egyptians from the first generation still enjoy a strong sense of belonging to Egypt and their Egyptian identity, although 2011 and its aftermath has had a negative effect on their sense of belonging.

Second generation

The main findings revealed by the interviews conducted with Egyptians from the second generation in the UK are that the sense of belonging to Egypt, Egyptian identity and sense of pride in the country were temporarily reinforced by the 2011 uprising. Second generation Egyptians found the 2011 uprising a good opportunity to express their feelings of belonging to Egypt, their Egyptian identity and their sense of pride in being Egyptian. Their sense of belonging might vary between Egypt, their parents' country of origin, and their place of birth (the UK).

The meaning of 'homeland' to second generation Egyptians varies, but has not changed that much since the 2011 uprising. For instance, Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) believes that his homeland is Egypt although he was born in the UK. This demonstrates that there is a strong affiliation to Egypt, confirmed by Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt), in spite of the 2011 revolution. According to Muhammad, 'homeland is the place [to which] you feel affiliated. Rana (F, aged 20, 1.25 generation as she came to the UK at the age of 16 and she is politically active in the UK) states that 'homeland is Egypt forever'. This reveals that the concept of homeland is always associated with Egypt despite living abroad. To conclude this point, Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) has defined homeland as 'wherever you feel comfortable' and this is the sense that second generation Egyptians have.

Second generation Egyptians have made use of the 2011 uprising to reinforce their sense of belonging and Egyptian identity, as previously mentioned. Muhammad (M, aged 18,

belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) stated that the 2011 revolution was a turning point regarding his Egyptian identity: 'I was more certain after the revolution that I am Egyptian, unlike before, when I was thinking of my parents as being Egyptian and maybe I am Egyptian-British'. The sense of belonging to a country as being that of the parents' country of origin is common among second generation immigrants; however, according to the sample of interviewees for this thesis, the 2011 uprising has contributed to strengthening the sense of Egyptian identity among second generation Egyptians such as Muhammad. Moreover, not only has the revolution been effective in terms of reinforcing Egyptian identity, but it has also encouraged second generation Egyptians to feel more Egyptian and be part of political life, according to Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution). In contrast, some interviewees such as Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore) feel that his Egyptian identity has been negatively affected: 'I did not feel […that I was…] Egyptian during President Morsi's era between 2012 and 2013'.

The sense of pride felt among second generation Egyptians is another valuable point that arose from the 2011 revolution. All eight second generation interviewees agreed that they felt extremely satisfied with what happened during the 2011 uprising. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation) states how proud she felt regarding the peaceful nature of the revolution and how it attracted recognition worldwide. Nonetheless, prior to the 2011 revolution, being Egyptian for Sama was just a nationality, and there was nothing of which to be proud. The 2011 revolution, in this sense, has dramatically affected the sense of pride. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years

old) adds that the revolution provided everyone, not just Egyptians, with a sense of pride in how it was conducted. She believes that it even made Egyptians very proud of being Egyptian. The 2011 uprising has consequently given Egyptians the chance to talk positively about Egypt. Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore) mentioned that the 2011 revolution was the beginning of democracy, which made Egyptians proud of what they have done.

According to Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt to go Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), the question of identity depends on the context, as one can be British in some instances and Egyptian in others. This raises the notion of having a multinational identity: 'I believe my identity is mixed, I would like to […consider myself as…] Egyptian-British'. The advantage of being multinational is that these people can take what they like from both cultures: 'I take good things from both Egyptian and British cultures. I feel strongly about both cultures, but I always care about Egypt, as I have roots […there…] and that's why I […was…] motivated to participate in Egypt's politics', Michael added. This discussion began with second generation Egyptians, as the idea is that they are not particularly interested in the identity of the country of origin, according to their responses.

Egyptians from the second generation are divided in relation to the notion of return. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution), for instance, has shown how she is enthusiastic about going back to Egypt as soon as she finishes her Master's in the UK. Sama adds that the main motivation for her returning to Egypt is to be politically active in Egyptian affairs. The 2011 revolt has reinforced the sense

of belonging and identity among some second-generation Egyptians. As a result, the desire to return is appealing for Sama, especially after the changes that occurred after the Egyptian uprising. Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) shares the same idea with Sama regarding returning to Egypt: 'Once I graduate and reach the level which allows me to go back to Egypt, I will go back'. The notion of returning to Egypt has not been considered by some second-generation Egyptians living in the UK, contrary to what happened to the first generation of Egyptians, due to 2011 uprising.

Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), for example, has stated that the notion of return to Egypt is unlikely, as he has family members who left Egypt after the revolution, due to the difficult economic and social situation there: 'My cousins left Egypt after the revolution, as the lifestyle was not comfortable and […they…] went to Canada and developed many skills'. Mohammed (M, aged 37, 1.75 generation as he came to the UK when he was 3, he is politically active in Egypt and the UK and online activities) shares the idea of not being able to return to Egypt, as many of his friends left Egypt after the uprising, to work elsewhere. This has consequently discouraged Mohammed from going back to Egypt, especially with the bad economic situation. Besides, he also feels settled in the UK, as he has been here for a long time. Mohammed adds that second generation Egyptians are settled here, especially those born in the UK or those who came to the UK at a very young age, such as Mohammed and Dina. Regarding Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old), she mentions that although she feels connected to Egypt, this does not mean she would abandon her life in the UK to settle down there. The lack of opportunities and the

difficulty associated with living as an independent woman in Egypt, discourage Dina from considering this option. The notion of return among second generation Egyptians does vary, but what unites them are the visits to Egypt to see members of their families, and to personally witness events.

According to Rumbaut (1994), immigrants to the United States tend to stick more to their national identity (their country of origin). Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old), demonstrates how strongly she feels about her Egyptian identity by stating that although she does not look 'British', whenever people ask her where she is from, she replies Egypt, not Britain or England; even though she loves Britain, and does not intend to leave. She feels connected to Britain because she grew up here and 'it's where I study and know how things work', Dina says. Dina feels Egyptian, regarding her identity, but, at the same, the connection to Britain, where she grew up and has lived almost all her life, is also part of her identity. This is what is meant by 'multiple belonging' and being happy about living in two different worlds.

Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) agrees with Dina (F, aged 22 years old, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old), in terms of being affected by both Egyptian and British cultures: 'I am lucky to have got two cultures as I can take good things from both cultures and leave the bad stuff in each culture'. Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics) also expresses how fortunate he is to belong to both cultures: 'I feel lucky to have two cultures as I get the best […from…] each culture'. The notion of acquiring the positive aspects from both cultures is common among Egyptians, especially those who

are second generation living in the UK. This concludes this section by showing how second generation Egyptians living in the UK are happy with the combination of living in both cultures – especially belonging to two cultures – due to the place of birth and belonging to their parents' country of origin.

A discussion of some of the theories that have been adopted in each chapter to back up the findings of this thesis, appear at the end of each section. The definitions of 'diaspora' are dealt with in this chapter regarding identity and belonging. Theories on identity and sense of belonging in diasporic groups by Safran, Clifford, Sheffer, Armstrong and Hirji, for instance, are examined, in order to uncover the possible similarities that these groups may or may not have. Safran's characteristics of diaspora (see Chapter Five for more details) cannot be applied to all diasporic groups, as his definition of diaspora does not include other generations such as the second and third, although they are part of the diasporic groups. Sheffer (1986) conversely, comes up with a new definition of diaspora, which refers to diasporic groups which have no connection with either their countries of origin or their host countries. Sheffer to an extent, builds on Safran's definition of diaspora, however, some critics refute Safran and Sheffer's explanations of diaspora. Armstrong and Hirji for example, deal with diasporic groups as those which include all diasporic groups, such as second and third generations.

The focus of this chapter has been on first and second generations within the Egyptian diaspora. The findings have shown that through conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK, the Egyptian diaspora is involved in the activities of both the country of origin (Egypt) and the host country (the UK). This demonstrates a strong identity and sense of belonging to each country; moreover, not only are Egyptians in the UK involved in the politics of both Egypt and

the UK, but the majority of interviewees belong to both countries to different degrees, which contradicts both Safran's and Sheffer's definitions of diaspora.

Safran's idea of diaspora characteristics, illustrates one of the key features of diaspora: the notion of returning to the homeland (Egypt, in this case). The findings in this thesis indicate that this notion in the case of Egyptians from first and second generations is divided. For instance, Egyptians from the first generation have been negatively affected by the uprising, while the desire to return to Egypt among the second generation has been reinforced, for a while. This demonstrates that the return to one's home country can be affected by important events such as revolutions.

Summary

The 2011 uprising in Egypt has contributed somewhat to the social lives of Egyptians from first and second generations. Interviews with Egyptians from first and second generations have revealed that each respondent has had a different experience pertaining to the 2011 revolution. The first generation has been negatively affected by the uprising, as they no longer wish to go back to Egypt to settle down, principally for economic and security reasons. The only time when identity was reinforced during the 2011 revolution, was when the first generation Egyptians' sense of pride in the peaceful demonstrations was overwhelming. Recently however, most of the first generation has abandoned the sense of pride in their homeland, due to the chaos and uncertainty. The second generation are also divided in terms of the sense of belonging and identity but are united in terms of a strong sense of pride and being happy to live within two cultures.

In this section, I present some of my reflections on belonging, identity and if the 2011 uprising has had any impact. Initially, an interesting fact revealed in this project is the strong

attachment of second generation Egyptians in the UK to Egypt, in terms of Egyptian identity and belonging to Egypt. I had the assumption that Egyptians who were born outside Egypt or have lived away from Egypt for a long period would not be interested in their parents' country of origin. Furthermore, that those who left Egypt for a long time are assumed to be disconnected from their country of birth. The other fascinating fact interviewing Egyptians in the UK, is the unifying sense of pride in relation to the first and second generation Egyptians in the UK. This confirms how the 2011 uprising has been the reason for such a unifying feeling among Egyptians in Egypt and abroad, specifically in the UK. Then again, the 2011 revolution has had a profound effect on Egyptians but for not long. Nowadays, Egyptians do not experience the sense of pride and interest in returning to Egypt unlike during and immediately after the uprising back in 2011.

Such points raise the notion of how an event such as the revolution can impact on personal lives of citizens either positively or negatively. Moreover, the impact of some revolutions might last for decades, considering the effect that the 2011 uprising has had on Egyptians. Even if the effects of the uprising have had temporary positive impacts on Egyptians in terms of sense of pride and the notion of return to Egypt, the negative effects such as the disinterest in settling down in Egypt permanently and the sense of not having an Egyptian identity anymore will most probably last a long time. The notion of return has been made conditional among Egyptian interviewees by significant and radical changes in their homeland or their parents' homeland for some Egyptians, especially those who were not born in Egypt. Moreover, changes in homeland invoke an imaginary picture of the homeland as a better society. Citizens become hopeful that the homeland can be a good place to settle in, thanks to a revolution or any other type of change. In other words, if Egypt did not witness major change such as the revolution, the notion of return would not be a common idea among

many Egyptians, especially during and straight after the uprising. Finally, this chapter has shown how the 2011 revolution was an extraordinary event affecting Egyptians in the UK (more details in Chapter Nine).

Chapter Seven: Political Participation and the Egyptian Diaspora in the UK

Introduction

The report produced by the House of Commons (2014) focuses on the political participation of ethnic minorities in the UK, how politically apathetic they are and how the 2011 uprising contributes to this factor. Zapata-Barrero et al. (2014) agree with other scholars and the House of Commons report that diasporic communities are not interested in politics.

This chapter attempts to examine the political engagement of diasporic communities and how involved they are in the politics of their homeland, by answering the following research questions: 1(a) to what extent has the 2011 revolution seen a great change in terms of the political activities of the Egyptian diaspora in the UK? And, 1(b) if the 2011 uprising in Egypt has had an impact on Egyptians in the UK, has this been temporary, or is it on-going? 2(a) have there been any changes regarding the notion that diasporic communities are politically apathetic, as the report of the House of Commons asserts?

This chapter is divided into two main sections according to which generation interviewees belong to and political engagement among different generations. The interviewees have been categorised according to first and second generations, as I have ascertained that a difference exists between the Egyptians from these generations. The first main section deals with political participation and the first generation, which includes those who were born in Egypt and are currently residing in the UK. The second section is regarding second generation Egyptians, primarily those born in the UK, as well as those who belong to the 1.25, 1.50 and 1.75 generations (see Chapter Five). Additionally, type of political participation is dealt with in this specific section, including voting, protesting, and online and offline participation among each generation. Table 6 presents general information concerning participants; specifically,

the percentages of females and males among the interviewees, besides the percentage of political activities and religion. Such percentages give readers an idea of the type of participants in this study and to which religion, gender and political group they belong.

Table 6 Number and percentage of participants in terms of gender, religion and political participation

Category	Participants	Number	Percentage
Gender	Females	6	27%
	Males	16	73%
Religion	Muslims	21	95%
	Christians	1	5%
Political participation	Active in political activities in Egypt	5	22%
	Active in political activities in the UK	14	64%
	Not interested in politics	3	14%
Total	Participants	22	100%

Online vs. offline participation

First generation

The main finding regarding political participation and the first generation is that Egyptian participants from the first generation are not interested in protesting or becoming involved in Egyptian politics. Being politically apathetic among the first generation has emerged due to many factors; one of them being the sense of hopelessness felt by the participants from the first generation, particularly regarding the situation in Egypt during Mubarak's regime. Scepticism was also common among the first generation during 2011. There were many Egyptians, including Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he

was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), who were surprised by the fact that the revolution succeeded so quickly and peacefully. Issam states that he believed nothing would happen in Egypt. Nonetheless, this unexpected and surprising conduct during the uprising was one of the factors which helped the revolution succeed. Though most Egyptians under forty and their parents' generation did not anticipate any changes occurring in Egypt, young Egyptians decided to fight until the government responded to their demands.

The participants felt that their voices were not heard by the Egyptian authorities. According to the Egyptian interviewees involved in this study, the feelings of hopelessness among Egyptians was a consequence of the corrupt government in Egypt, the mainstream media, residing in the Gulf prior to moving to the UK, and the futility in protesting, voting and participating in political activities. The other notion which discouraged Egyptians from protesting was the lack of freedom of expression in Egypt, compared to the UK. Eslam (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in online and offline activities in the UK) expresses how Egyptians living in the UK have the chance to join peaceful protests, as they are considered part of freedom of expression. Moreover, no one can force Egyptians to join any protests in the UK. The Egyptian media, conversely, encourages people by means of propaganda to participate in protests.

The role that the media played in the uprising of Egyptians in the UK is discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. First generation participants indicated that their voices did not make any difference in decision-making prior to 2011. They had a sense of hopelessness, because nothing was going to change, whether they were politically active or not. However, this changed during the uprising. Participants started to feel that they could make a difference by

engaging in politics after the 2011 revolution. They believed that if they do not participate in Egypt's politics, they would lose their country, and moreover, Egypt would not be a good place in which to live. It should be noted that the participants from all generations felt a sense of euphoria during the 2011 uprising.

The other factor which contributed to the participants being politically apathetic is residing in other countries which banned protests regarding Egypt, prior to living in the UK. Egyptians living or working in Gulf countries, for instance, were prevented from protesting, even if they had wanted to do so. This has underpinned the lack of interest in any political activities. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for instance, used to reside in Kuwait for a while and explains how he and other Egyptians were not permitted to engage in any political activities relating to Egypt, which discouraged many Egyptians from becoming involved in politics, prior to and during the uprising.

Egyptians living in Gulf countries who wished to engage in political activities, such as protests, to support Egypt faced two options: the first was to travel back to Egypt to protest and share their demands with fellow Egyptians; the second was to protest online. However, online activities were also monitored by the governments of certain Gulf countries, according to Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK). It is worth mentioning that Issam chose to travel to Egypt from Kuwait to participate in the revolt in 2011, although a lot of Egyptian families attempted to discourage and even ban their sons and daughters from protesting. Subsequently, he decided to leave Kuwait and move to the UK, where he has participated in political activities organised by various Egyptian groups in the country, for

instance, Egyptians Anti-Coup and Rabia-London, to express his opinion. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) believes that political activities in the UK are important and are better than protests being banned, as in some Gulf countries. Issam and his friends were politically active online, primarily through *Facebook*, even though protests were illegal and online political activities were monitored in Gulf countries. Protesters used online platforms to organise sessions to raise awareness of the events taking place in Egypt, and how Egyptians abroad could stand against the dictatorship. Online activities have somehow replaced physical activities, for example, protesting in the streets, for those who cannot physically protest or who feel that physical protests will not be effective. According to Issam, online activities were effective in terms of applying mechanisms that would benefit Egypt: 'We held sessions [… to think about…] how we, as Egyptians abroad, could do something for Egypt'; Issam adds that the most important task is how Egyptians abroad can contribute […towards…] achieving change in Egypt.

The mainstream media in Egypt is another factor contributing to the sense of hopelessness felt among first generation Egyptians. Issam was asked about the techniques used by the media to force Egyptians to protest, he replied: 'by lies and propaganda'. It is true […that…] every media […outlet…] has its own agenda and uses propaganda, but the Egyptian media played a major role in leading Egyptians to join protests by means of their programmes and propaganda. This has led to mistrust of the mainstream media among Egyptians. Egyptians protesting in the UK back in 2011 were sending messages to the Egyptian government and media saying that they could be effective regarding decision making and that Egyptians abroad are in solidarity with Egyptians 'at home'.

Participants from the first generation are not interested in protesting in the UK, seeing as they believe that their role would be more influential if they participated with their friends and relatives in Egypt itself, not in the UK. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt), for instance, states: 'if there is going to be a second revolution in Egypt – which is coming soon – I would prefer to be in Egypt with my friends and family'. Goffman's (1959) notion is that an individual's performance is socialised according to what society expects from him or her. Egyptian society expects Egyptians from the first generation to protest in Egypt among family and friends, as illustrated by Mazen's statement. That is why some Egyptians travelled back to Egypt during the revolution, to reinforce their Egyptian identity and to meet expectations. My question to Mazen was: 'Do you not think your role here in the UK can be more effective than protesting in Egypt?' Mazen's answer was that the effects of protesting here in the UK are limited, while in Egypt one can sense that one is doing something for one's country; however, Mazen adds that this does not deny the fact that the role of Egyptians abroad is crucial, as it shows their solidarity with their fellow Egyptians at home, by sharing their demands and suffering.

Egyptian groups on *Facebook,* such as '25th of January Egyptians in the UK' had organised the event 'Freedom and dignity to our people back home' on 21st of October 2014 to display their support for Egyptians in Egypt. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) shares the same opinion with Mazen, in terms of the limited role Egyptians in the UK have. Shabaan states: 'I do not believe in protests here in the UK as they are ineffective'. This is the reason for Shabaan not participating in any protest organised in the UK regarding the revolution. There are many participants who agree with the notion that political activities, such as protesting in the UK,

are symbolic, but have a psychological effect on Egyptians. Egyptians feel that their protests in the UK symbolically contribute to Egypt by displaying solidarity. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) believes that protesting in the UK has a mental and emotional effect: 'Protesting in the UK is psychological and symbolic, as there are very few protests'. Moreover, some people believe that the voices of Egyptians abroad would not make any difference, nor [would it] put pressure on […the…] government. The reasons mentioned above reveal that first-generation Egyptians in the UK do not protest in their host country but believe more in online participation.

Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt), believes that protesting in the UK is not as effective as becoming politically involved in Egypt. He believes that his role and that of his fellow Egyptians in the UK is futile: 'I don't believe in protests in the UK about Egypt, as they are ineffective and that's why I didn't participate in […any…] protests regarding the uprising'. Shabaan adds that even protests in Europe are unproductive, as they achieve very little, unlike protesting in Egypt, or a place where protesting might be effective. Nonetheless, there are still certain interviewees, such as Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) and Issam who believe Egyptians in the UK do have a role to play, such as raising awareness and showing solidarity with fellow Egyptians to demonstrate to the world that Egyptians abroad are there and that they can make their voices heard.

In contrast, there are other participants who still believe that the role of Egyptians abroad is limited and that they cannot change anything. The notion of a physical presence in the 'hot

spot' is valid, as some Egyptians, such as Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt), believe being present in the protests among their friends and family, is the most important thing, and much better than wasting time by protesting in the UK. Mazen adds: 'What I am doing here in the UK? Protesting or posting on *Facebook* cannot be compared with what some do in Egypt. I just want to satisfy myself, my conscience, that I am at least doing something for Egypt. That is the least I can do'. Mazen basically summarises what many Egyptians feel regarding living abroad and how they feel towards their home country. However, Mazen also states that protesting in the UK can have some positive results regarding informing the world of the events in Egypt. He added, 'I heard how the role of Egyptians in the UK was effective during the 2011 uprising by informing people in the UK about what was going on in Egypt'. He was asked whether he had experienced that during 2011, and replied 'yes', as he had been able to share updates on Egypt with his colleagues at university. Ehab (M, aged 43, 1st generation), conversely, believes political participation is a waste of time: 'I do not think political participation in the UK is useful, as I live in the UK currently and I want to be integrated into international society […], the country I live in, and be useful to the whole world'.

Egyptian interviewees from the first generation are often reluctant to protest in the streets. Consequently, interviewees decided to look for alternatives with which to support Egypt. Based on interviews with fourteen first generation Egyptians residing in the UK they have been divided into two groups: (i) those who believe that the role of Egyptians in the UK can be effective in terms of raising awareness of the situation in Egypt as Egyptians living in the UK and (ii) the second group of first generation Egyptians comprised of those who believe their role in the UK is limited and protesting in Egypt is more effective than protesting in the UK.

Role of the Egyptians in the UK

Raising awareness of events in Egypt has been the mission of many Egyptians living abroad, since the uprising in 2011. According to Issam, (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) the role of Egyptians abroad is to show the world that Egyptians still have issues that they wish to address: 'It's just to show people outside Egypt that we, as Egyptians, have a […duty…] to raise awareness, as the media do not cover such issues'. Consequently, the mission of Egyptians overseas is to raise awareness of several activists and ordinary people being killed and kidnapped. According to Issam, raising awareness of the situation in Egypt should not only have occurred at the time of the uprising, but even now during current events, five years after the revolution. There are many issues that should be raised after 2011. For instance, Egyptians are still suffering from kidnappings, killings and torture. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) argues that the role played by Egyptians abroad is essential, in terms of showing the world that Egypt is still going through challenging times. Nevine was asked if she believes the role played by Egyptians abroad would have any positive effect. She replied that 'It would make a difference to tell the world about what was happening in the country at the time of the uprising, just like the Egyptians in Europe did'. This shows that the part played by Egyptians abroad is as vital as protesting in Egypt.

Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) believes that the participation of Egyptians in the UK can be effective by raising awareness of what is happening in Egypt. For example, when Issam travelled to Egypt to witness the revolution, he joined his friends as members of a movement, known as 'Taghyeer' (meaning 'change' in English) by distributing

fliers. In addition, when Issam was residing in Kuwait, he started to collaborate with his fellow movement members in his homeland, to let people in Kuwait know what was happening in Egypt. Moreover, Issam and other Egyptians in the UK therefore raised awareness, and informed people of the 'truth'. The role of Egyptians living outside the country is to distribute accurate news about Egypt, as the media can rarely be trusted to do this. Issam adds:

'With the collaboration of friends in Egypt, we are able, as Egyptians abroad, […not only…] to tell the world what's going on in Egypt, […but…] and, at the same time, tell the Egyptian authorities that we, as Egyptians abroad, are not passive'.

Furthermore, Issam adds that Egyptians overseas can send a message by means of their political activities to the Egyptian authorities that they are knowledgeable of what's going on, such as killings without any reason, and […that…] Egyptians abroad haven't forgotten such events in Egypt. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) also shares Issam's view that Egyptians should still be involved and raise awareness of Egyptian affairs. She believes the notion of leaving Egypt to the Egyptians to decide what they want to do to change Egypt is mistaken: 'I am still Egyptian […although I live in the UK….] and have the right to interfere in Egypt's politics, as I might return to live in Egypt someday'. The notion of interfering in Egypt's affairs for some such as Nevine, is a matter of identity and a sense of belonging to Egypt. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics), alternatively, believes that once someone leaves Egypt, he or she should start a new life in the host country, and should concentrate on building a future there. He prefers to focus on his life in the UK rather than protesting or becoming involved in any political activities: 'I want

to build a good life for me in the UK and stop thinking about Egypt […] and leave Egypt to the Egyptians who live in Egypt […], as I left Egypt. That's it'. It is perfectly acceptable to think about building a good life for oneself, especially in one's host country; however, the idea of leaving Egypt to the Egyptians who live there, might appear to be passive and politically apathetic to others.

Shereen (F, aged 31, 1st generation), in contrast was active by organising sessions in different universities in the UK to talk about the situation in Egypt, as opposed to Ehab. Shereen argues that everything in Egypt, especially in 2011, happened suddenly, and people needed some explanations, especially during the uprising. Shereen also mentions that she and her friends started a campaign on the streets of Sheffield during the 2011 unrest (where she was studying) entitled 'Ask about Egypt' to answer any questions that passers-by might have had regarding the revolution. Shereen adds that the best people who can answer questions about Egypt are Egyptians living in the UK. Shereen says that she held a banner saying 'Ask about Egypt' during the campaign, and people in the street actively engaged with questions. British people had some queries about Egypt for which they could not find answers from the media. Shereen adds that holding a campaign like 'Ask about Egypt' is the least Egyptians abroad can do.

Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) claims that if the role of Egyptians in the UK is limited, the only option available is to raise awareness of the events in Egypt for those who are interested in knowing more. For instance, obtaining the news from people who have networks in Egypt, besides family and friends, would be a reliable and credible source: Maher adds: 'People outside Egypt depend

on news about Egypt from specific sources, primarily the media'. According to Maher, Such sources might be biased and misleading, unlike those who are based in Egypt and witness events personally. Those people cannot be biased, and their pieces of news are genuine.

There are many participants in this research who depended on friends and family based in Egypt for their information; however, what Maher says is not strictly true. These people might also be biased, according to their personal agenda and own point of view. The fact that Egyptians in the UK felt helpless about improving the situation in Egypt prior to 2011 and believed nothing would change, meant some decided to protest for other reasons.

One of the main reasons Egyptians participated in political protests in the UK was to support the Palestinians in their on-going conflict with Israel. Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) claims that because protesting in support of Egypt was useless, participating in protests supporting Palestine was the alternative. There were some Egyptians in the UK who were politically active but for different reasons. Maher did not join the street protests in 2011, as he was not aware of the protests happening around him and took on the responsibility to raise awareness of the current situation in Egypt among his colleagues by depending on his source of information, his family and friends. The argument here could be that friends and family can also be biased, depending on their ideologies and in what they believe, but they would deliver news as it is, according to what they witnessed. To receive news from people who have witnessed events, is still better than receiving news from the media, with their own ideology, and methods of presenting the news, by reporting some events and purposely disregarding others.

People who live outside the country, and who only have access to Western media or a limited news source which is selective in its coverage, have the chance to make up their own minds by obtaining their news from different sources. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) states that: 'I personally experienced something like that, informally with my colleagues at work'. Issam started raising awareness about the situation in Egypt as the news on TV did not report the truth: 'Being an Egyptian abroad, I have a responsibility to make things clearer to people worldwide'. Issam's statement demonstrates how Egyptians abroad can play a vital role in raising awareness and show the world the true image of the events in Egypt. Raising awareness is as crucial as protesting in the streets, and it might be effective, to a certain degree. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) also participated in the protest organised in London during the official visit of Egypt's President El-Sisi. The protest was organised on the 4th of November 2015, in front of 10 Downing Street, by those who oppose President El-Sisi, to demonstrate their disapproval of his visit to London. The protesters wanted to show that El-Sisi was not welcome in London, and that he is an illegitimate leader of the country. Maher's participation in the protest is another sign that a group of Egyptians still believe protesting on the streets is beneficial, despite the opposition of other Egyptian groups.

The other alternative that Egyptians from the first generation, especially those above forty, have considered is online protests or activities. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) says that he participates in online activities, for example online protests, as it is his best option, considering that he is a medical doctor and has a busy life. This confirms, once again,

that online protesting had replaced physical street protests for Egyptians in the UK. There are many Egyptians residing in the UK who believe posting events, in relation to the uprising, online (*Facebook,* for instance), is the best option, given the fact that they live away from the 'hotspot'.

According to the first-generation Egyptians, there is another choice which involves obtaining a higher academic degree in the UK. There are some Egyptians who believe that studying for a higher degree, rather than being active in political activities, will benefit Egypt more: 'If I study here in the UK, this will benefit Egypt in the future', Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) claims. To be useful to Egypt, he says, is being successful in one's studies – obtaining a higher degree is the solution. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics) also believes in the same idea. He considers that people who leave their home country and settle down in another one, should be encouraged to engage in further studies. To be successful, they should work towards being useful citizens, wherever they live:

> Ehab adds 'Egyptians must conduct themselves, according to the place they live in […]. They should be productive in the country they live in […Britain…]. They should not be negative and just be productive in their home country but be productive in their host country as well'.

Karim (M, aged 26, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is not interested in politics) agrees with Ehab, asserting that it would be more beneficial for Egyptians to be well-educated, rather than engaging in protests. Karim's thoughts show that he is in the UK to succeed in obtaining a degree for his studies, rather than protesting. The second group of Egyptians from the first generation on the other hand believes protesting is

futile and a waste of time. A group of participants, especially those aged forty and above, believes that the role that Egyptians can play in the UK is limited, and moreover, that protests in the UK are ineffective, but may help to make Egyptians 'feel good' about having contributed something to Egypt.

Participation by permission

This section discusses the authority that parents have over their adult children, and how this authority affects the decisions related to be politically active. This parental control has discouraged many young Egyptians from protesting. Al Rub and Majedh (2007) conducted a study on parenting styles among immigrant parents in the US. The study focuses on the methods parents adopt to deal with their children in the host country. The study revealed that the most common one that parents assume among immigrants from Arab backgrounds in the US is the authoritarian style. The study demonstrates that parenting styles differ among parents in home countries and in host countries. Parents from an Arab background would be much stricter and more controlling in their home countries than in host countries, where their approach would be more permissive and more indulgent (Al Rub and Majedh 2007). Children of immigrants face difficulties in expressing their opinions to their parents. Their desire to participate in protests (or their actual participation in protests) and involvement in political activities, is not always met with approval. According to Dwairy (2004), parents residing in a host country tend to stick to their cultural habits and traditions with respect to raising their children, but also attempt to adapt to the culture of the host country. Parents who keep their home country's culture rooted in their children, whilst at the same time endeavouring to integrate into the host country's culture, could confuse their young children.

Parents of Egyptian interviewees in the UK adopt an authoritarian style with their children, by preventing them from protesting and being involved in political activities. Young Egyptians who wished to go back to Egypt to participate in the protests organised there were banned from going by their parents, whilst parental authority has also been used on those young Egyptians who wished to participate in protests in the UK. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for example, claims that his parents' generation was the main problem preventing the younger generation from engaging in revolutionary activities in Egypt. The parental ban was due to various reasons; apart from disagreeing with the change and uprising, parents were also concerned about safety issues and the dangerous environment that protestors had witnessed, especially in Egypt.

Families can also impact on their children's political participation. Maccoby and Martin (1983) categorised parenting behaviour as 'controlling' and 'permissive' (cited in Baumrind 1991). The control over young children's decisions has been associated with specific groups of individuals, such as Hispanic and African-Americans. The parenting style that some Egyptians in the UK have adopted is the controlling one (Zahran 2011). Johnson and Kelley (2011) believe that children raised under the permissive parenting style, enjoy freedom of expression and choice. Moreover, children are not controlled by permissive parents. As a result, children would have the choice to become involved in various activities. In addition, Johnson and Kelley (2011) demonstrate that children raised under the permissive parenting style tend to enjoy a warm and welcoming environment at home. However, this parenting style might have a negative impact on children, given that they may not receive proper guidance from their parents, as they are free to do anything.

Baumrind (1971), in contrast, identifies parenting styles as authoritarian, authoritative and permissive. The authoritarian style affects children not only in the early stages of their lives but also into adulthood. According to parental acceptance–rejection theory, children and later adults, might develop aggression, passive aggression, besides many other problems (Rohner 1986). Parents from a Middle Eastern background tend to adopt the authoritarian style, which may cause difficulties for children, such as making their own decisions and how to integrate into the society in which they reside. The nature of an authoritarian parenting style involves explaining reasons for rejecting some values and actions; however, some authoritarian parents might explain reasons for rejecting something but always force their children to follow their orders (Rohner 1986). Parenting styles vary, and each style has its advantages and disadvantages. According to Zahran (2011), parents do not always stick to the culture inherited from their parents but create their own culture. Creating a special culture by combining many factors from various cultures could be beneficial to children. Second generation immigrants, for example, would benefit from this approach, seeing as they would be able to adapt to home as well as host societies.

The study conducted by Dwairy et al. (2006) focuses on parenting styles in Arab societies and consists of three patterns. The first style is controlling and is also termed 'authoritarian and authoritative' (see also Baumrind 1971). This style is associated with not allowing children to express their opinions and feelings and involves rejecting many actions and attitudes without giving any reasons. The interviews in this study show that many Egyptians in the UK experienced the same parental style during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The second style is inconsistent, authoritarian and permissive, whereas the final style is flexible, combining both authoritative and permissive attitudes. Parenting styles are important to children regarding

their psycho-social development. Permissive parents allow their children to make their own decisions and prepare them to face various activities in later life (Dwairy et al. 2006).

The most common parenting styles in Arab societies are permissive and authoritarian (Dwairy et al. 2006). Parents residing in the US have benefited from living there by not adopting the same strategies of discipline their parents used with them. Parents in the US who are from Arab backgrounds started to research new ways of disciplining their children, such as open discussions. These parents are aware that old-fashioned techniques, for instance spanking and hitting their children are not allowed in the US; consequently, new disciplinary methods are required. Parenting styles have affected the political participation of young people: as a result, some young people are not interested in politics.

The question would then be: what about protesting in the UK, where it is claimed most protests are safe? Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) explains that his mother objected to his becoming involved in politics:

> 'Personally, I would so love to get involved in politics, but the problem is my mother […]. She is so concerned about me getting involved in politics, especially when I go to Egypt, given the fact that she realises that my point of view is against the army ruling Egypt'.

Mazen adds: 'My mother thought I would get arrested the last time I visited Egypt, because I posted [… comments…] against the Egyptian army'. This point shows how parents, especially from Middle Eastern societies, have powerful authority over their adult children. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) states how his family was extremely worried about him protesting

in Alexandria, Egypt, during the uprising. However, Mohamed was not prevented from protesting, but the idea that families opposed protesting, was common. Consequently, the safety of protesters is a significant factor, especially for mothers. Protesting outside of Egypt may be safer, but some people are not interested in political activities, while others may be prevented from participating by their parents, and so on.

Egyptian interviewees in the UK agree that young Egyptians were the reason for the rebellion and success of the 2011 the revolution: 'Mostly those who were in Tahrir Square are the young and middle-class people', Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) says. According to Hani, the younger generation of Egyptians are more likely to take risks, unlike their parents' generation, which is reluctant to welcome change. This is the key difference between the young Egyptians and their parents' generation: 'The 2011 revolution was mobilised by young Egyptians, while the older generation opposed what was happening in Egypt, as their businesses had been negatively affected, so they view the term 'change' differently to the younger generation', Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) added. Hani's statement illustrates the different viewpoint that these two generations had.

The young generation of participants blame their parents' generation for delaying the revolution until 2011: 'I think we must ask my parents' generation why they hadn't done anything about the corruption and poor situation in Egypt'. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) added that the young should ask their parents' generation if they were satisfied with the situation in Egypt. This demonstrates how the younger generation 'welcomed risks', as Hani

says. The young Egyptians are revolutionary and want to change everything wrong with society: 'The younger generation is not going to be silent anymore, unlike […their…] parents' generation: Mubarak would have stayed for another forty years, if it was up to […our…] parents' generation – the young want change', Mazen asserts. Mazen was asked whether the parents' generation participated in the uprising. His answer was that the Egyptian army strove to convince the older generation that the uprising was bad, by showing the negative side of change – how Egypt would be ruined if those 'bad guys', the Muslim Brotherhood, were in charge. Mazen says

> 'I don't deny that the older generation did participate in the revolution, but […it was…] the older generation who brought President El-Sisi to power on the 30th of June 2013 – the coup – when President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate for the presidential election, was removed by the army'.

This suggests that the older generation played a negative role in the uprising, according to many Egyptians. The level of negativity was generally high among Egyptians, whether in terms of Mubarak resigning or concerning any change in the country. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) states that he did not expect President Mubarak to resign: 'I never thought Mubarak would leave, at all'. There were many Egyptians, including those residing in the UK, who had the feeling of hopelessness and negativity, as previously stated. However, when the 2011 revolution erupted, the sense of positivity 'went viral', especially with the younger generation, encouraging each other to revolt. The slogan among Egyptians, as Mohammed (M, aged 37, 1.75 generation as he came to the UK when he was 3, he is politically active in Egypt and the UK and online activities) states, was: 'It is a chance that comes once in a lifetime'. Once again, the younger generation took on the responsibility to first encourage

each other, and then urge other generations to revolt and say no to the circumstances in Egypt.

Mohamed adds that the younger generation's encouragement of others to support the revolution was vital, as many had had negative feelings about the revolution in terms of its effectiveness and success. According to them, it would achieve nothing, though the young people were determined to meet the revolution's goals. According to Mohamed, the main motivation for fellow Egyptians to support the protests of 2011 was the large number of Egyptians on the streets endorsing the uprising. A further reason for Egyptians to join the protests was because the Egyptian police had acted aggressively and violently towards the protestors, causing the deaths of countless Egyptians. This situation created widespread anger among the families of those who had died or had been injured. This resulted in Egyptians deciding to join these families to seek justice for those killed and injured, and consequently, encouraged millions to join the protests on the country's streets.

The notion of negativity was more common among the older generation, and those aged forty and over: 'The parents' generation is very negative, as they just don't want to change anything. They are used to a specific lifestyle and don't want anything disturbing this lifestyle', Mohamed adds. Egyptians over the age of forty did not want any change, as, throughout Egyptian history, nothing had been changed, even when Egypt went through testing economic and social periods. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics) analyses the issue by stating: 'The main problem among Egyptians is that they want the president to solve their problems, and they expect that if you don't find a job, the president is responsible'. Ehab's comment includes all Egyptians, not just the older generation, as some young people

also believe in the status quo. Ehab was asked about Egyptians revolting against the Egyptian regime in 2011. He replied that this uprising was wrong from the beginning, as the reason for it occurring had not been clearly stated. According to him, the problem lay with all Egyptians, despite their age. Ehab's principal notion is that the former government in Egypt did well for Egyptians, and it was a serious mistake to revolt against the governing body. This illustrates that Egyptians over forty years believe in the notion that the revolution and protesting were not good ideas.

Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) continues: 'Our parents' generation not only acted negatively towards the uprising, but they used their strong authority as parents to prevent us, the young people, from protesting'. The idea not to support the unrest is an individual decision, but parents who used their authority to affect the decisions that young people wished to take, was the thing which many interviewees hated, as previously explained. Mohamed claims: 'Our parents' generation used its authority as parents to prevent young people from protesting […], as they are aware […that…] that in Arab societies, including Egyptian society, parents have strong authority over their children'. Maged (M, aged 24, 1st generation) is indifferent towards the idea of preventing young Egyptians from protesting by stating: 'It happened with my friends, as their parents stopped them from protesting, although it didn't happen to me, as I was not that active'.

This demonstrates that the authority of parents is effective among Middle Eastern and Muslim societies, even with their grown-up children. The Arab saying in which the parents' generation believes is: 'الريس اللي تعرفوه احسن من الريس الي ماتعرفوش'. The translation means 'The president you know is better than the president you don't know anything about'. According

to Mohamed, this saying has been used by many Egyptians over forty, to discourage young people from protesting and aiming to bring change to Egypt. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) mentions how many Egyptians over forty believe in this saying. There are other sayings, for instance ' خليك بحالك' ('mind your own business') which Egyptians have adopted, especially the forty-plus generation, with respect to not interfering in politics. This saying encourages negativity about things: when someone merely cares about their own business, without becoming involved in politics, and is a form of protection. This is a typical sign of negativity which young Egyptians refused to accept, despite the killings, opposition by the older generation, and other social obstacles, such as expressing an opinion against their wishes and choosing who to marry. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on Facebook) went on to explain the second most popular saying in which the older generation believes: ' خليك ماشي جنب الحيط' ('don't interfere in anything'). This means the acceptance of the current situation in Egypt and living in the country without arguing about it, whether it is satisfactory or not.

The parents' generation not only had a negative opinion of the uprising, they also strove to label the young as 'bad' and accused them of being promiscuous by saying that the 'men and women were having sexual intercourse' in Tahrir Square. Mohamed refuted these accusations by explaining that the attitude of protesters was appropriate and cooperative, according to what he himself witnessed. The allegations that the youth were being 'bad boys and girls' had been generated by the pro-Mubarak media: 'Our parents' generation was trying to force us to accept the situation we were living in', Mohamed adds. The notion is that the

parents' generation was seeking to convince young Egyptians that the situation in Egypt was not that bad, and they should live and accept life as it is. Young Egyptians were not satisfied with the situation in Egypt, so they decided to do something about it by revolting. For instance, Maher experienced his parents' authority by always disagreeing with them, to the extent that they sought to prevent him from protesting during the 2011 uprising.

The notion of being sceptical about events, particularly regarding the Egyptian unrest, has been common among first generation Egyptians over forty, living in the U.K. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) believes that nothing was going to happen in Egypt, and President Mubarak would not leave the presidency easily. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) also shares the notion with Shabaan. 'I didn't participate in the protests organised in the UK to be honest, as I thought Mubarak would not quit. I still believe Mubarak is not in jail, but still in power' Nevine says. The notion of scepticism among Egyptians from the first generation has led them to be negative about the uprising. This has resulted in the parents' generation encouraging their sons and daughters not to participate in such 'delusions', as some people describe them.

Egyptian interviewees from the first generation revealed little or no desire to go to the elections prior to the revolution. The reason for the lack of interest in voting was that the results were obvious from the beginning, in favour of President Mubarak: 'I didn't see that the elections would have any effect, that's why the revolution evolved', Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) declared. This demonstrates that the 2011 revolution was built upon the failure of

the previous regime to provide Egyptians with freedom of expression, dignity, free elections and democracy. Egyptians who were eligible to vote did not do so because of the hopelessness of the situation: 'Before 2011, I was not eligible to vote. Even if I […had been…], the elections, in my opinion, […would be…] ineffective and my vote would not have changed anything, as Mubarak would have won anyway', Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) argues. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) adds that he had not participated in any elections in Egypt prior to 2011.

The sense of despair concerning any change, was common among all Egyptians, especially those residing in the UK. The 2011 revolution, alternatively, has changed the minds of Egyptians regarding voting in Egyptian elections, and faith in Egyptian elections has been restored among Egyptians from the first generation after 2011. Issam expresses his feelings towards Egypt after 2011 by stating that: 'Egypt is our country, once again'. Egyptians from the first generation have started to lose the sense of hopelessness and feel they need to participate in political activities to support their country. Voting in elections was one option for Egyptians from the first generation to express their loyalty to their country, once more. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) says the elections before 2011 cannot be called 'proper presidential elections' because there were no real candidates, only one, President Mubarak, and he would obviously win the election. According to Maher, the only time Egypt had a real election was in 2012 when President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the elections. However, Maher argues that democracy was destroyed by the military coup in 2013, when El-Sisi,

formerly the defence minister, took over and became president of Egypt. Egypt has returned to the point prior to 2011, as the 2011 revolt has not changed anything, according to many Egyptians from the first generation.

Second generation

This section examines the political participation of the second generation of Egyptians, and what effect, if any, the 2011 revolution has had on their political activities. The key finding is that the 2011 uprising has had an effect, to some degree, on this group of Egyptians. The first part deals with the status of political participation among the second generation, prior to, during and after 2011. Egyptians from the second generation have also experienced the sense of hopelessness as the first generation has. They also felt that their voice would not make any difference in Egypt. Additionally, Egyptians living abroad from the second generation have been as politically apathetic as the first generation. This section addresses the concept of protesting, voting, the status of diaspora Egyptians as being politically apathetic, and the effect of the 2011 revolution among the second-generation Egyptians.

Egyptians were not politically active before the 2011 uprising. Egyptians living abroad, specifically those living in the UK and many Egyptians living in Egypt, had the sense of hopelessness, and many interviewees from the second generation express how despondent they felt towards the situation in Egypt, prior to 2011. Second generation Egyptians shared the sense that their voices were not heard by the Egyptian authorities together with the first generation. Both groups felt that their contributions would not make any difference in decision-making. The sense of hopelessness was common among most Egyptians, because they believed nothing was going to change, whether they were politically active or not; besides, the risks would be high and there would be no positive outcome. Egyptians began to

feel that they could make a difference after the 2011 revolt, and, if they did not participate in Egypt's politics, they would lose Egypt and it would not be a good place in which to live one day. Dina (F, aged 22, 1.75 generation, came to the UK when she was 3 and interested in political activities in the UK), for instance, states that she was not involved in political activities regarding Egypt, because she felt that such protests were futile. The Egyptian revolution in 2011 is a substantial landmark in Egyptian history. Nevertheless, when the uprising unfolded in 2011, everything changed for the Egyptians in terms of political participation, and the sense of hope for a better Egypt was restored. Egypt made headlines with peaceful protests organised by young Egyptians. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) says that she knew nothing about Egypt before 2011 – she did not even know who the Egyptian president was. However, everything changed in 2011 when the idea of protesting was generated, and Egyptians started to pay attention to the news. This indicates that the idea of becoming involved in Egypt's politics had not been common among Egyptians abroad, until the 2011 uprising.

The Egyptian rebellion reinforced solidarity among Egyptians, both in Egypt and abroad. Dina expresses how she feels more connected to her Egyptian roots, nowadays, thanks to the 2011 Egyptian revolution: 'I did not feel […that…] I was part of […the…] Egyptian diaspora, until the revolution, as I […now…] participate with my fellow Egyptians in protests'. Dina also explains how the revolution allowed her to be up-to-date with the events in Egypt:

> 'The revolution gave me the chance to participate in what's going on in my country […] as before, you sense the detachment from what's going on in Egypt, as you live in the UK and you do not have a say in what's going on in Egypt'.

Dina's quote has raised the issue of the 'sense of detachment' diaspora Egyptians felt before the revolution. Egyptians living abroad have been viewed as 'aliens'. Nonetheless, the 2011 revolution has restored the sense of attachment to Egypt once again by encouraging Egyptians abroad to protest and be part of building Egypt's future. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) raises an important issue which is how Egyptians living in Egypt and abroad can help Egypt progress towards being a better country.

Protesting, according to Sherif, could be merely to show solidarity with various issues regarding Egypt:

> 'The only demonstration I had been in was about cutting off connections with Egypt. I joined the protest, although I live in London, not Cairo, just to show solidarity with the Egyptians, and to show the world how horrible it is to cut connections off'.

Moreover, Sherif believes protests were not that effective in terms of the uprising in Egypt: 'Things happened in Egypt so quickly – the revolution lasted only 18 days – and, despite all that, I believe protests have not been successful weapons in the uprising'. The sense of political participation among Egyptians abroad has not been that strong. According to Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old), the only thing which can unite Egyptians is an Egyptian national team football match:

> 'I remember when there was a match between England and Egypt, I felt that the medium connecting Egyptians to Egypt is football, and I remember there were many Egyptians in the stadium supporting Egypt. Suddenly, after 2011 – the revolution – everyone started to be interested in politics and to speak about it […] and I felt –

> Egyptians are more connected to Egypt than previously, […] as before, you would rarely know that someone was Egyptian'.

Regarding the desire that second generation Egyptians felt about participating in protests supporting the uprising in Egypt, Egyptian parents used their authority to ban their children from protesting. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK), for instance, states how he wanted to go to Egypt to help the sick and injured, but his parents were against that idea:

> 'I wanted to go to Egypt, back in 2011, to help as a doctor, but my family banned me from doing so, as it was dangerous and many people had been shot for no reason […]. I wanted to go to help people medically, but my parents said you will go there and be killed'.

The fact that it was an unsafe environment prevented many Egyptians from going to Egypt to participate in the uprising. Parents had used their authority over their adult children to prevent them from protesting in Egypt', conversely, second generation Egyptians could protest in the UK as illustrated by Sherif and Dina. The parents' argument was all about security and the risks involved in going to Egypt to protest. Dina agrees with Sherif's parents by stating: 'I only go protesting, if I feel I am going to be safe and it is worth it'.

The authority parents have over their adult children, especially Egyptians, has been powerful. There were some Interviewees who were not allowed to have any political activities relating to Egypt, because their parents believed that their children were naïve, and did not know anything about Egyptian politics. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution), for instance, claims that her family, primarily her parents, did not encourage her to protest and said: 'you don't need to protest, and it has nothing to do with you – You can leave Egypt anytime, if you want'. Sama was asked

about her reflections on her family's argument. She said that protesting had nothing to do with nationality, but that it was the right thing to do. Sama suffered from the notion that those who do not live in the country, should not protest. Parental authority plays a significant role in deciding what their children can or cannot do, on their behalf, without consulting them: 'I even had my family urging me to leave Egypt, at the time of revolution. But I was …like, no, I would love to stay to do the right thing'. Authoritarian parents always believe they know better than their children; consequently, they are responsible for making decisions in the interests of their children.

Sama also agrees with the fact that young people are motivated to engage in politics, but their parents are against the idea:

> 'I wanted to participate in protests, but I was not allowed to, as my family is so protective and wouldn't allow me to participate […]. I tried once by going to Tahrir Square, as I was in Egypt during the 2011 uprising'.

Sama thinks that, although her family was against protesting, she was happy that she could do something for Egypt. Sama's family was concerned about her safety, and even asked her to go back to the US where she used to live. The ideology of families would affect the decision to protest or not. Sama's family supported the army, and consequently, were against the revolution, especially the older generation: 'My family thought that things cannot be solved by protesting […]. The younger generation is trying to revolt, so we don't end up like the older generation', Sama added. The idea of the younger generation wanting change arises again, and how they do not want to be like the older generation who accept everything, regardless of whether it is right or wrong.

There are some young Egyptians such as Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics) who agree with the idea of the negative role that the parents' generation plays – Rami says: 'Our parents' generation – and my father is one of them – thought President Mubarak was the right one to rule Egypt, and, if Mubarak went down, chaos would happen. To be honest, I thought the same something during 2011'. There are some families of young Egyptians living in the UK who have been supportive of their sons or daughters. Rana (F, aged 20, 1.25 generation as she came to the UK at the age of 16 and she is politically active in the UK) states how her family felt when she participated in the protests in support of Egypt: 'My family was proud of me participating in protests, in London'. The argument would again be the safety of protesters in the UK compared to their safety in Egypt. The approval of Rana's family with regards to protesting meant she did not participate in the protests in Egypt in 2011, as she claims it depends on personalities. There were several interviewees, in contrast, who positively viewed the role of their parents' generation. Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), for instance, paid attention to his parents' opinion regarding the revolution: 'I listened to my parents, for example, my dad is politically involved, as he was working for the military, but he is retired now'. Listening to one's parents' point of view may be sensible, but this does not mean it should affect young peoples' opinions, as many interviewees stated.

It is not only first-generation Egyptians over forty who are negative concerning the situation in Egypt. Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) does not feel positive about what happened, and what is happening, in Egypt. He describes his experience in the

revolution as ‘chaotic’ and not a real revolution: ‘I went to Egypt with my parents during 2011 to spend Christmas […there…], but the situation was bad – no electricity or water – and my parents did not feel comfortable, so they booked a flight back to the UK’. Muhammad protested in Tahrir Square on the 27th of January: ‘In the beginning it was fun to be surrounded by Egyptians from different religions and backgrounds, but later, it became more violent and perilous for us’. Hence, Muhammad decided not to participate in protests anymore.

The notion of being at risk was a great concern for Egyptians, especially for those who lived abroad and went back to Egypt to witness the revolution. Post-2013 has been a turning point regarding the political participation of the Egyptians living in Egypt and abroad. The ‘military coup’ – as some people call it – in 2013 was the end of democracy in Egypt, and the beginning of disunity among Egyptians. Egypt is back to ‘square one’, as many argue, that is, to the Egypt that existed prior to the 2011 uprising. Political participation, especially in the UK, is practically non-existent, as some interviewees have argued. Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics) expresses his despair: ‘I feel something has passed away, nowadays, regarding protesting and other political activities in the UK’. There are some political activities that exist in the UK, such as protests, although people are no longer interested in joining them anymore. Rami states that the purpose of protesting is obscure and pointless, and that therefore he is not protesting.

The comparison of political participation by Egyptians in the UK in the 2011 uprising and the current activities, conducting interviews with Egyptians residing in the UK and conducting ethnographic work, have shown that Egyptians are less enthusiastic about protesting and

becoming involved in political activities, today. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) states the following: 'In 2011, I was eager to participate in protests; however, nowadays I do not participate, as people have started to be[come] divided, and there is a lot of trouble'. This lack of enthusiasm to protest is shared among many interviewees. It seems that the 2011 revolution created a sense of solidarity among Egyptians both in Egypt and abroad. The notion of solidarity among Egyptians during the 2011 uprising has been mentioned by many interviewees. Dina, for instance, states that during the 2011 uprising Egyptians were united and had one goal, which was to be rid of President Mubarak and achieve justice; however, after 2011, Egyptians have become divided and even hate each other. Dina had the same feeling that 'something has died away': 'After 2011, I only participated online and did not go on the streets to protest'.

The second point discussed in this section is voting, and how Egyptians from the second generation have dealt with it, in relation to the 2011 revolution. The sense of the effectiveness of votes by Egyptians abroad has been reinforced after the 2011 revolt, although some Egyptians remain confused and moreover, their vision regarding whom to vote for is still blurred. Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics) states that he did not vote in the Egyptian elections, due to the lack of advertising – he was unaware of the nominees:

> 'I did not vote in the Egyptian elections after the 2011 revolution, and I really feel bad about that, but it was because I did not know who to vote for […]. If I get the chance again, I would participate, as I believe my vote now counts'.

It is worth mentioning that Rami did not vote in the UK elections, either. This indicates that Rami is politically inactive regarding both Egypt and the UK. The reason Rami and others

are being politically inactive is that voters are not convinced by any candidates. This has been the case for many Egyptians from various generations.

The sense of duty of Egyptians to vote after 2011 has been strengthened: Egyptian second-generation interviewees such as Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) believed in the importance of voting to rebuild Egypt after the revolution. There was more involvement in political activities during 2011 and immediately after the uprising by Egyptians abroad. The process of voting was easy for Egyptians in the UK. The first step of the voting process was to register online; secondly, the embassy would send a voting form via the post: 'I participated in three elections after the revolution', Dina added: 'I registered with the Egyptian embassy in London and voted although some Egyptians did not vote as they were not registered'. Dina was happy that she had voted in the elections, despite the difficulties she had faced. The main difficulty was completing the voting form in Arabic. Although Dina speaks and reads Arabic, she found it hard to follow the Arabic instructions. The point of writing the form only in Arabic would cause complications among many Egyptians, who do not speak and read Arabic, even though they might have been interested in participating and being part of Egypt's future. This might indicate how Egyptians abroad are still alienated. There may be two reasons why Egyptians are not registered with the Egyptian embassy: either some Egyptians are not interested in politics, or, as claimed by the UK Census Centre (2015), in response to the email enquiry I sent, many Egyptians are not registered with the British government. As a result, the number of Egyptians in the UK is inaccurate.

Dina's difficulties with reading the form written in Arabic are common among many Egyptians. Dina understands and speaks Arabic, but found the form was difficult to

understand, as it was written in modern Standard Arabic. The spoken language among immigrants is usually their dialect which differs from modern Standard Arabic. Dina had to ask her parents to help her to vote. It would have been better if The form is written in both Arabic and English, to make it easier for those who reside abroad to vote. This demonstrates that Egyptians abroad are excluded from the process, to a certain extent, and their votes are not significant. It is worth mentioning that Egyptians abroad did not have the right to vote for a long time, especially prior to the 2011 revolution. Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), conversely, does not see the point of voting in the Egyptian elections, as, he says: 'We don't live in Egypt – I should vote for things that are going to affect me in the country I live in'. This demonstrates that the notion of belonging to a country cannot be drawn from voting.

The physical presence in a country is crucial, according to Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), as he believes that he will be affected by the environment in which he lives, and not what will affect people who live somewhere else by participating in voting for that specific place. It is worth mentioning that Michael participated in the Egyptian election, but, again, he believes his vote will not make any difference to Egyptians living in Egypt. People should vote in elections which are going to be of direct benefit to them, not those that will have no influence on their lives. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) disagrees with this notion, as she believes that voting in the Egyptian election gives her the chance to practise her right as an Egyptian citizen, even though she does live abroad:

> ‘Although no one I have voted for succeeded, of course I felt I had the chance to have a say in what’s going on in Egypt. It was the first time I voted for anything in Egypt. It was a big and great thing for Egyptians abroad’.

According to Dina, after 2011, Egyptians felt they had a national duty to participate in Egyptian politics, including protests and elections, to have their voices heard.

The last point to discuss is around several difficulties participants face, particularly from their families, when trying to intervene in Egypt’s politics while living abroad. For example, Dina (F, aged 24, 1.75 generation) is regularly reminded by her family that she is not living in Egypt, and does not know much about what is happening in Egypt. Therefore, they believe that she should not get involved in political activities related to the country. Dina says: ‘I always hear this argument within my family; when I say my opinion, they say: you don’t understand anything; you live abroad, and you just watch Western media. You know nothing’. Dina feels it is frustrating to think like that, just because she does not live in Egypt, given the fact that Dina studied political science, as part of her undergraduate degree, and her dissertation was on the Egyptian military.

Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore), in contrast, agrees to some extent with his family, which has a similar opinion to Dina’s family. ‘I have been told that I am not able to interfere in Egypt’s business, as I don’t live in Egypt. Nonetheless, I can give my opinion, but my aunt, who left Egypt recently, told me, you don’t live in Egypt, so you don’t know what’s going on in the country, and can’t talk about it’, Michael said. He still believes that he is free to voice his opinion concerning issues relating to Egypt. He argues that a physical presence is essential to feel what people are

experiencing: ‘I believe in the idea of not interfering in a country’s business, to a certain degree, and I understand peoples’ frustration, as we don’t understand what people living in Egypt are going through, from an outsider’s point of view’.

Summary

This chapter has dealt with political participation among Egyptians in the UK. In this section, I present my reflections on the chapter. Participating in online vs offline activities is the main difference between Egyptians from the first and second generations. Egyptians from the first generation prefer to be politically active online, I think, as it is easier to join in due to busy careers and to show support, while the second generation has chosen to be active both offline and online. Offline activities have included protesting in different cities in the UK and being involved in Egyptian politics, especially during 2011, with the aim of expressing their ‘Egyptianness’ via online activities on *Facebook* and other platforms. Egyptians from the first generation do not need to prove their ‘Egyptianness’. However, those Egyptians who have been residing overseas for a long time need to prove to others that they are still Egyptian by protesting and posting pictures online, as a few interviewees, such as Khouloud (F, aged 45, 1st generation and considered 1st generation-young adulthood as she Left Egypt in her 20s, she is active in political activities in Egypt and the UK), have done. This confirms that Egyptians from the second generation must prove themselves as Egyptians, by protesting and being politically active, both online and offline, while Egyptians from the first generation prefer to prove their ‘Egyptianness’ online. In my opinion, both first and second-generation Egyptians agree on the significance of political participation, especially after the 2011 revolution. Nevertheless, the tools used to express ‘political contribution’ among different generations differ. This of course applies to Egyptians who are interested in politics (see Table 5).

For the first generation, alternatives such as raising awareness and sending money back home are preferred over protesting or going back to Egypt to protest among Egyptians in Tahrir Square to contribute to rebuilding Egypt. Alternatively, the second generation have preferred to express their support for Egypt by protesting on the streets of the UK. Second generation Egyptians have protested in streets to achieve two things; the first one is to show support to Egyptian uprising and the second one is to prove they are Egyptian and still belong to Egypt. The 2011 revolution has given Egyptians abroad, specifically the second generation, the chance to contribute to Egypt and to strengthen their relationship with their 'homeland' or their parents' homeland. Moreover, the other point unifying both generations of Egyptians is that the euphoria related to the 2011 revolution and political participation has faded, and furthermore, Egyptians abroad are not interested in protesting or participating in any political activities nowadays. In other words, Egyptians in the UK have become active in political protests because of the 2011 uprising. Thus, this project has revealed how effective the 2011 uprising has been, even if only for a short period.

Chapter Eight: The Media as a Tool for Identity Performance and Political Participation

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the third theme formulated from conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK and ethnographic work. The chapter is divided in the same way as the previous chapters, into first and second generations. In addition, among the two main groups, use of mainstream and social media is discussed in relation to the 2011 uprising. Moreover, the sense of trust in both the mainstream Arabic and Western media among first and second-generation Egyptians is discussed. At the end of the chapter, a summary of the main findings is presented, whilst my own reflections on the chapter are also provided.

Howard et al. (2011) argue that the media, especially social media, have played a crucial role in spreading democratic ideas in Arab countries, essentially Egypt and Tunisia, where social media have helped young Tunisians and Egyptians to spread this concept. Howard et al. (2011) state in their report regarding social media during the Arab Spring, by analysing the Tweets on *Twitter* and other social media websites, that social media gave ordinary people the chance to be in control of their future by starting peaceful revolutions using social media to change regimes and be influential in the future of their countries. In addition, social media websites have been a successful tool for forcing dictatorships in many Arab countries to step down. Most of the population in Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, is young (under the age of 34). Young people are the most common users of social media and therefore, social media was heavily used in Tunisia and Egypt (Howard et al. 2011). Howard et al. (2011) add that urban, young and well-educated people in Egypt and Tunisia used social media to start political debates and conversations online. It was not only young Egyptians and Tunisians who used social media to be politically active regarding enhancing the situation in their countries,

though social media were used to put pressure on governments of these countries to make changes.

This chapter examines the general role the media played in the uprising among Egyptians in the UK. According to Egyptians in the UK, the media were used as a tool to show their political participation, to prove their sense of belonging to Egypt and to generate a strong Egyptian identity. An attempt is made to find answers to the research question regarding media use among Egyptians in the UK during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. An examination of the different media uses Egyptians in the UK adopted will hopefully reveal how the media have contributed to Egyptians' engagement in the revolution.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section deals with first generation Egyptians, whereas the other section deals with the second generation, and how these two groups have used the media. The first issue that is addressed is the notion of mistrust of the mainstream media among Egyptians in the UK, while the second is how Egyptians from both the first and second generations view social media regarding news about Egypt. The final matter is an examination of the sources of information for both generations.

Mainstream media vs. social media

As this section deals with the mainstream media and social media among Egyptians in the UK, definitions of both are presented. According to Ofcom – the UK communications regulator – (2017), the definition of mainstream media is any traditional media, such as TV channels (the BBC, newspapers, radio. Furthermore, it is the opposite to alternative media, principally social media. In contrast, social media or alternative media are media associated with the Internet, for instance social networking websites including blogs, *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube* (Ofcom 2017).

First generation

The first generation of Egyptians agree in terms of the notion that social media has played an essential role in the uprising, while mainstream media is viewed as having played a negative role. The sense of mistrust in the mainstream media was common, both during the 2011 uprising and currently, among the first generation of Egyptians living in the UK. Ehab (M, aged 43. Ehab belongs to 1st generation as he left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics), for instance, demonstrates how the mainstream media, Arab media, and specifically the Egyptian media, played a negative role in the uprising, by misrepresenting the news to Egyptians, regarding the situation in Egypt during the uprising: 'The mainstream media in general have imagined and deceived Egyptians with regard to their reality about being poor, and made them believe they are brilliant and great, which is not the case'. Ehab believes Egyptians live in denial about their reality, and that the mainstream media, primarily the Egyptian, are to blame. There are many Egyptians, including Ehab, who have lost faith and trust in the mainstream media. This lack of trust and credibility means that several interviewees in this study have decided not to watch the mainstream media, anymore.

Ali and Fahmy (2013) tackled the issue of bias and the Arab media when they conducted a study on the coverage of *AlArabiya* news and events in Egypt. The study reveals that *AlArabiya* news channel is biased. The bias was identified through the types of news broadcast about Egypt in accordance with the Saudi government, given the fact the *AlArabiya* channel is Saudi owned. This proves that the Arab media, predominantly the mainstream media, are biased and have a hidden agenda. Moreover, this illustrates why some interviewees in this study do not trust the Arab media in general because of their hidden agenda. One example of that is Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in

his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt), who lost trust in the mainstream media because of their hidden agenda and propaganda.

Alalam (2013) conducted a study focusing on the role of the media in the democratisation process in Egypt after 2011. The study established that people started to trust social media more than the mainstream media; after 2011, and that Egyptians began to trust the non-Egyptian mainstream media. Issam (M, aged 36. Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), however, disagrees with this notion. He believes that some Arab media, such as *AlArabiya*, also have their own agenda and cannot be wholly trusted: 'I watch the mainstream media, such as *Al-Jazeera*, (Qatari-owned), but not *AlArabiya* […] and, of course, I would be picky, as I don't believe everything broadcast'. It is worth mentioning that the level of trust can be measured according to the ideology and point of view of the person watching. The proof lies in what Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt) says, in terms of freedom of expression during President Morsi's regime from 2012 to 2013:

> 'We had freedom of speech and the press, but now we don't have any, and, whether you agree or disagree with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, you have to admit that we had freedom [of expression] during Morsi's regime'.

According to Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood. He is politically active in Egypt), this was the case, which illustrates his personal beliefs.

Shereen (F, aged 31, belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) states that the mainstream media are no

longer informative: 'In terms of the mainstream media, before 2011, there were some events in Egypt which I knew about via *Twitter*, before […they were broadcast on…] TV'. This demonstrates how people are being updated through social media and not the mainstream media. The mainstream media, including television and newspapers, have become secondary sources of information for some, especially the young generation of Egyptians in the UK. There are some programmes on television, for instance, that would not be watched on screen, but are when posted on *YouTube*.

Egyptian interviewees of the first generation in the UK believe that they are not credible as the Western mainstream media do not cover all events concerning Egypt. According to Issam (M, aged 36, belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), there was a demonstration in London and almost 150,000 participants were on the streets of London in solidarity with Gaza, which Issam attended himself: 'There was not a hint of such a huge demonstration in London – on the BBC, for example'. This is just one example mentioned by one of the interviewees about the lack of credibility of the Western media, which led many Arabs, including Egyptians, not only to lose faith in and trust of the Western media, but also the mainstream media, in general. The mainstream media, especially the Western media's well-known names still attract audiences and have credibility, unlike some other channels which promote propaganda and have a hidden agenda: 'Although I don't trust the mainstream media, both Arabic and Western, the Western media, such as *Reuters* still have credibility somehow, so I watch. But again, I don't rely on it'.

Regarding social media and the first generation of Egyptians in the UK, the participants have been divided into two groups: those who trust social media and those who still doubt

its credibility. Those who trust social media are first generation Egyptians, aged below forty, and those who mistrust social media are aged above forty. To the first generation of Egyptian interviewees aged below forty, social media played a crucial role in the revolution – without social media, the revolution would not have been successful. There is a sense of trust present among this group of first generation Egyptians, and the voices of the young would not have been heard without the help of social media. Issam (M, aged 36. He belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) demonstrates how social media gave Egyptians the chance to voice their demands:

> 'In Egypt, we have no voice at all […] even if we vote for a candidate, we don't see actions from that candidate […] as a result, social media has played a significant role in terms of making our voices heard'.

People use social media as a platform to freely express their demands, without being censored by governments.

That is why social media websites are trusted among young Egyptians in the UK. According to Mazen (M, aged 20. He left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood. Politically active in Egypt), social media had played the role of the facilitator in the 2011 revolution: 'Via discussions and pieces of advice we were getting from Tunisia, via social media, we managed to deal with how to resist tear gas and […receive…] other instructions'. This shows that without social media people would not have benefited from Tunisia's prior experience, and understand how to have a successful revolution. Mazen adds that the previous Egyptian government had sensed the danger of social media regarding revolting against Mubarak's regime, and, as a result, the Internet was shut down in Egypt during the uprising, as social media had not been under government control, until that point. Hani (M,

aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) mentioned how social media played the role of being the medium to achieve democracy, although social media was not the cause of the uprising: 'The use of social media is a channel for a democratic process', Hani says. A study undertaken by Ali et al. (2013) agrees with the interviewees that *Facebook*, for example, was merely a tool in publicising the revolution; it was not the reason that the revolution unfolded. Herrera (2011) also argues that *Facebook* was not the principal reason for the success of the Egyptian revolution, but it was the people who were on the streets demanding that Mubarak should step down. This view is shared by most of the participants in this study.

Was social media the key reason for the revolution in 2011? The findings reveal that most participants agree on the notion that social media had been an important and powerful tool for monitoring the revolution, but it was not the reason for the uprising and not the only tool: 'The 2011 revolution could have happened without social media and technology', Hani says. Social media therefore helped in the success of the 2011 revolution, but it was not the only reason for the revolt. Participants of this study mentioned many factors that sparked the revolution, such as poverty and unemployment during President Mubarak's era. Singer and Ashman (2009) challenge the credibility and accountability of news published on social media posted by ordinary people, after the *Guardian* in London allowed the public to contribute to the news, as an experiment.

Regarding how social media had contributed to the success of the revolution, Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) raises the issue of how Arab revolutions in the Middle East played a major part in promoting social media: 'The revolutions in the Arab

world have made social media more popular and have helped in the publicity of social media'. Shereen also states that before the Arab Spring, the use of social media was exclusively for social reasons; nonetheless, the name 'social media' is linked to the Arab Spring. According to Howard et al. (2011), without social media stories like the self-immolation of Bouazizi, a Tunisian vegetable seller, would not have been made public in 2010. There are many other cases of self-immolation of ordinary people in the Middle East; however, social media helped to shine a light on such incidents, unlike pre-social media. Social media has thus encouraged many in the Arab world to revolt against injustice and unfairness.

Shereen also identifies how social media exposed the news: 'Social media allowed countless people to hear about events worldwide, especially events such as the brutal death of Khaled Said, and Bouazizi in Tunisia', as the mainstream media were not telling the truth. Shereen (F, aged 31. Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK), argues that without revolutions in the Arab world, Arabs would not have used social media so much: 'The truth is […found…] on social media and not on mainstream media, as people have started to use social media more'. This illustrates that people these days trust social media more than the mainstream media. The role of social media in the 2011 uprising encouraged some participants in this study to use it to publicise the revolution. Shereen mentions that her role during the uprising was to encourage people to join the protests through social media: 'I knew about the revolution through social media and a published video. My role then was to encourage Egyptians to participate in the protests via social media'. Ali and Fahmi (2013) stressed this point by mentioning how influential social media had been in the uprising. Shereen can therefore be called a 'a citizen journalist' as she shared photographs and videos, and even encouraged Egyptians to protest via *Facebook* (Goode 2009).

According to Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), social media freed people worldwide in terms of being able to freely contribute: 'Via social media, you can express your opinion without fear of being caught or put in prison'. Social media, such as *Facebook, Twitter* and *YouTube,* are considered as a source of 'true' information, especially for young people. Young people found the platform on which they could express themselves without fear of being imprisoned, as was the case during Mubarak's regime. Issam and Mazen (M, aged 20. He left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood. Politically active in Egypt), agree that social media is the main source of information about Egypt and in general.

News on *Facebook*, for instance, can be accurate when the source is credible. Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) claims that social media can be a good source of information, especially for those living away from their home country: 'You can get accurate information from social media, especially when you are away […]. It is tricky, but you can get accurate information from social media, especially news from people living in Egypt and witnessing events themselves'. The mainstream media employs correspondents, whereas ordinary people can act as 'voluntary correspondents'. People will generally believe news from those witnessing events, especially if they are friends or relatives. This demonstrates that the news reported by citizen journalists is more believable than that reported via the mainstream media.

Shereen (F, aged 31. Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) claims that social media can be trusted as a source of information, but some news verification skills are required: a person

working in the media industry, for instance. Trust in social media has been generated by freedom of use, in addition to news distribution and credibility. One of the reasons for trusting social media is the combination of news. To prove the powerfulness of social media in the uprising, Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK) mentions that a large part of what happened in 2011 would have been silenced, without social media. Social media was significant regarding making Egyptian voices heard, and without social media the revolution would probably have failed. It is worth mentioning that social media is easy to access on smart phones, unlike mainstream media.

Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) argues that social media was significant, especially during the 2011 uprising, as it provided information regarding where events were being held, and how to become involved. Hani adds that without social media the source of information would have been limited if it had to depend only on mainstream media. Social media was used as a platform for Egyptians to stay connected with what was happening in Egypt, especially for Egyptians abroad, principally in the UK. Social media is trusted, to some extent, by Egyptians aged below forty, although its credibility is also questioned. There are some first-generation Egyptians under forty in the UK who do not fully rely on social media news; although Egyptians abroad rely on news published on social media, but only if they believe that the source of that news is credible, if it is also reported in newspapers or on TV channels. According to Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging): 'Social media is not the magical weapon which can lead to […making…] dictatorships […step…] down, but social media websites are a

powerful tool'. Hani's comment could be a good summary of the role of social media according to Egyptians in the UK. But can it be wholly trusted?

According to many participants in this study, the answer is no: the content on social media should be monitored, and the monitoring should be neutral and independent. Monitoring is important because everyone in the world has the right to use social media and publish whatever they wish. The credibility of the content of social media remains doubtful. Conversely, the debate is that if social media is monitored, the democracy of publishing would be at risk, as in the case of the mainstream media. However, responsible, unbiased monitoring would go a long way in preventing the publishing of 'fake news'. The sense of trust in social media is common among the first generation aged above forty. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. Shabaan left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt) tends to mistrust social media for its hidden agenda (although he does not explain what he means by 'hidden agenda') even on social media: 'Personally, I use social media to spread the word, but news on social media is not guaranteed news, and I would never ever trust news on *Facebook* as news on social media has agenda'. This indicates that there are hidden agenda or hidden motives in both social media and the mainstream media.

The question is: from where do the first generation, mainly over forty, obtain their information? Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) says her source of information is her family in Egypt, as they are the ones who can be trusted as witnesses of the events in the country, unlike the media which often provides 'fake' news. Nevine adds that when she reads or hears any piece of news relevant to Egypt, she immediately refers it to her family in Egypt to make sure that it is genuine and not fake. This is the same point

raised by Shereen (F, aged 31, Shereen belongs to 1st generation-young adulthood as she was born in Egypt and left in her 20s. She is politically active in the UK): 'I always research news from the TV or on the Internet to make sure it is credible'. Nevine adds that she does not often believe anything her friends tell her. But, in addition to researching online, she calls her family residing in Egypt, specifically her brother, to ask about the credibility of the news: 'Why wouldn't I believe people who witness events live, in Egypt? […] as a result, these are my sources of information'.

There are ordinary people who are being used as a source of information, called 'citizen journalists'. Goode (2009) defines citizen journalism as ordinary people acting like journalists when reporting the news by sharing photographs and videos and by blogging. This method of journalism allows ordinary people to share those photographs or news, and to participate in discussions around that piece of news. Furthermore, this type of journalism is interactive, unlike the mainstream media where the audience is unable to interact with the news on TV for instance. Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) agrees with this point by observing how social media today is powerful and being interactive means that people can be a part of creating news and distributing it, unlike the passive role audiences have in the mainstream media.

First generation Egyptians both under and above forty tend to search for an alternative as a source of information to social and mainstream media, for instance, stories written by ordinary people. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he is active in online activities and sometimes in Egypt) expressed his trust in what people post online, as most news online is credible, especially if the people posting are known to the reader: 'I do trust people's posts, but not everything of course. I would believe my best

friends stories posted on social media, as social media gives everyone the chance and the opportunity to report incidents'. Singer et al. (2011) referred to citizen journalism as 'participatory journalism'; that is, citizen journalism indicates its collaborative nature, such as participatory journalism on social networking sites.

Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) says: 'My source of information would be my own personal network, social media and TV, but the trick is that I would differentiate between what I am reading and eventually I would create my own truth'. Hani thus demonstrates how some people, especially Egyptians in the UK, have decided to depend on their ability to differentiate between fake and true news that comes from various sources. The interesting point raised from conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK, is that after losing faith in the mainstream media and having little trust in social media, they believe in real people's news as their source of information, Issam (M, aged. Issam belongs to 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) explains how he relies on people witnessing events in Egypt for information: 'I trust people who publish on social media, unlike the news on TV, as news on TV can be fake, and I can't trust […it…], unlike news published on social media by trusted people, or friends of mine'. This demonstrates that some Egyptians trust people who publish online more than the mainstream media which can broadcast fake news, or people are unable to make sure whether the news on television is credible or not. Sources of news on social media can be investigated to determine where news items originate from.

The sense of belonging to Egypt is enhanced through social media. Egyptians in the UK feel that they are more linked to Egypt through social media. They can contribute to Egypt

through social media from the news extracted from the postings and videos, unlike the mainstream media which is not helpful. Mazen (M, aged 20. Left Egypt in his teens so considered 1st generation early adulthood and he is politically active in Egypt), as a migrant living in the UK, describes how social media has been playing an important role, and how his life cannot be defined without its existence. As an Egyptian living abroad, social media is not just a source of information for Mazen; it is a lifestyle.

The reason that people who publish news on social media are seen as being more credible is because of the 'fake' or biased news the mainstream media broadcast. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) explains how one day she called her family and told them a story she had heard on television about Egypt, and how worried she was about her family. It turned out that the piece of news was in fact 'fake' and there was nothing of that nature happening in Egypt at that time. This demonstrates how news on the mainstream media can be fake or misleading. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) expresses how he does not doubt people he knows such as his family and friends: 'I believe news from people I trust, as I believe the mainstream media, either Arabic or Western, have a hidden agenda'. The lack of trust among Egyptians, especially diaspora groups, means they tend to believe real people who are live witnesses to events in Egypt.

The main finding in this thesis is Egyptians in the UK believe more in real people as a source of information than mainstream and social media. According to Gillmor (2004), citizen journalism has become popular nowadays with the rise in the use of social media and

blogging. The benefit that citizen journalism offers people is more freedom to report news the way they see it – unbiased and credible.

Second generation

The use of the media as an enforcer of the sense of belonging, identity and political engagement among second generation Egyptians in the UK, differs among this group. Regarding the mainstream media, Arabic and Western, first and second-generation Egyptians share the sense of mistrust, whereas in terms of social media the level of trust varies from one to another. The findings that have emerged by way of discussing the effects of both the mainstream and social media on second generation Egyptians are considered in this section. The concluding section is a discussion on some of the findings that have emerged through conducting ethnographic observations, and how the media have been used by Egyptians during and after the 2011 uprising to enforce their sense of belonging, identity and political engagement.

The question about whether the mainstream media has been effective or not for Egyptians from the second generation is addressed here. They believe the mainstream media has lost its significant role and cannot be trusted anymore: 'I believe the mainstream media have no effects in Egypt, and that's why social media, including *Facebook* and *Twitter* are the only medium where our voice, as young people, can be heard', says Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3). Dina raises an important issue which is about how social media is taking over the role of the mainstream media, as young people rely more on social media in contrast to the mainstream media. Second generation Egyptians tend to believe more in their ability to differentiate between news on the mainstream media and social media, and, as a result, second generation

Egyptians do not trust the mainstream media to be a tool to express their identity and sense of belonging on their behalf and become involved in political activities.

The reason for the second generation depending on social media more than the mainstream media is because social media websites are interactive rather than passive. This raises the idea of 'citizen journalism' and how interactive social media can be. Singer et al. (2011) defines citizen journalism as 'user-generated content', in which ordinary people contribute to news broadcasts. Singer et al. (2011) also state that the advantage of citizen journalism is that people play an active role in the process of distributing news and information to other people. This suggests that people believe such news more than 'suspicious' news on the mainstream media. The preferred name for ordinary people contributing to the news process is 'participatory journalism', according to Singer et al. (2011).

According to Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK), the problem with the mainstream media is not only the lack of credibility, but also that the mainstream media helped to add additional problems to the Egyptian situation, during the uprising. The mainstream media, especially the Western media, created more division between Egyptians by broadcasting biased news. The point raised by Sherif is important, as biased news can create serious discord in a nation, as it did in Egypt. The aftermath of the uprising, as Sherif demonstrates, has left Egyptians divided, to the extent that they cannot tolerate anyone who disagrees with them. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) agrees with Sherif regarding this division among Egyptians and how the mainstream media played a role in it. The fact is that the Western mainstream media played a negative role in the Egyptian uprising, and, for that reason Egyptians have lost trust in Western new

organisations. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) claims that Western media coverage was biased according to its own agenda: 'The Western media has its own agenda and propaganda, and you have to be careful and picky in what you believe and […what you don't…]'. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) agrees with Dina and argues that the Western media did not remain neutral regarding reporting on the Egyptian revolution. According to Sama, the reason for the Western media being against the uprising in Egypt is fiscal: 'The Western media were against the revolution for economic reasons, and, I guess, even until now'.

A further significant point about the Western media is that some participants prefer to watch and trust the Western media because of language barriers. Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore) prefers to watch the Western media as it is in English, which is more comfortable than watching news in Arabic. This illustrates that the Western media have not won audiences because of their credibility, but for the language in which they broadcast. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation), also prefers to watch the Western media because of the language barrier: 'I don't watch Egyptian channels that much, as they are in Arabic, and I also believe they are biased'. This demonstrates that some Western media are watched by Egyptians, especially from the second generation, or those who do not speak fluent Arabic. A language barrier is created for second generation Egyptians because of broadcasting in a language that they have difficulty in understanding.

It is worth mentioning that in terms of trusting the mainstream media, most interviewees neither trust the Western nor the Arabic media. Consequently, the mainstream media were not used as a tool to express their feelings of belonging to Egypt or to be politically active. Sama argues that the Arab media was also biased, each according to its own agenda: 'I don't watch Arabic channels, as Egyptian channels are in Arabic, but despite that, the Arab media are also biased'. This demonstrates that in addition to the language barrier mentioned above, both the Western and Arab media were biased.

Egyptian interviewees from the second generation tend to trust social media more than the mainstream media. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) considers social media as the main source of information with regard to Egypt. Social media is considered more trustworthy and credible than the mainstream media; because the mainstream media has somehow lost credibility. The alternative is social media: 'I use and watch both, but I take my information from social media, as social media is more democratic, and you can't trust the national mainstream media, anymore', Sherif added. Rami (M, aged 36, he belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK and he is not interested in politics) agrees with Sherif, in that he is inclined to believe what people publish on social media, more than the mainstream media: 'Social media is spontaneous, and can't really be […as…] corrupt as the mainstream media'. This shows that as social media is operated by ordinary people, they cannot be as easily corrupted as the mainstream media, led by corporations which have a specific agenda. The interviewees have raised an important reason for the mainstream media losing its credibility, which is that the mainstream media require a medium to follow such as television, radio, or buying actual newspapers. Conversely, social media merely requires an Internet connection on a laptop or smart phone to follow the news. This is one of the reasons for the

popularity of social media in comparison to mainstream media. Rami (M, aged 36, he belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics), in contrast, explains how he started to watch the mainstream media after moving to stay with his mother and sister, who have satellite channels at home.

To return to the point of relying on real people in Egypt, Rami trusts his father, who resides in both the UK and Egypt, as a trustful source of information about Egypt. This suggests that real people can be trusted more than mainstream media for the news, and, to some extent, social media. It is worth mentioning that people can also trust some mainstream media, depending on the broadcasting channel and the newsreaders: 'To a certain degree, I trust people bringing news from social media, and it really depends on what kind of channel I am watching on TV', Rami says. Trust can be built again on the mainstream media, depending on the broadcasting channel, and the ethics of the channel. There are some Egyptians who do not completely rely on real peoples' posts on social media; Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) confirms that she cannot rely on these posts as a source of information, and says that peoples' posts can just be read to know other peoples' points of view, but may not be news, as such. Dina argues that her parents' generation do often rely on peoples' posts, but the younger generation do not, as mentioned previously: 'I do not take peoples' stories as news, but my mother would take peoples' stories as news […] but I tend to believe stories published by people which […have been…] taken from newspaper links or even TV channel websites'. This once again, shows the difference between the ideologies of the younger and their parents' generations, and how both think differently about sources of information regarding Egypt.

Concerning social media and gatekeeping, a decision is taken when the mainstream media use content from social media, termed gatekeeping, which accepts or rejects the publication of certain pieces of news. Ali et al. (2013) claim that user-generated content (UGC) is predominantly used in social media and is also subject to gatekeeping. The traditional media tend to pick which pieces of news they will publish from social media. The question is, what about news published on social media itself, and how could news on social media be monitored by gatekeepers?

The role of social media among Egyptians living in the UK had been to support fellow Egyptians in their demands. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) demonstrates how social media had been useful in terms of gathering Egyptians together, worldwide, and uniting them in their demands about toppling the authoritarian, Mubarak regime. Social media, such as *Facebook*, had also been used by Egyptians abroad to raise money, to support the revolution: 'We created events on *Facebook* to raise money supporting Egypt, entitled 'Egyptians in the UK', as it is easier to send money via *Facebook* and gather fundraisers', Sherif says. Sherif claims that fundraisers would find it easier to contribute to Egypt by sending money there to support the revolts. This reveals how social media can be powerful in connecting Egyptians abroad with their country of origin and their roots.

Social media cannot be fully trusted, on the other hand. For that reason, people tend to read and watch news online, but make sure the news is accurate by checking newspaper websites and people they can trust: 'I investigate news on social media and look for where the source news is coming from', Dina says. This shows that people obtain news from social media and check its reliability from other traditional sources. People would read news via

social media and then check that piece of news in the mainstream media, such as in newspapers or television, to make sure the news is reliable and not fabricated. Social media cannot take over the role of traditional media, however, even if people have lost trust and faith in the mainstream media regarding their source of information.

Social media have won large audiences because of the notion that they are owned by ordinary people. The interviews conducted with Egyptians in the UK have shown that the idea of social media being run by ordinary people, who are like everyone else, is common among Egyptians in the UK. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) describes how he feels social media represents people and not the specific agenda that the mainstream media adopt: 'All social media were against Mubarak, as they are […the same as…] us, and were helpful in terms of gathering people, and encouraging them to protest and to go out into the streets'. Social media is therefore trusted, because ordinary people are in control of what to broadcast, unlike the gatekeepers in the mainstream media.

Egyptians in the UK consider social media play an effective role in their social lives, in addition to their political activities and anything related to Egypt. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) argues that social media have given her more freedom than the mainstream media with regard to reading and watching news or programmes, at times that are convenient for her:

> 'I believe social media is more effective, as I can access it any time I want, as [it is …] faster to access, and you can be informed of the latest updates when they happen. I don't have to watch the whole programme or the news to be informed'.

Mohammed (M, aged 37, 1.75 generation), describes social media as being a '2-in-1' platform: 'Social media websites are like having TV with different channels, and you tend to choose from and differentiate between wrong and right news'. Mohammed raised a significant point: how social media perform the dual role of mainstream and other media platforms. Moreover, social media has given people the opportunity to be in control of the news they read and what to believe.

Howard et al. (2011) have researched the role of social media during the Arab Spring. Their findings revealed that social media played a central role in spreading democracy in the Arab world. Their research demonstrated that social media have been used by the youth to freely connect with each other, without the censorship of governments. This proves the point that Hani (M, aged 35, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 30s so middle adulthood. Politically active in Egypt and online blogging) raised in terms of freeing the youth in the Arab world via social media. Hani claims that social media have taught young people how to practise freedom of speech and democracy, which were missing during the Mubarak era. Howard et al. (2011) argue that democracy was introduced in the Arab world by means of the Arab Spring and the effective use of social media.

Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) claim that social media in the Arab revolutions, also known as the Arab Spring, had a vital role in the success of these revolutions in many Arab countries. Moreover, social media and other technological devices, for example SMS and telephones were the weapons used to organise protesters and run successful social movements. Social media has been used as an organising tool since 2003. For instance, in the anti-Iraq war movement in 2003, social media was comprehensively used by activists to raise awareness and to encourage people to protest in streets against the war (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011).

The following part deals with the findings that have emerged from conducting ethnographic work, participant observation and attending events and protests organised by Egyptian groups in the UK. Egyptians in the UK, including first and second generations, as previously stated, have used the media, especially social media, to demonstrate their sense of belonging and solidarity with fellow Egyptians in Egypt during the 2011 uprising. Additionally, participant observation has shown that social media and *Facebook* were used by Egyptian groups to capture the attention of Egyptians to participate in political activities. The Egyptians lost interest, however, after the uprising, as revealed in Chapter Seven regarding political participation. The events discussed here consequently illustrate that Egyptians in the UK are interested in events, but only online, not offline, in terms of going on the streets to protest. By observing some Egyptian groups on *Facebook*, there are many activities regarding Egyptian affairs.

The first group observed is '25th of January' (Egyptians in the UK مصريين 25 يناير في بريطانيا.). This group was created after the 2011 Egyptian revolution. It was chosen for this study because it is particularly for Egyptians in the UK and the activities held in London and the rest of the UK. The group aims to be 'the voice of Egyptians in the UK', according to the group's description. The page in 2015 has 79,179 'likes'. Most of the posts in this group oppose the military rule of President El-Sisi and the group always supports activists fighting for freedom under El-Sisi's regime. The Rabia incident is one of the major ones this group supports. The Rabia incident, or as some describe it, the massacre that happened in August 2013, was when protesters were killed by Egyptian forces primarily led by President El-Sisi's forces. Protesters in Rabia Square were against the coup led by El-Sisi, as some called it, back in June 2013. Moreover, protesters were in support of President Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, the elected Egyptian president from 2012 to 2013 (Kingsley 2013). This group –

'25th of January Egyptians in the UK' – organised a protest on the 16th of August 2014 in collaboration with the R4BIA-London group to commemorate the first anniversary of the Rabia incident. The group frequently organises events to support Rabia and oppose the current Egyptian government led by President El-Sisi.

Figure 7 Screenshot of the Facebook group: '25th of January Egyptians in the UK مصريين 25 يناير في بريطانيا

Observation of this group and the interview conducted with the group's admin, revealed that although activities are organised by this group for Egyptians living in the UK, events and protests do not attract the attendance of many Egyptians. One of the events was called 'The current moment in Egypt اللحظة الراهنة في مصر'. This event was supposed to host Zyad El-elaimy, a member of the revolutionary youth coalition of the 25th of January revolution, to talk to Egyptians in the UK about the current situation in Egypt. The event was originally supposed to be held in April 2015 but was postponed six times. Even now the event is still pending, and

was supposed to be held in March 2016, although there is no guarantee that this event will ever be held. I contacted the organiser of the event and asked why. He said that the reason the event was postponed on two separate occasions was due to Zyad El-elaimy's personal circumstances. In 2015, there are some eighty-two people interested in attending this event. The admin of the group claims that the Egyptians have lost interest in participating in any activities after 2011.

The division among Egyptians has led them, especially those living in the UK, to lose faith in protests organised in the UK. For that reason, events are being postponed frequently and even cancelled. The event 'Freedom and dignity to our people back home' was originally due to be held in October 2014. However, it was postponed five times between October 2014 and January 2015. It was eventually cancelled. The postponement of events was inconvenient for me. I tried to attend one of the proposed event days, but it was postponed on the same day, without any advance notice. When I contacted the admin of the event, the reply was 'people are busy and not attending'. According to the admin of '25th of January Egyptians in the UK', the main reason for people giving up on protests and events regarding Egypt, is that they are too busy with their social lives. I believe postponing and cancelling events would dispirit anyone, especially many Egyptians whose intention to protest is present. There were many Egyptians who posted on the group's Facebook timeline, asking about the date and time of the event. Moreover, they also wondered why the event had been postponed. One of the group's members was urging the organisers to arrange more events regarding Egypt so that he could attend.



Figure 8 A screenshot showing a member urging organisers to arrange more events (the member's name was removed to protect his/her confidentiality)

The observation of events organised online has revealed that there is another reason why Egyptians do not attend events organised in the UK. Most events are organised or held in London, therefore some Egyptians living in Wales, Scotland or in other cities in England find it hard to attend. The concentration of most events in London makes it difficult, if not almost impossible for many Egyptians. One of the posts of '25th of January Egyptians in the UK' was urging the organisers not to postpone their events, and to announce them well in advance, so that members would be able to travel from Scotland and other cities in the UK. This demonstrates that some Egyptians are still interested in participating in political activities, but the events are not well organised and do not attract all Egyptians in the UK. The organisers of such events claim that people are not interested in attending protests or events arranged in the UK, but many Egyptian interviewees in this research feel it is important to organise such events in the country. Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK

especially during 2011 revolution) declared that encouraging Egyptians to arrange political activities in the UK once again is essential: 'I really want to generate some motivation again about the situation in Egypt, as I think motivation after 2011 died down'.

The second group I observed is called: 'Egyptians abroad are all coming back to rebuild Egypt'. This group was created in February 2011 after the resignation of President Mubarak. This group was chosen group because, firstly, it is related to Egyptians abroad and the rebuilding of Egypt, especially after the 2011 uprising and the huge change in Egypt; and secondly, this group did not attract much attention or many 'likes' (it only has eleven 'likes').

The admin of the page was interviewed and said that the main purpose of the group is to encourage Egyptians to participate in political protests and events, once again, in order to restore the spirit of the 2011 uprising. Asser, the group's admin claims that almost all Egyptians were hopeful about rebuilding Egypt once more, immediately after President Mubarak stepped down as president in Feb 2011:

> 'Many Egyptians shared the dream of being part of rebuilding Egypt, and that's why I created this group. In retrospect, it was such a naïve way to look at it, and now I guess we all realised that countries don't just become better in a few days or months'.

Asser also adds that he organised rallies for Egyptians abroad to meet and discuss what to do regarding Egypt; although these meetings were successful immediately after the revolution, but not afterwards. This once more emphasises that Egyptians abroad shared the sense of euphoria (as previously mentioned) during the 2011 uprising. However, these days, the spirit of protesting and participating in political activities has died down as Sama (F, aged 24, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution)

and Rami (M, aged 36. He belongs to the 2nd generation of Egyptians as he was born in the UK. He is not interested in politics) say.

There was a definite sense of division among Egyptians during the ethnographic work I conducted, when I attended protests organised by Egyptians in the UK. For example, one of the protests organised in London to reject the visit of President El-Sisi to London, was organised online, mainly on *Facebook*, to be held on the 4th of November 2015. The protest was predominantly organised by those who supported the Muslim Brotherhood, not President El-Sisi. The sense of division was strong, as attendees were all against President El-Sisi and those who supported the president were not welcome. There is further proof of the division between Egyptians. The next day, the 5th of November, supporters of President El-Sisi had organised their own protest to welcome him. In response to that, the anti-El-Sisi group organised another protest on the same day to demonstrate how strong they were to their rivals (Shenker 2015).



Figure 9 A screenshot of a Facebook group named: 'Egyptians abroad are all coming back to rebuild Egypt'

As a non-Egyptian, an outsider endeavouring to be neutral by not supporting either side, I felt quite unwelcome. The protest organised by the Muslim Brotherhood had slogans and banners that were 'bloody', including pictures of El-Sisi covered by blood and furthermore, used strong language such as 'butcher' and 'killer'. There were many police officers present that day, in case any conflict arose between the pro-El-Sisi groups and those against. The atmosphere in both protests was tense, especially as people in each group had strong opinions regarding the situation in Egypt.

It is worth mentioning that there was an obvious difference between the protests. The one I attended on the 4th of November 2015, the number of attendees estimated at 200. It was the first time that a protest had been arranged in front of 10 Downing Street and there were lots of police present. The atmosphere was tense and I could not speak to any of the

protesters, for several reasons. First, as an outsider, I do not look like a protester, according to the primarily conservative or Muslim Brotherhood members, as Elmasry Elyoum claims (Hosni 2015). And second, it was crowded and noisy to the extent that it was hard to talk to anyone. However, I managed to speak to one of the attendees of the 4th of November protest by meeting in the protest. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in activities in the UK and Egypt 'when convenient' plus online activities on *Facebook*) subsequently agreed to be interviewed online and reflected on his participation. He was happy to participate in the protest, in order to display his rejection of the El-Sisi visit.

It is essential to state that what the protester explained was different from the observation points I had collected. Maher (M, aged 38, 1st generation) mentioned how organised the protest was, yet what I noticed was how chaotic the protest was, especially the timing. The protester claimed that several protesters were not respecting speeches by cheering during the speeches, which disturbed many. This demonstrates how an insider and outsider observe the same event.

Added proof of the division among Egyptians in the UK was the protest organised by members of the Muslim Brotherhood or, as they call themselves, Rabia London. Egyptians in London held protests in memory of the Rabia incident of 2013, in London in 2014 and 2015, to show the Egyptian government, primarily President El-Sisi that they were still against the coup. Protesters were using slogans against President El-Sisi, as some call what happened in 2013 a 'military coup', which removed President Morsi from office. *Al-Jazeera* (Arabic) was covering the protests and encouraging the public to support the anti El-Sisi protest led by the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Maha Azzam, the head of the Egyptian Revolutionary

Council in Europe, the activities which support Rabia are peaceful and extremely important, as they are to remind the world of what the Egyptian government, mainly El-Sisi's, did to Egyptians (Ameen 2014). It is worth mentioning that the common factor among protests in the UK, according my personal observation, is the general peacefulness, despite the impression which such protests give to audiences. Moreover, no violent incidents were recorded.

Summary

This chapter has shown that the main finding is how social media was used by Egyptians in the UK as a tool to contribute to Egypt and stay informed about news on Egypt. The idea that the mainstream media have lost their credibility as a source of information regarding news on Egypt, and, that this media have not been used as a tool by Egyptians to stay connected to Egypt. Social media, in contrast, has been used as a source of information, a tool to stay attached to Egypt and for people to express their political engagement with Egypt. Personal networks, including family and friends, among Egyptians in the UK are more trusted as sources of information than social and the mainstream media. The ethnographic investigations have shown that social media have been used as tools for Egyptians to express themselves as Egyptians, through signing up for *Facebook* events but not protesting.

The Egyptian uprising in 2011 led Egyptians abroad to feel more connected and involved in Egypt's politics. The notion that Egyptians abroad do not have the right to interfere in Egypt's business has slowly diminished. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as she was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3) says: 'Egyptians nowadays are more connected to what's going on in Egypt, as you feel you have a role, and your Egyptian passport has a value, not just to visit Egypt without getting a visa'. This confirms that Egyptians living

either inside or outside Egypt currently have the right to express their opinion, without worrying about preventing Egyptians abroad from being part of the decision-making in Egypt. Egyptians today feel they are part of Egyptian society again, thanks to the Egyptian uprising in 2011.

The theories that have been adopted in this chapter are those of Goffman (1959) and 'performing identity' through political participation concerning Egyptians in the UK. Goffman (1959) deals with identity as a theatrical stage (see Chapter Five). Goffman also asserts that performing identity concerns meeting other peoples' expectations, and how individuals have a set of roles to play and expectations to meet in society regarding Egyptians and political participation, especially the effects of the 2011 revolution. Egyptians perform political activities as actors on a stage and should play the part to satisfy what is expected of them. As Egyptians, performing identity is another way to prove belonging to an identity, especially with those residing abroad.

Chapter Nine: Discussion

Introduction

The first aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings explored in the previous three chapters, and the second aim is to connect the findings to the current research and theories, in order to highlight the gap in literature which this study fills.

The story of Egyptians in the UK started with the sense of belonging to Egypt and the UK. The sample of Egyptians studied in this research has been divided into two main groups: the first generation and second generation. Differences between the first and second generations have emerged regarding belonging, identity, political participation and media use, as illustrated in the interviews with Egyptians in the UK.

Discussion on identity and belonging

This section discusses the significant findings retrieved from conducting interviews with Egyptians from first and second generations regarding belonging and identity among diaspora communities.

The first issue to discuss regarding identity and belonging among interviewees who participated in this study is the notion of 'homeland' defined, according to Kaplan (2003), as 'native land or country of origin, fatherland or motherland'. This demonstrates that homeland for some depends on their parents' country of origin. According to Rumbaut (1994), immigrants to the United States tend to cling more to their national identity (their country of origin). First generation Egyptians in the UK are also inclined to cling to their homeland. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), for instance, believes that Egypt is his homeland, regardless of how many passports he holds. Factors affecting the sense of

considering a country a homeland are the place of birth and the period spent in that country. Issam was born in Egypt and moved to the UK in his twenties. His sense of belonging would be to Egypt, and Egypt would therefore be his homeland. First generation Egyptians tend to cling to their national identity (country of origin), as Rumbaut (2004) claims, no matter what.

Egyptian interviewees in this project found the question of defining 'homeland' challenging to answer. The notion of choosing which country should be considered as one's homeland – Egypt or the UK – is not easy. Participants occasionally feel that they belong to both countries; therefore, choosing one or the other often does not apply. Hani (M, 1st generation, he left Egypt in his 30s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood, active in political activities in Egypt and online activities such as blogging) defines homeland as 'the place where I grew up and the place which has major factors which made me [are my make-up]'. Caplan's (2003) definition conforms to that of Hani, as he believes his homeland is what has defined him. Hani was asked if his point of view would have been different if he had been born in the UK or anywhere else, but his parents were Egyptian. Hani replied that in that case, he would have had two homelands. Additionally, place of birth and the period spent in that country would make a difference in deciding which country is the homeland for that person and the notion that people today live in a multicultural world and therefore, do not limit themselves to one homeland, as Hani argues. There are some Egyptians, conversely, who feel so strongly about being Egyptian, that they regard 'homeland' as being linked to the sense of one's own identity: 'I am Egyptian whatever happens', says Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt). There are some participants in this research who consider Egypt as their homeland, no matter where they reside and others who believe that they have two homelands.

The meaning of 'homeland' for second generation Egyptian participants varies. For instance, Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) believes that his homeland is Egypt although he was born in the UK. This demonstrates that there is a strong association with Egypt, also confirmed by Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt). The definition of homeland as Muhammad demonstrates is 'the place [to which] you feel affiliated'. Rana (F, 1.25 generation as she came to the UK at the age of 16 and she is politically active in the UK) states that 'homeland is Egypt forever'. This shows that the concept of homeland is always associated with Egypt despite living abroad. To conclude this point, Sama (F, 2nd generation, active in political activities in the UK especially during 2011 revolution) defines homeland as 'wherever you feel comfortable' and is the sense that second generation Egyptians have. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) feels strongly about her Egyptian identity by demonstrating that although she does not look 'British', whenever she is asked where she is from originally the reply would be Egypt, although she also believes she is connected to the UK, as she was born here and it is where she has spent all her life. This reveals that second generation Egyptian participants are linked to and hold strong connections with Egypt.

The definition of homeland for first and second generations of Egyptian participants in the UK have agreed on considering Egypt as their homeland. Even if the definition of homeland is determined by the country of birth, several participants of the second generation, born in the UK, still consider Egypt to be their homeland. The second generation agrees with the first generation regarding defining Egypt as 'homeland', no matter where they were born.

However, the sense of multiple belongings is also strong among the second generation due to the place of birth (the UK).

The sense of pride is strong among first and second generation Egyptian interviewees. Al Aswany (2011) demonstrates how the 2011 uprising is a historical moment and motivated the Egyptians to feel proud of themselves in relation to what happened. The notion of being one family among Egyptians has led many of them to feel proud to be Egyptian once again. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) states: 'I was really proud during 2011 and even saw that pride in the eyes of non-Egyptians'. This sense of pride has led many Egyptians worldwide to feel that they can make a difference and achieve the change they desire. This sense of pride and euphoria has been shared by many Egyptians. Eslam (M, 1st generation. Left Egypt in his 20s so migrated in his young adulthood, active in online and offline activities in the UK) shares the sense of pride with Issam by stating how Egyptians can change any bad situation, thus spreading the sense of pride to all or most Egyptians. Mohamed (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) believes that the Egyptian uprising has taught Egyptians and others how to start a peaceful revolution, which not only makes Egyptians proud, but also the entire world. Majed (M, aged 24, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens and he is active in online activities and sometimes in Egypt) shares this sense of pride and euphoria with his fellow Egyptians, including those living in the UK. This sense of pride however has changed later, and became negatively affected, by the events following the 2011 revolution, and it has also had an impact on the sense of belonging and identity. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK), declares that he does not wish to be called Egyptian

because of the current events in Egypt: 'To be honest, I don't wish to be Egyptian, if the system is going to be the same, as I feel the revolution has done nothing, and it is getting worse, not better'.

The sense of pride has been the main belief uniting the second generation Egyptians interviewed for this thesis with the first generation regarding the events in Egypt. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) and Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) agree on the notion of being proud of change in Egypt, which reinforces their sense of Egyptian identity. The first and second generations in this research experienced a strong sense of pride during and directly after the 2011 revolution, which united the two generations in their feelings of pride.

Diaspora communities tend to be attached to their 'homeland'. Safran (1991) argues that one of the significant features of diaspora is attachment to the homeland: homeland occupies an important space among diaspora communities; consequently, diasporic groups tend to be connected to their homeland whatever happens. Kuşcu (2012) examined the relationship between American-Egyptians and their homeland (countries of origin) and concludes that diasporic groups tend to be strongly connected to their homeland. Hirji (2009) also conducted research on diasporic communities and how second and third generations remain connected to their countries of origins. Safran (1991) indicates that the notion of return is one of the features of diasporic communities (Table 7 shows a comparison between Safran's features and my proposed features of the second generation diaspora).

The first generation of Egyptian interviewees is strongly attached to Egypt, as previously mentioned. Nevine (F, aged 50, left Egypt in her 20s so she is considered 1st generation from young adulthood. She is politically active in the UK and was during the 2011 revolution) has demonstrated how she is attached to Egypt, despite the extensive period she has spent in the UK. Nevine (F, aged 50, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is politically active in the UK and was active during the 2011 revolution) spent the early stages of her life in Egypt, which explains why she is still strongly attached to Egypt. The fact that many Egyptians have close family members in Egypt would strengthen the relationship between an immigrant and their homeland (Egypt, in this case). The first-generation Egyptian interviewees are already strongly attached to Egypt, and the 2011 revolution has only had a slight impact on their sense of belonging and attachment. Mohamed's (M, aged 32, 1st generation-young adulthood as he left Egypt in his 20s and he is politically active in Egypt) sense of belonging has started to shift from Egypt to the UK because of 'the decent lifestyle' he enjoys in the UK.

The notion of return to Egypt is common among the first generation, especially after the 2011 uprising; however, for some first-generation Egyptians such as Mohamed (M, aged 32) the notion of return vanished after the uprisings, especially the one in 2013. This illustrates that external factors, such as the aftermath of an uprising may change the views of citizens. The sense of belonging to Egypt (parents' country of origin) for second generation Egyptian interviewees is strong; the findings in this research conform to what Hirji (2009) claims about immigrants; specifically, second and third generations have a strong connection with their countries of origin. The sense of attachment and belonging to Egypt has been reinforced by the 2011 uprising – second generation Egyptian interviewees felt more attached to Egypt due to the 2011 revolt. Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born

in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt) demonstrates, for example, how certain he was of being Egyptian and more attached to Egypt after the 2011 uprising. The sense of belonging for Muhammad is associated with his parents and extended family. Hence, after the 2011 uprising, he genuinely feels that he belongs to Egypt as that his homeland is Egypt.

The notion of multiple belongings to both Egypt and the UK among the second generation of Egyptian participants has emerged in the findings. The notion of return among the second generation was particularly influenced by the 2011 uprising, both during and straight after it happened. The desire to return among the second generation, however, is not easy to achieve. As long as the second generation of immigrants share the notion of 'going back to the homeland' (parents' homeland), there is a need for a different approach. I propose a new feature as part of the diaspora called 'second generation diaspora'. The main feature of the notion of return is present, but with special circumstances.

Belonging and attachment for first and second generation Egyptian participants in this thesis have been strong. Nevertheless, for the first generation, the 2011 unrest has not had a dramatic effect on the sense of belonging and attachment for this group. The sense of attachment and belonging to Egypt from the second generation of Egyptian interviewees, in contrast, have been reinforced by the 2011 uprising. Egyptians from the first and second generations share an important concept: 'happy with [the] combination of cultures'; both generations have a strong sense of belonging to Egypt, but both are also happy living in Egyptian and British cultures.

Social Identity Theory addresses the formation of identity among ordinary citizens. Abrams and Hogg (1990) demonstrates how individuals tend to have multiple identities, for

instance religious, social and national, though for diasporic groups, construction of identity is challenging, especially with the identities of belonging to a homeland and to a country of origin. According to Hall (1990), identities are not about 'who people are' or 'where people come from' but about 'who people might become' (p. 4); forming identities is therefore not about place of birth or country of residence. The main theorist dealing with the concept of performing identities is Goffman (1959). Goffman explains that individuals tend to perform their identities in society according to what is expected of them.

Egyptian identity is influential for first generation Egyptians, regardless of place of residence, as shown by Nevine (F, aged 50, left Egypt in her 20s so she is considered 1st generation from young adulthood. She is politically active in the UK and was during the 2011 revolution). Goffman (1959) claims Egyptian participants from the first generation have used political protests to perform their Egyptian identity; consequently, the term 'proving Egyptianness' has emerged. Khouloud (F, aged 45, 1st generation and considered 1st generation-young adulthood as she Left Egypt in her 20s, she is active in political activities in Egypt and the UK) performed her identity by travelling to Egypt during the uprising to prove to everyone that she is still Egyptian by sharing pictures online and sharing the demands of her fellow Egyptians. By doing so, Khouloud reinforces her Egyptian identity and reminds everyone that she is still Egyptian despite residing abroad.

Goffman (1959) introduced the concept of 'impression management', which is how individuals are in control of the image of themselves that they present to society. Khouloud and Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt), from the first generation, preferred to be among family and friends in Egypt during historic moments, such as the uprising, convey a positive message about

themselves in regard to Egyptian society: the society to which they belong. 'Performing' an Egyptian identity, as Khouloud and Mazen have done, would satisfy them as Egyptians as well as Egyptian society. The sense of identity has been strengthened, according to second generation Egyptian interviewees. For instance, for Muhammad (M, aged 18, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is active in political activities in the UK and Egypt), the sense of being Egyptian was reinforced after the 2011 uprising. Thus, Muhammad has started to feel he is Egyptian and tells everyone that he is Egyptian and not 'originally from Egypt' as he did before. The concept of identity is divided between Egypt and the UK for Egyptians living in the UK. This has become obvious among second generation Egyptians, especially those who were born in the UK. Second generation Egyptians have not only undergone multiple feelings of belonging and identity, they have experienced it.

Considering the above discussed findings around belonging and identity such as sense of pride, homeland belonging and Egyptian identity, I propose new features to Safran and Cohen's diaspora model pertaining to the second-generation diaspora groups. Those features have been influenced by historic events, such as the Egyptian uprising of 2011. Egyptian interviewees in the UK from the second generation such as Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) and Muhammad share some of the features of diaspora, such as notion of return to Egypt and duty to rebuild Egypt. Thus, the participants share some of Safran's and Cohens' features of diaspora; however, not all features could be applied. For example, one of the diaspora characteristics is around not being fully accepted in host countries. This feature does not apply entirely to the second-generation Egyptian diaspora. The proposed feature suggests that they are fully accepted in host countries and they often consider it as their homeland. As for the persistent notion of return to homeland, according

to Safran's model, the first generation tend to feel impermanent in their host countries and have the persistent feeling to return, one day, to their home country. Conversely, my interviews show that the second-generation diaspora share this notion of return, but with restrictions. Those restrictions could be due to security concerns, significant life style changes, in addition to limited job opportunities and career prospects in their parents' country of origin (Cohen 2008).

As previously discussed, the second generation do preserve links with their parents' homeland. However, this was not entirely done with a sense of duty as is the case with the first generation, as shown in Safran's (1991) features. Their sense of attachment to Egypt was triggered by political milestones in their parents' homeland, for instance the 2011 uprising. Their sense of attachment was strong but was rather communicated via distant means, such as online activities, protesting and raising awareness while remaining in the UK. Such an important political milestone ignited their sense of belonging to their parents' homeland beside their belonging to their host country, which they also consider to be their homeland. This left the second generation with multiple facets of belongings and identities as opposed to the first-generation diaspora. Table 7 presents my observations of these features of diaspora (second generation) identity and compares them to Safran's model.

Table 7 A comparison between Safran's features of diaspora and my proposed features of diaspora

1st generation diaspora: Safran's features	2nd generation diaspora: My proposed features
Dispersion from country of origin to one of multiple host countries	Those groups who were born in host countries (never migrated before)
A collective memory of homeland (real and myth of homeland)	A memory of myth of homeland (never lived in)
Not fully accepted in host countries	Fully accepted in host countries and considered as homeland (being born and raised in)
Notion of return to homeland is overwhelming with sense of impermanency	Notion of return is present with restrictions and sense of permanency
Maintenance of homeland is a duty	Sense of maintenance of homeland is strong but by distant activities
Preserving links between homeland and host countries	Maintaining links between the parents' homeland and young diaspora's homeland (host countries)
	Multiple belongings and identities (parents' homeland and current homeland)
	Political events in parents' homeland affect second generation diaspora

The above discussed features reflect the need to propose a new model pertaining to the second generation drawn on the findings discussed in this thesis. I propose these features to be applied to second and third generations of immigrants. As the six features of Safran (1991) do not apply to all diaspora groups, some features are replaced with new features which fit new diasporic groups. Although Cohen (2008) has modified the features developed by Safran to fit other groups, the contribution of Cohen pertains to groups which have witnessed traumatic incidents, and which include collective identity and collective memory of homeland. Figure 10 explains the new features that I find more applicable to the sense of identity amongst second generation diaspora communities.

The first feature Safran (1991) discussed is dispersion of groups from homeland to one or many countries. The second generation – such as Dina, Sherif, Muhammad, Mohammed, Sama, Rami and Rana – have not been dispersed. However, the second generation should be named diaspora for sharing other features of diaspora and for being considered a 'diaspora group'. The second feature proposed in the new characteristics is multiple belongings among the second generation. The second generation of Egyptians interviewed have shown multiple belongings and loyalties to both Egypt and the UK, which is the result of being born in the UK but feeling attached to Egypt at the same time. Safran has stressed the notion of belonging to just one homeland and not the host countries, but I suggest a sense of multiple belongings to the host country (where second-generation immigrants are residents) and country of origin (psychological attachment to their parents' homeland).

The next feature proposed is about maintaining links with both the host country (the UK) and the parents' homeland (Egypt). Egyptian interviewees from the second generation vary in preserving links with Egypt through regular visits to Egypt even if it is for a holiday or visiting extended family. Moreover, another sign of maintaining links with Egypt is through acknowledging their 'Egyptian identity' and letting everyone know they are Egyptian or as Michael (M, aged 31, belonging to the 1.50 generation as he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia then came to live in the UK when he was 7. Michael used to be politically active in the UK but is not anymore) prefers to be called 'British-Egyptian'. A further sign of belonging to Egypt among the second generation could be the myth of return to Egypt; although some restrictions such as lack of job opportunities and freedom of expression in Egypt discourage many of them from settling down in Egypt. The other feature is sense of permanency in the host country (the UK) unlike the first generation who feel impermanent, as Safran (1991) claims. The last feature felt among the second-generation Egyptians is their sense of duty to rebuild Egypt,

which is one of the results of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, which shows the impact of historic events on them.



Figure 10 Researcher's proposed features of second generation diaspora

Discussion on political participation and Egyptians in the UK

Political apathy is the first theme addressed concerning political participation. Indeed, the sense of political apathy among diaspora groups is common. A report by the House of Commons (2014) indicates that ethnic minorities in the UK are not interested in British politics. Moreover, the UNDP (2013) in the *Good practice guide* shows that although young people play an essential role in politics, they are excluded from politics, especially decision making, which consequently makes them politically apathetic. However, in countries which witnessed Arab uprisings, such as Egypt, the youth had a powerful role in achieving change. The political participation of the youth has been examined among interviewees from first and second generations. The sense of hopelessness for any change in Egypt, felt by the first generation prior to the 2011 uprising, has been overwhelming. This sense of hopelessness in Egyptians has led them to be politically apathetic regarding any political activities. Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) demonstrates how hopeless he feels

regarding Egyptian politics by believing nothing would change in Egypt, whether or not he becomes actively involved in politics.

There are many factors contributing to the sense of hopelessness and political apathy. Adamson (2006) stated that those who have lived previously in strict oppressive regimes tend to be less actively involved in politics, as they sometimes do not see the value of their political participation. Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab is not interested in politics), for instance, could be an example of how growing up in Egypt under a supressing regime could affect political participation. He was born and raised in Egypt before moving to the UK which encouraged him to be more politically apathetic. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, he stated that he is not interested in participating in political activities such as demonstrations related to his country of origin. He would rather focus more on his personal life as opposed to getting involved in political affairs such as the revolution or regime change.

Political apathy for the second generation has also been common regarding the uselessness of protesting prior to 2011. Egyptians abroad, primarily from the second generation, believed that their voices would not make any difference, even if they did become involved in politics. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK) shows that prior to 2011, she felt that there was no point in participating in political activities concerning Egypt. However, during the Egyptian uprising things changed, and Egyptians began to feel that they could become involved in Egyptian politics and do something for Egypt.

Protesting for Egyptians has not been a common phenomenon. Ismaeel (2014) discusses the laws against protesting in Gulf countries and how these should be changed. This has been

one of the factors enforcing the sense of hopelessness of protesting among Egyptians in the UK. Protesting for the first generation, prior to 2011, was not common, but this changed during the uprisings. Egyptian interviewees from the first generation preferred to protest online during the 2011 uprising, as they felt it was the least they could do for Egypt while residing abroad. Shabaan (M, aged 50, 1st generation. He left Egypt in his mid-adulthood and not interested in politics either in the UK or Egypt), for instance, prefers to join online protests as it is the easiest option for him due to his busy career. Online protests, which include raising awareness of the situation in Egypt, have replaced offline protests for the first generation of Egyptian interviewees.

The 2011 uprising motivated many young Egyptians, particularly those from the second generation, to participate in offline protests. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) was motivated by the revolution to join fellow Egyptians in the UK to demonstrate solidarity with Egyptians in Tahrir Square. Dina does not only feel that she has done something for Egypt but has also reinforced her Egyptian identity by mixing with other Egyptians in the UK. There are some second generation Egyptians who have also participated in online activities, predominantly social media platforms. Protesting for first and second generations has given them a good opportunity to show their solidarity with fellow Egyptians. Nevertheless, first generation Egyptians chose online protesting to support Egypt, whereas second generation Egyptians chose to be present on British streets to show their solidarity with the Egyptians, in addition to engaging in online activities.

To sum up, first and second generations went through the stage of feeling hopeless regarding Egypt and lost faith in protesting before the 2011 uprising. Since then, participants

have actively engaged in political activities, online and offline until the present, although the sense of hopelessness in protesting has returned among the Egyptian participants in this study. I was able to confirm that during the ethnographic work conducted by attending protests organised in the UK.

Kuşcu (2012) examines the role of Egyptian-Americans in the US and how they benefit Egypt. The findings revealed by Kuşcu (2012) show that Egyptian-Americans played an important role during 2011 – how they let the world know about what was happening in Egypt, for example. The role of the Egyptians in the UK regarding Egypt represented in my study – a sample of 22 Egyptian interviewees – has been examined. The first-generation Egyptians have shown that the role played by Egyptians in the UK regarding the uprising can be effective. The effectiveness can be visualised by raising awareness of what was happening in Egypt during the 2011 uprising. Shereen (F, 1st generation-young adulthood as she left Egypt in her 20s, she is active in political activities in the UK) believes, for instance, that the role of Egyptians in the UK could be effective by raising awareness of events in Egypt and organising the campaign 'Ask about Egypt' on the streets of Sheffield. Informing people around the world of the events occurring in Egypt was more useful than merely protesting on the streets. Conversely, some of the first generation feel protesting in the UK is useless and prefer to travel to Egypt to protest there. Raising awareness as Shereen does might be useful, but not as useful as protesting in Egypt, as Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt) believes.

The second generation Egyptians believe that it is better for them to protest in the UK than travel to Egypt and risk their lives. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old) prefers to protest on the streets

of London's to support Egypt, and let everyone know that Egyptians abroad have a voice. Egyptian interviewees, including the first and second generations, agree with Kuşcu (2012) regarding the importance of the role of Egyptians abroad. However, each group expressed this importance differently, either by protesting, as the second generation did, or by raising awareness concerning Egypt.

The 2011 revolution has not only helped Egyptians abroad to become more involved in politics, but also shown the world that they are politically active. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the second generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK) mentioned how unifying Egyptians was a powerful result in relation to the 2011 uprising. Boursoti (2015) states that Egyptians were united during 2011, as most of them had the same desires, one being the downfall of President Mubarak. Sherif confirms Boursoti's statement, by describing how everyone in Egypt sensed they were one and had common demands in 2011. The unity of Egyptians results in the fact that all Egyptians living abroad and in Egypt were equal during the 2011 revolution and contributed to the betterment of Egypt. Nonetheless, Sherif claims that: 'Egyptians today are polarised, no-one respects the others' opinion, and that Egypt is divided'.

The findings shed some light on the link between parenting style and political participation. For instance, Al-Rub and Majedh (2007) examine parenting styles. The most common style used by parents originally from the Middle East living in the US is authoritarian. As I show in this study, first generation Egyptians such as Issam (M, aged 36, belonging to the 1st generation-mid adulthood as he was born in Egypt and left in his 20s. He is politically active in Egypt and the UK) blame their lack of political participation on the authoritarian style adopted by their parents who prevent them from protesting. Egyptian parents then have

frequently used their authority over their children to stop them from protesting. Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt) has also suffered from his parents' authoritarian style as they monitored his online activities and did not allow him to travel to Egypt to protest in Tahrir Square. Egyptian interviewees from the second generation have experienced the authority of parents over their political activities. Sherif (M, aged 33, belonging to the 2nd generation as he was born in the UK. He is interested in politics in the UK), for instance, wanted to travel to Egypt to help the Egyptian medical teams, being a doctor himself; however, Sherif's parents prevented him from travelling to Egypt and risking his life. Egyptians from the first and second generations receive the same authoritarian parenting style from their parents. The findings in this thesis confirm what Al-Rub and Majedh (2007) say regarding the authoritarian parenting style adopted by immigrant parents.

Regarding voting and Egyptians abroad, Egyptians abroad did not have the right to vote in Egyptian elections and more than seven million Egyptians worldwide were not allowed to vote prior to 2011 (Zohry 2011). However, following the 2011 revolution, laws were changed to allow millions of Egyptians abroad to vote in Egyptian elections. Thus, Egyptians abroad obtained the right to participate in Egyptian elections since April 2012 (BBC 2012). Prior to 2012, many Egyptians abroad felt detached from Egypt as they could not vote in national elections there. Zohry (2011) explains how Egyptians abroad were not contributing to decision making in their country of origin or parents' homeland prior to the 2011 uprising. The participation of Egyptians abroad including the second generation has consolidated the sense of belonging to Egypt once more after the sense of hopelessness. Many interviewees who contributed to my study have expressed how voting in Egyptian elections has strengthened their sense of being Egyptian, especially post 2011. In other words, the 2011

revolution has been a political milestone in the political and social history of Egypt. It is worth mentioning that Iraq provides a similar example after 2003 and how the invasion of the country was considered an important event for Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq. For instance, Iraqis especially abroad contributed to the Iraqi election in 2005 and 2009; Iraqis had high hopes of change in Iraq straight after the invasion, particularly the 2005 election similarly to the case of Egyptians (Mahdi 2018). Nevertheless, Iraqis abroad faced some difficulties in their participation in Iraqi elections in addition to the belief among many Iraqis that change has been hard to achieve. Consequently, this has discouraged many Iraqis from being politically active in Iraqi politics except for voting in Iraqi elections (Mahdi 2018). The comparison between the cases of Iraqis and Egyptians abroad shows how Arab nations abroad share the same fate regarding changes in their country of origin in the wake of significant political milestones.

Discussion on the role of the media among Egyptian interviewees in the UK

Howard et al. (2011) contend that although the media, especially social media, played an essential role in the Arab uprising, they were not the reason for Arabs to revolt (Al Aswany 2011). In fact, social media were used as tools to monitor protests, and were not the cause.

Social media have been successful tools for first generation Egyptians to organise both Egyptians abroad and within Egypt to join protests; however, the sense of trust regarding social media varies among the first-generation Egyptians. Participants aged less than 40, such as Mazen (M, aged 20, 1st generation-early adulthood as he left Egypt in his teens. He is politically active in Egypt), seem to trust social media and consider them a source of information. Participants aged 40 years and over, such as Ehab (M, aged 43, Ehab belongs to the 1st generation as left Egypt in his 20s so considered 1st generation-mid adulthood. Ehab

is not interested in politics), conversely, do not blindly trust social media. Sources of information for participants from the first generation can be a personal network, including family friends and credible newspapers.

Social media for second generation Egyptians have been the source of information for most of the participants in this study. Dina (F, aged 22, belonging to 1.75 generation as was born in Kuwait and came to the UK when she was 3 years old, interested in political activities in the UK), for instance, demonstrates how she regularly follows social media as her source of information. The credibility of news on social media must be painstakingly checked to avoid 'fake news'. Johnson and Kaye (2004) conducted a study to measure the credibility of online sources. Although the results show that online sources are more trusted than traditional sources, people still check the credibility of such sources from other sources or ordinary people, as there is a substantial amount of fake news on the Internet.

The findings regarding the first and second-generation participants in this study reconcile with Howard et al. (2011) in terms of the importance of social media, although the credibility of news is still questionable. Participants also conform to Al Aswany's (2011) claim concerning the use of social media as a tool to organise themselves regarding protests. Social media has been a good platform for the Egyptian participants in this thesis to be politically active and 'perform their identity' by displaying solidarity with Egypt to show they are still Egyptian or by raising money for Egypt. The findings illustrate that almost all the first and second-generation participants agree that Western and Arab mainstream media cannot be trusted as they have a hidden agenda, for instance political or religious ideologies and the economic value [advertising and subscriptions] of their broadcast.

Summary

The story of the Egyptian participants in this study has revealed that both first and second-generation Egyptians felt a sense of hopelessness concerning Egypt prior to 2011. The uprising in 2011 was the historic moment that awakened Egyptians and motivated them to be politically active. Participants have been seen in this study to be politically active through protests and voting. These political activities have reinforced their Egyptian identity, sense of pride and belonging to Egypt. Compared with the features of the first-generation Egyptian diaspora in the UK, the study showed that the second generation have different features. As they were born in the UK and have not been dispersed before, they have a myth of homeland. They are more accepted in their country of birth (the UK) so they have a restricted notion of return to their parents' homeland. In addition, the 2011 uprising has encouraged the first and second generation to be politically active during the uprising. Media primarily social media have been used as a tool among first and second generations of Egyptian participants to 'perform' their identity and to prove their belonging to Egypt.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

Introduction

This chapter concludes the thesis and is divided into three main sections. The first section is a summary of the thesis and the findings, and the researcher's contribution to knowledge. The second section addresses the limitations of this project, whilst the last section focuses on future research.

The present study investigates the effects of the 2011 Egyptian revolution on the Egyptian diaspora, including first and second-generation Egyptians residing in the UK, in terms of belonging to Egypt, Egyptian identity, political participation and media use. The majority of studies conducted on the Egyptian revolution focus on the uprising's impact on the Egyptians in Egypt but not Egyptians abroad. The focus sample of Egyptian diaspora has been chosen for this study, as most studies conducted on the 2011 Egyptian uprising have focused on how the revolution had an impact on Egyptians living in Egypt though Egyptian expatriates and the 2011 uprising have not been the subject of scholarly studies. The focus of a few studies conducted on the Egyptian diaspora and the uprising have principally been on social media and political participation, but not on the sense of belonging and identity, which is the focus of this thesis.

The results of this thesis extracted from interviews and ethnographic research have revealed differences among Egyptians from the first and second generations regarding belonging, Egyptian identity, political participation and media use. Each interviewee from each generation has viewed the revolution differently in terms of belonging, identity and political participation. It is worth mentioning that Egyptians from the first and second generation were united at some point regarding sense of pride, achieving change in Egypt,

the victory Egyptians enjoyed in forcing a dictator to step down, and so on. The main finding in this thesis is that there is a significant difference between Egyptians from the first and second generations regarding the 2011 revolution. The other important finding is how the 2011 revolution has been a political milestone for Egyptians abroad, albeit temporarily. In other words, Egyptians had enjoyed a sense of euphoria in terms of what Egyptians achieved during and straight after the 2011 revolution.

The 2011 uprising temporarily affected the first generation in terms of belonging to Egypt and Egyptian identity. This can be described as a sense of euphoria which almost all Egyptians experienced during the 2011 uprising, considering that Egypt had not had a political change since the 1980s. Egypt needed change which would only be possible through a national movement such as a revolution. No one expected Egypt to change, and everyone felt a sense of hopelessness. This sense of hopelessness was shared by all (or most) Egyptians, including the first generation, and united the Egyptians prior to 2011. The Egyptians from the first generation were again united during the 2011 uprising in terms of the sense of pride they felt regarding the revolutionary events in Egypt. This euphoria did not last long for the first generation, as, after the 2011 uprising and its consequences, Egyptians in the UK began to have negative feelings again: a bad situation had returned to Egypt, such as the violation of human rights, no freedom of expression, insecurity and a lack of job opportunities.

This is one of the findings regarding the effect that the 2011 uprising has had on every aspect of Egyptians' lives. The feelings of negativity are principally concerned with the notion of 'return' which most interviewees from the first generation have rejected due to the current political and economic situation in Egypt. This notion of returning to Egypt to settle down was powerful during and soon after 2011; however, a short while after 2011, the notion of return

vanished for the first generation. Regarding political participation and how first-generation Egyptians have expressed their belonging to Egypt, they have preferred to use alternatives such as raising awareness and online protesting in contrast to protesting on the streets in the UK or Egypt. According to the first-generation Egyptians, protesting is not helpful regarding the progress of Egypt, especially for those residing abroad; therefore, they decided to raise awareness of Egypt's situation to non-Egyptians. The second option the first generation had was to travel to Egypt to protest with friends and family. Concerning other political activities such as voting in elections, the 2011 uprising has encouraged many first-generation Egyptians to vote, and to be a part of the decision-making in Egypt, having previously lost faith in the elections.

The sense of belonging to Egypt among the second generation has been reinforced regarding finding the opportunity to express themselves as being part of Egyptian society. The notion of return to Egypt was strengthened during 2011 and immediately after, but has been weakened once more, owing to the uncertain political situation in Egypt. The 2011 uprising was therefore influential regarding the sense of belonging and Egyptian identity among second generation Egyptians, but only for a short time. Specifically, the notion of return to Egypt has been conditional due to this important milestone, the uprising and its aftermath. The scenario would have been different if Egypt had not witnessed the 2011 uprising. The proof of how conditional the notion of return is among diaspora groups due to the situation and its aftermath, is evident in how the notion of returning to Egypt has turned to wishing not to return at all, even if the idea was common among some people prior to the uprising. Thus, the 2011 uprising has been effective in positive and negative ways. In other words, the unstable situation in Egypt has led many to change their mind about returning to Egypt. Consequently, the uprising has affected the notion of return and even the notion of 'home'

and what home means to these diaspora groups. The theoretical application which can be made from this finding is the notion of return to 'homeland' can be conditional due to various factors, such as revolution, social movement, unemployment and others. In other words, even if the notion of return has crossed the mind of many Egyptians after the revolution, the idea died after the euphoria of the uprising diminished. Egyptians from the second generation had felt that it is their duty to support Egypt by any means during 2011, but this feeling of loyalty to the 'homeland' has been weakened due to the current situation there.

Concerning political activities among the second generation, they have protested on the streets as well as online to express their 'Egyptianness'. The second-generation Egyptians have decided to show their support for Egypt, both offline and online. This is the second finding that has emerged regarding how the Egyptians from the first and second generations expressed their feelings of belonging and support for fellow Egyptians in Egypt during the 2011 uprising. Egyptians from the second generation have faced many obstacles, however, such as respecting the authority of their parents who prohibited them from being politically active.

Regarding theoretical foundations, I have adopted Goffman's concept of 'performing identity' especially among Egyptians from the second generation and some of the first generation. In terms of the core themes of Goffman's theory, the main concepts adopted are 'expression management' which consists of three main components: performers, performing and audience. Having applied those concepts to Egyptians in the UK, the following results have emerged: political protests during the 2011 uprising have allowed Egyptians residing in the UK to perform their identity and prove their belonging to Egypt. It is worth mentioning that second generation Egyptians have resorted to the act of 'performing identity' much more

so than the first generation. I have adopted the concept of 'expression management' in terms of how 'performers' (Egyptian interviewees) used the 'performance' (political protests) as a platform to perform their Egyptian identity and show the 'audience' (fellow Egyptians back in Egypt and the world) that they share a sense of 'Egyptianness'.

The other theoretical foundation applied to the group selected for this study is Safran's model of diaspora. I have challenged Safran's model and have created a new model to apply to second generation Egyptians in the UK. The reason for modifying Safran's model to apply to the second generation is related to how interviews with Egyptians in the UK revealed shared features among the first and second generations.

Finally, findings reveal how Egyptians from the first and second generations have used media, especially social media, as a tool to express their sense of belonging and their Egyptian identity by being politically active through online protesting. This finding emerged from participant observation; specifically, attending events and protests organised by Egyptian groups in the UK, predominantly in London. The social media websites were used as tools of expression during the 2011 uprising by the first and second generations. Although the first generation, for instance, do not blindly trust social media, the second generation depends on social media as a source of information, even though it may not always be true.

The first and second generations agree on the notion of mistrusting mainstream media for its biased and misleading coverage of events concerning Egypt. Another finding from conducting interviews, is the difference between first generation Egyptians – 40 years and above – who mistrust both mainstream and social media, while the first generation of Egyptians – under 40 years old – trust social media and consider it a reliable source of

information. There are new sources of information for Egyptians in the UK, which are interpersonal communication and online media.

To sum up the results of this thesis, the Egyptian diaspora have developed their sense of belonging to Egypt: starting with the feeling of belonging to Egypt and a strong sense of Egyptian identity prior to the 2011 uprising, and subsequently feeling that this belonging and identity have been affected by the uprising. Egyptians differ in the extent of political activism practised either in the UK or in Egypt. Social media have been used by Egyptians as a tool to express their feelings towards the uprising and helped them perform political activities online.

The general theoretical consideration adopted and applied to the entire project is Safran's features of diaspora. As results of the thesis have shown, second generation Egyptians have shared many diaspora features with the first generation though Safran's features are specific to the first generation. Consequently, a new model including features of the second generation of diaspora is proposed.

Researcher's contribution

This thesis contributes to the literature about belonging and identity amongst diaspora communities, such as the Egyptian diaspora; its main contribution is in its focus on the impact of this sense of identity on the Egyptian diaspora's engagement with political events affecting Egypt, especially at a historic moment, the 2011 revolution. This focus has not been previously explored, as several studies have highlighted different themes but not the impact of political upheaval on this diaspora community. Studying the effects of the 2011 revolution on the Egyptian diaspora is a new perspective pertaining to this subject and the results of this study can be added to the current studies focusing on the Egyptian diaspora. I have contributed new knowledge to the work of current theorists such as Safran (1991) by proposing new

features of diaspora or, what I termed the 'second generation diaspora features'. It relates to some of the features which Safran illustrates and is applied to the second generation. I propose developing Safran's model to take into account the specificity of the second generation born in the host country (in this case, the UK). The second-generation diaspora are not usually labelled 'diaspora', as proposed by Safran, hence my proposal to develop that model.

A further contribution to the literature is on identity amongst these communities and how immigrants can 'perform' the identity of their country of origin in times of significant political events, such as the 2011 uprising in Egypt, which shook up the country after 30 years of stagnation under Mubarak's rule. Goffman's (1959) theory of performing identity has been selected to study Egyptian identity among Egyptians in the UK, especially those who need to prove their Egyptian identity. To my knowledge, no previous studies on Arab diaspora communities have made use of Goffman's identity theory. Moreover, this study creatively combines theories of Goffman and Safran to add to our knowledge about the ways diaspora communities' political activities can be a manifestation of their identity and also a stage for performing this sense of identity and belonging to a distant homeland.

Finally, this thesis shows that some of the Egyptian participants were politically active in affairs concerning their home country in the wake of such a significant political milestone as the 2011 uprising. Those participants were part of the ethnic minorities in the UK, whom the House of Common's report (2014) singled out as being less politically active in British politics. This project looked at political participation from a different angle and unveiled different political participation behaviours related to their homeland. Therefore, it indicates that in order to acquire a full understanding of motivations and engagement in political participation,

one should study both participation in the host as well as the country of origin of the diasporas. This is particularly important now in the wake of Brexit and the future of the UK being apart from the EU. It is possible that the same diaspora communities will show significantly more political involvement if an opportunity arises, for instance, a second referendum on Brexit. As such, political events do impact on the political participation of young people and minorities in democratic societies such as the UK.

Challenges and limitations

It is important to mention some of the limitations faced in this study. The main limitation is regarding conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK. The first challenge was to find Egyptians in the UK fulfilling specific criteria, as not every Egyptian in the country was eligible to be interviewed. The time limit and limited budget to travel and access as many Egyptians as possible, meant I could not travel to some cities where many Egyptians are concentrated, such as Manchester. Furthermore, accessibility was another challenge I faced while conducting this project. Time, budget and accessibility limitations have resulted in the fact that this study cannot be a generalised reflection of all Egyptians in the UK but can only be applied to the chosen sample.

The other limitation I faced whilst conducting this research was the poor response from potential participants who were invited to participate in my project. I used *Facebook* as a platform to access Egyptians, but many did not even reply. Distributing leaflets in some universities, as shown in Chapter Five, the methodology chapter, was not a successful way of accessing participants, as only one contacted me to be interviewed. It appears that people do not seem to care about leaflets and do not read them. The second challenge encountered in this project was the disorganisation of events, principally the protests organised by Egyptian

groups in the UK. It was difficult to find any events organised by Egyptian groups in the UK, due to the lack of advertising. Attending events was part of the participant observation process for this project; therefore, attending events organised by Egyptian groups in the UK was essential.

The problem was these events were either postponed or cancelled without prior notice: this cost me money, time and effort. The other challenge I faced while conducting this project was being outside the group being studied. Although me being an Arab and speaking Arabic made it easier for the interviewees who preferred to conduct the interview in Arabic, it was a challenge in terms of their 'opening up' to a non-Egyptian. Eventually, this problem was surmounted, as most interviewees were fine speaking to me about their views regarding Egypt. In fact, some felt that it was better to speak about Egypt to a non-Egyptian, but others were distrustful. Being a non-Egyptian studying Egyptians in the UK, political participation was viewed with some suspicion occasionally, as some interviewees thought I might have been a spy. Nonetheless, when the main aim of the research was explained to them, that this research is an academic project as part of my PhD, participants became more relaxed. Moreover, accessing the Egyptian embassy as a non-Egyptian, was not an easy task and the Egyptian authorities were not very helpful.

The few sources available for recruiting Egyptians in the UK was an additional limitation that needs to be acknowledged. Sources were limited to *Facebook*, *Meetup* forums and distributing leaflets. Using *Meetup* as the second tool for recruiting Egyptian participants was beneficial to some extent, although this website is not as well-known as *Facebook*. Some interviewees were recruited from *Meetup* but changed over to communicating on *Facebook* as an easier option.

Considerations are various but the most important generalisation to be made here is regarding the differences between generations. The first generation differs in its sense of belonging, identity, political activities and media use from the second generation. These findings are applied to the sample studied in this study and cannot be generalised to all Egyptians in the UK.

Future research

These are several recommendations for future research. In future research, it will be beneficial to focus on issues that were not addressed. One of these issues is to interview Egyptians who currently reside in Egypt and who witnessed the 2011 uprising in Egypt, and to draw a comparison between those residing in the UK and those residing in Egypt during the uprising. The second issue is, what sorts of activities political activists organise or in which ones they participate, and the difficulties they might face in the UK. The limited sources available for recruiting interviewees, as mentioned in the limitations of this research, could be expanded on in the next research project to more platforms that recruit participants, for example, other social networking websites such as *Twitter* and some other Egyptian groups. Another recommendation is to examine how religion can affect the sense of belonging, identity and political participation, as religion was not an important variable regarding this project. Interviewing Egyptians of mixed parentage would result in new findings concerning sense of belonging and Egyptian identity. Dealing with the concept of identity crisis more in depth and whether the 2011 revolution has had any effects in this regard would be valuable. Moreover, focusing on class, gender and religion and their effects on Egyptians after the 2011 revolution could be another avenue concerning future research. In this research, the focus is not on class, gender and religion and no comparison was made.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Recruitment

Appendix 1.1: Sample of the leaflet used for recruitment

University of Bedfordshire

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and Egyptians in the UK

My name is Rua Al-sheikh and I am studying for a PhD at University of Bedfordshire. My PhD thesis is on The 2011 Egyptian revolution and the Egyptian community within the UK. I am looking for participants to interview. If you meet **All** the criteria below:

1. Be of Egyptian descent, either having been born in Egypt or the UK.
2. Lived in the UK since 2011.
3. Witnessed the 2011 revolution either in the UK or having witnessed it in person in Egypt.
4. You need to be aged 18 or above.

اسمي رؤى الشيخ طالبة دكتوراه في جامعة بيدفوردشاير , بريطانيا .. اطروحة الدكتوراه عن الثورة المصرية 2011 والمهاجرين المصريين في بريطانيا.. الاطروحة تتطلب اجراء مقابلات مع مصريين في بريطانيا وابحث عن مصريين اذا كنت مقيم في بريطانيا منذ العام 2011 وشهدت الثورة عام 2011 في بريطانيا او في مصر ويكون عمرك فوق ال 18 (سواء من مواليد مصر او بريطانيا)....

If interested please contact me on:
rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk
Telephone: 07475561588
Facebook: Rua Alsheikh

SCAN THE BARCODE

Your help would be very much appreciated
Thank you

Appendix 1.2: Message sent to potential interviewees

Dear member,

My name is Rua Al-sheikh, PhD student at University of Bedfordshire. I found your name in one of the Egyptian groups on Facebook. The topic of my PhD thesis is the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its effects on the Egyptian community in the UK with regard to political activities, relations with Egypt and the U.K. and media consumption. This project involves conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK (Born in Egypt and the UK), especially if you have been living in the UK since 2011 and witnessed the revolution either in the UK or travelled to Egypt to do so and you are above 18...The interview can be conducted via skype or face to face Many thanks and looking forward to hearing from you.

مساء الخير اسمي رؤى الشيخ طالبة دكتوراه في جامعة بيدفوردشاير , بريطانيا .. اطروحة الدكتوراه عن الثورة المصرية 2011 وتاثيرها على المهاجرين المصريين في بريطانيا وهذا يتضمن العلاقات مع مصر والنشاطات السياسية والاعلام الغربي والعربي و خلال بحثي في جروبات وصفحات الفيس بوك المصرية وجدت اسمك وبما انه بحثي يتطلب اجراء مقابلات مع مصريين في بريطانيا وجه لوجه او عن طريق سكايب .. اتمنى ان توافقين على المشاركة في بحثي من خلال اجراء مقابلة اذا كنت ساكن في بريطانيا منذ العام 2011 وشهدت الثورة عام 2011 اما في بريطانيا او سافرت خصيصا لمصر لحضور الثورة هناك ويكون عمرك فوق ال 18 (سواء من مواليد مصر او بريطانيا).... شكرا جزيلا مقدما

Contact details:
Email: rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk
Skype: ruaalsheikh1

Appendix 2: Samples of transcripts

Appendix 2.1: Transcript of Shereen (1st generation) with colour coding



Shereen 12/11/2014

Transcribing 23/11/2014 & 4/1/2015

Q: how long have you been in the UK?

A: 2009 5 years and few months

Q: Why have you chosen the UK to settle in?

A: I came here to study my masters then had work experience then found a job here in the UK and currently working so for studying and working. I mainly came here as a fellowships in Egypt as I was doing voluntarily works in Egypt. I chose the UK as my uncle has been living here in the UK for forty years and I have this idea that the British community is closer to the Egyptian community so its easier to live here. Plus, studying masters is one year and "it is closer to Egypt as the US is away as I am attached to Egypt and my family so I preferred the UK as closer to Egypt and I can visit kind of easily" **(Belonging to Egypt section).**

Q: Have you participated in any of the protests organized in the UK at the time of revolution back in 2011?

A: I participated in the UK and in Egypt. I went back to Egypt during 2011 ad participated in the protests in Egypt.

In the UK, we did protests in Sheffield. We did a campaign called ' ask about Egypt' , we did hold a banner written ask about Egypt and people get to ask anything related to Egypt to understand what's going on in Egypt. I also held some sessions in some universities talking about the situation in Egypt and what happened and happening there as everything happened was sudden so people wanted to understand whats going on". **(Role of Egyptians abroad)**

I knew about the revolution from a video published on social media plus as I worked as a journalist in Egypt, I knew about the revolution from my colleagues back in Egypt as revolution has started with educated people in Egypt. As a result, my colleagues have started to encourage people to protest and "my role was to encourage Egyptians to protest via social media" **(role of Egyptians in UK+ political participation + role of social media).**

The idea of Mubarak stepping down was not expected but the idea of how corrupted the Egyptian regime was and how the situation is difficult was common among Egyptians who revolted". **(The same idea as Alaswany mentioned)**

Q: why do you think the uprisings happened in 2011?

A: the movements in Egypt have started since the 1990s in Egypt and this has produced accumulation and raised awareness among Egyptians. Kefya and 6th of April movements have been founded so it took time to revolt. This is in my opinion normal especially with people who have never got involved in politics and were away from for a long time.

Q: If yes, what did motivate you to participate? If no why not?

1

Appendix 2.2: Transcript of Sherif (2nd generation) with colour coding



Sherif (2nd generation) 2/9/2014

think protesting is helping polarize the country and whats really important now is what we can do to Egypt"
" I have been to Bosnia and seen the killings because of the war and how people there are divided as Muslims and Christians and how they hate eachother. Once people are being killed, people wont forget that and will keep hating eachother so I think what happened in Egypt is the same and Egyptians will keep polarized and if we keep protesting this polarization will develop and will do nothing to Egypt".
"If I keep campaigning against military , this will not change anything and nothing will happen and no one is going to reposnd"

political participation

Q: then why have you participated in the Vodafone protest you talked about, has anything changed or any responses?
A: *"no not really nothing happened but its juts to show solidarity with people back in Egypt and show Egyptians in Egypt the picture from London". " even if I support Rabaa and sympathize with but ill not hate others who support Sessi and polarize the country more".*
"I also don't want to join protests which support Rabaa but ill not to divide and hate others".
"I support Rabaa by heart but not just going to the street as its useless and its reality so its pointless".

media role

Q: what do you think of media role in terms of social media and mainstream media?
A: *social media role was fine but the mainstream media was terrible as they create some much problems". Western media was fine and they were a bit biased but they were with people and biased in terms of supporting people".*
"All Social media was against Mubarak as social media is us and it was effective in terms of encouraging people to protest and go in the streets".
"we created events on Facebook to raise money supporting Egypt in the UK as its easier to send people via Facebook and gather people".

homeland belonging

Q: can you define homeland for you?
A: *its Egypt and although I was born here in the UK but I look Egyptian and my way of living is Egyptian and I am a foreigner here as British people always ask me where are from?"*
" the problem is that people who were born abroad don't feel they belong to here or there, it is an identity crisis but I don't think it's a problem as I am an Egyptian living in the UK as I feel Egyptian in everything , culture, food and religion and this what makes up human being".
" I respect British culture and people more than Egyptians as I think British culture are clever and efficient" I am lucky to have got two cultures as I can take the good things in both culture and leave the bad stuff in each culture". " you take the best of both cultures and reject the rubbish of both cultures".

Q: what about marriage?
A: *"oh this is a problem here as you know people from the same culture most probably will marry from the same culture and I think that's in all cultures, Pakistani, Egyptian and Arab culture and I think the best thing to do is to find someone who was born in the UK but originally from Egypt who shares the background like me". "marrying someone from Egypt is hard for different mentality.. I think it's a crisis that all people who were born abroad face and experience".*

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Appendix 3: Consent form

University of Bedfordshire

CONSENT FORM

Title of the Project: The Egyptian community in the UK and the 2011 Egyptian revolution
Name of researcher: Rua Al-sheikh

Position: PhD researcher

Contact address of Researcher: rua.alsheikh@study.beds.ac.uk

Please tick Box

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. ☐

2. I understand that my participation is voluntarily and I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reasons. ☐

3. I agree to take part in the above study. ☐

4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. ☐

5. I agree to the use my first name in quotations in the final report. ☐

Name of Participant	Date	Signature
_____	_____	_____
Name of Researcher	Date	Signature

Appendix 4: Information sheet

Information sheet

Name of researcher: Rua Al-sheikh
Student number: 1317405
Title of project: the Egyptian community in the U.K. and the 2011 Egyptian revolution.
Degree: MPhil/PhD project
Director of Studies: Prof. Noha Mellor

This project focuses on the participation of Egyptian community in the UK in the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The aim of the project is to examine the effects of 2011 Egyptian revolution on Egyptian diaspora in the UK in terms of political activities, relations with Egypt and the U.K. and media consumption. This project involves conducting interviews with Egyptians in the UK. The participation is voluntarily. Participants have the right to withdraw from the whole project at any stage without giving any reasons. The interviews will be audio recorded and interviewees have to give the permission to be recorded. The data will be confidential and kept in a password protected computer with a password protected folders. The data will only be viewed by the researcher and information will be used only for the academic purposes. Data will be destroyed after completion of the project. Participants have the right to request the transcript of their interview to review before publishing to make sure the information used is accurate.

For confidentiality purposes, each participant has the right to agree on using first name in the final report or not. For those disagreeing on using first names, the technique used will be using fake names. For those who agree on using their first names, first names are used without giving any further details such as contact details.

Every participant will be provided with a consent form to sign before the beginning of the interview to confirm his/her official participation. The interview will be conducted in public places.

In case any questions causing any discomfort or stress, the participant has the right not to answer and withdraw from the whole project. This can be avoided by asking unbiased and neutral questions away from personal opinion. In addition, questions asked in the interviews must not be leading to specific answers. The researcher should be neutral and unbiased in order to produce valid and unbiased results of the project.

Rua Alsheikh

Appendix 5: Checklists of Ethnographic work

Appendix 5.1: 'The 1st anniversary of Rabia incident'

Observation checklist

Name of event and date	The first anniversary in memory of Rabia incident where many Egyptians were killed by the Egyptian military and police back in August 2013. Date of event 16/8/2014
Timing	• Original time of event was 12 in the afternoon • Protesters were late not sharp 12
Location	• The Egyptian embassy in London
Number	50 I think
Peaceful or violent	• No aggression reported
Appearance	People were from mixed background, veiled non-veiled, men with beard and without.
Atmosphere	It was mainly peaceful
Type of banners	Against military rule
Type of cheers	• Protesters were talking in English to attract foreigners but then talked in Arabic • Down down military rule • Shame on you El-Sisi
Language of cheers	Arabic and English
Any problems	
Other comments	

Appendix 5.2: 'The 4th revolution anniversary'

Observation Checklist

Name of event and date	The fourth 25th revolution anniversary in London Date of event 25/1/2015
Timing	1pm but people had started gathering late
Location	The Egyptian embassy in London
Number	Almost 50 people, I am not sure
Peaceful or violent	It was a peaceful protest but the majority of protesters were holding Rabaa banners and reminding the world that Egyptians in the UK are against coup led by El-sisi.
Appearance	The majority of protesters were Muslim from their appearance wearing vie or niqab but there were unveiled women.
Atmosphere	The atmosphere was ok but I felt the majority supports the Muslim brotherhood by showing the hatred to El-sisi and his government and mentioning Rabia incident.
Type of banners	• Banners were mainly supporting Rabia, President Morsi, Muslim brotherhood's candidate by holding his pictures. • Against the coup. • Holding martyrs of 25th of Jan revolution
Type of cheers	President is back soon in shaa Allah (God willing), VIVA Rabia with holding the symbol of Rabia
Language of cheers	Arabic and English
Any problems	No reported incidents.
Other comments	• I didnt feel that this event is neutral, and majority of protesters were supporters of Muslim brotherhood (from their clothes and symbols against President El-Sisi and even if there were some who support El-Sisi or genuinely supporting the revolution won't be visible • I chose to attend this event to observe a neutral event gathering all Egyptians, but it sounds that even Egyptians in the UK are polarized

Appendix 5.3: 'Protest against El-Sisi's visit to London'

Observation checklist

Name of event and date	Solidarity with students and academics (Against El-Sisi's visit to London) Date of event 4/11/2015
Timing	5pm but the preparation for the protest started an hour before but people were not on time
Location	10 Downing street to oppose the official visit of President El-Sisi to London to meet prime minister David Cameron. Most of protests are held in front of Egyptian embassy, this is the first time to hold the protest in front of 10 Downing street
Number	There were almost 200 people
Peaceful or violent	It was a peaceful protest but there were some violent incidents such as attacking an Egyptian journalist, who came with President El-Sisi to support him and participated in the 5th of November protest to show support to El-Sisi. The police then arrested the guy who attacked the journalist.
Appearance	Majority of protesters were Muslim wearing headscarf, nikab and men with beards but there were foreigners, there was a father who looked Egyptian but his daughters looked English.
Atmosphere	The atmosphere was a bit tense as an outsider, I could not talk to many as I don't look like one of the group as I tried to be neutral but it was hard to do so as you cant predict what some might do if you disagree with some. As a researcher, it is important to be neutral and doesn't show personal points of view but as the protest was about opposing President El-Sisi, you can't find someone who might be neutral.
Type of banners	Banners were a bit bloody using strong language such as the butcher and killer
Type of cheers	Down, Down military rule
Language of cheers	Against the military and El-Sisi
Any problems	A woman pro-El-Sisi called the demonstrators against El-sisi, terrorists and the British police arrested her.

Other comments (Event flyer)	

Appendix 5.4: 'Protest pro El-Sisi's visit to London'

Observation checklist

Name of event and date	Protest to support the visit of President El-Sisi to London Date of event 5/11/2015
Timing	6pm
Location	10 Downing street to support the visit of President El-Sisi and to show groups who organized the protest yesterday opposing El-Sisi's visit that they support El-Sisi and Egypt. To show that El-Sisi has supporters in London.
Number	Almost 100 people, I am not sure
Peaceful or violent	It was a peaceful protest
Appearance	Majority of protesters were non- veiled women and bearded men or wearing Islamic wear.
Atmosphere	The atmosphere was ok but as the protest was pro-El-Sisi, You cant find someone neutral. Some protesters were afraid of clashes between them and those against El-Sisi as happened in other countries.
Type of banners	Banners were pro El-Sisi and military and supportive to the current Egyptian government under El-Sisi's rule.
Type of cheers	Pro the visit of El-Sisi Viva Egypt and El-Sisi,
Language of cheers	Arabic and English
Any problems	Fear of clashes with pro-Muslim brotherhood groups and those against President El-Sisi

Other comments	

Appendix 5.5 Notes on events postponed and cancelled

1. Freedom and dignity to our people back home organized by (25th of Jan. Egyptians in the UK group on Facebook)
    - 19/10/2014
    - 23/11/2014
    - 13/12/2014
    - 27/12/2014
    - 11/1/2015 then cancelled.
    - According to the admins organising the event, 'people are busy and not attending'
2. The current moment in Egypt اللحظة الراهنة في مصرby Zyad Elelaimy is one of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition after the rising of the 25th of Jan revolution and will be the speaker to talk about the CURRENT MOMENT IN EGYPT.

- Was first organised to be on April 2015 the postponed to:
    - September 2015
    - 26 November 2015
    - 20.12.2015
    - 20.2.2016
    - 3.3.2016
- The event is still to be confirmed.